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Abstract
How do financial reforms affect the allocation of production within an economy
and its long-run macroeconomic performance? How does the impact of financial
reforms interact with the effects of other policy reforms or the influence of an econ-
omy’s structural characteristics? These are the central themes of this thesis.
Chapter 2 examines how financial and trade reforms interact in determining
the allocation of production within a general equilibrium heterogeneous firm trade
model. While the two reforms have complementary effects on average productiv-
ity, the marginal benefits of trade liberalization for wages and household utility are
reduced if much reallocative work has been done through a well-functioning finan-
cial sector. Financial reforms can spill over internationally via trade channels and
greater usage of exports as collateral can enhance the benefits of trade reforms.
Chapter 3 analyzes how domestic and international financial reforms shift pro-
duction across firms and sectors. Using a modified macro credit multiplier model,
changes in credit constraints prompt reallocations in production as firms respond to
adjustments in sectoral relative prices and interest rates. Financial reforms generally
lead to higher relative investment by more productive firms and to increased aggre-
gate productivity. Intra-sectoral reallocations smooth out the steady state compara-
tive static effects of financial reforms. Structural features of an economy condition
the impact of financial reforms. Similarly, the impact of capital account liberaliza-
tion depends upon the state of domestic financial reforms.
Recent work has highlighted the potential for “threshold” levels of domestic
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institutional development above which the potential growth benefits of financial
openness offset the associated risks. Chapter 4 provides a wide-ranging empiri-
cal analysis of potential threshold conditions using parametric and semi-parametric
methods. It finds that there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as
financial depth and institutional quality and that the thresholds are lower for for-
eign direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities compared to those for debt
liabilities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How do financial reforms affect the allocation of production within an economy
and its long-run macroeconomic performance? How do the impacts of financial
reforms interact with the effects of reforms in other areas, such as in trade policy, or
with an economy’s structural characteristics? These are the central themes running
through the empirical and theoretical analysis in this thesis.
This introduction provides an overview of the issues analyzed in the following
three chapters and highlights the interlinkages, and differences, in their motivation
and approaches. The final chapter summarizes the main results of the thesis and
outlines the potential implications for future work.
The core themes of this thesis are motivated by the insights of the macro and
micro empirical literatures on the impact of financial reforms, both domestic and
international, on productivity and growth.1 The theoretical analysis of Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 concerns both the reallocative impacts of financial reforms and their
interaction with other reforms or institutional features. In particular, Chapter 2,
Trade and financial sector reforms: interactions and spillovers, asks how the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of domestic financial sector and trade reforms interact in
1See, for example, the surveys of Levine (2005), Henry (2007) and Kose et al. (2009), and the
analysis of the impacts of financial sector reforms on allocative efficiency in Wurgler (2000), Galindo
et al. (2007) and Abiad et al. (2008).
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influencing aggregate productivity, wages and utility. Chapter 3, Financial reforms
and the reallocation of production: looking across firms and sectors, switches at-
tention to how the interaction between domestic and international financial sector
reforms influences the allocation of production within an economy. Focusing on
the second theme, Chapter 4, Thresholds in the process of international financial
integration, turns to an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic relationship
between financial openness and growth and how it is affected by certain “thresh-
old”, or conditioning, variables or policies such as domestic financial depth and
institutional development.2 Figure 1.1 provides an overview and comparison of the
focus and type of analysis employed in the different Chapters, including the nature
of the financial reforms and the interaction variables which are examined.
In terms of the similarities across the theoretical models employed in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, both are modifications of workhorse models in the trade and macro
credit multiplier literatures, respectively, in which there are credit-constrained het-
erogeneous entrepreneurs who produce intermediate goods. In Chapter 2, this in-
volves the introduction of domestic credit constraints into a stripped-down version
of Melitz (2003) in which there is a continuum of entrepreneurial productivities.
Chapter 3 builds on the macro credit multiplier model of Kiyotaki (1998) which
features only high and low productivity entrepreneurs but, since the focus is also on
the impact of reforms on inter-sectoral reallocations, the model is extended to two
sectors.
In both these theoretical models the focus is on the general equilibrium impact
of financial reforms as modeled as a relaxation in credit constraints, i.e. firms can
borrow more against their future revenues. While this approach has the advantage of
simplicity, as it provides a clear link between borrowing and investment decisions
for producers, it is, of course, a relatively narrow dimension of financial reform.
2A shortened version of this Chapter was published as Kose et al. (2011) in the Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance, February, 2011.
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Figure 1.1: The themes and approaches of the different chapters
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For example, it does not capture a range of features of financial reform which have
been highlighted by the recent global financial crisis, such as the introduction of new
savings, borrowing or risk-sharing products or the implementation of improvements
in supervisory and regulatory structures and procedures.
Nevertheless, using a simple credit multiplier set-up allows a number of em-
pirically motivated modifications to be made in the models of Chapters 2 and 3 to
address their respective research questions. Drawing on the empirical literature on
the impact of financial frictions on trade, such as Manova (2006) at the sectoral level
and Greenaway et al. (2007) at the firm level, Chapter 2 allows the extent to which
a firm may borrow against export revenues to differ relative to that for domestic
revenues. This may reflect additional organizational or informational problems in
recovering export revenues or institutional features, such as requirements to repatri-
ate export revenues. Chapter 3 also allows for a variation in domestic credit multi-
plies but across intermediate goods sectors, as suggested by empirical evidence on
sectoral differences in financing obstacles. Furthermore, while Chapter 3 abstracts
from international trade it does allow for international borrowing. Following Aoki
et al. (2010), an additional international borrowing constraint is introduced whereby
foreign creditors can recover less than domestic creditors in the event of default by
the borrower. This differentiation can be thought to reflect greater informational
costs or legal restrictions for foreign creditors.
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 continues with the theme of the macro inter-
actions between the impacts of financial reforms and other policy variables. It builds
on the framework proposed in a survey by Kose et al. (2009) that highlights not only
the potential indirect benefits of financial integration for growth, for example, via
incentives for greater macroeconomic policy discipline or domestic financial mar-
ket development, but also the scope for certain “threshold” levels of financial and
institutional development below which an economy is unlikely to gain the full in-
direct benefits of international financial integration and to reduce the risks. Indeed,
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the global financial crisis has added further fuel to the debate about the merits of
financial globalization and the potential trade-offs between its benefits and risks to
growth, especially for developing countries. Using panel data for 84 countries over
the period 1975-2004, this Chapter provides an in-depth investigation into such po-
tential threshold effects using a range of empirical approaches, both parametric and
semi-parametric. Employing a common empirical approach, the analysis exam-
ines a host of measures of financial openness, including different types of capital
flow, and also looks across a range of potential threshold variables, from domes-
tic financial development through to trade openness and institutional quality. Such
cross-country growth regressions have well-known limitations, for example, due to
omitted variables and sensitivity to outliers. However, as a first step, they can still
be useful in helping to further understanding and to provide useful policy messages
related to the potential for threshold conditions in the relationship between financial
integration and growth.
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Chapter 2
Trade and financial sector reforms:
interactions and spillovers
2.1 Introduction
The efficient allocation of production across firms matters for aggregate total
factor productivity (TFP). Distortions which shift resources from more to less pro-
ductive firms can have a sizeable impact on TFP and hence on average output per
worker and welfare. For example, it is estimated that removing such resource mis-
allocations could increase TFP in China by 25-40% and in India by 50-60% (Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009).1 Improvements of such magnitudes are equivalent to substan-
tial reductions in the relative productivity gaps compared to the US, moving relative
TFP in both countries from around 40% to 60% of the US level (based on the 2004
aggregate TFP estimates of Jorgenson and Vu, 2007). Many of the wide-ranging
structural reforms across developing and transition economies in recent decades
have been focused on reducing distortions to the allocation of production. Although
1These estimates are derived from a movement to ‘US efficiency’ based on the distribution of
marginal products of capital for plants within sectors. In turn, in a model calibrated to US data,
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) find similar order aggregate TFP effects of distortions to prices
faced by individual plants.
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reforms to trade and domestic financial sectors are often both key elements of such
policy packages, the respective related empirical and theoretical literatures have
generally abstracted from the potentially important reallocative effects of contem-
poraneous reforms in the other sector. Thus, a fundamental policy question of how
reforms interact in terms of their impact on aggregate productivity, wages and wel-
fare cannot be addressed.
The objective of this Chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to analyze
this issue through adding financial constraints to a two-country (non-symmetric)
heterogeneous firm trade model. In order to do so I add a number of novel, em-
pirically relevant, features to a baseline heterogeneous firm trade model adapted
from Melitz (2003). The first is to consider intermediate production as owned and
operated by heterogeneous entrepreneurs whose borrowing is subject to credit con-
straints due to agency problems. The second is to allow these agency problems to
vary with the composition of the entrepreneur’s production between domestic out-
put and exports. This introduces a two-way linkage between a firm’s export decision
and its financial constraints as suggested by firm-level survey data. I then examine
the steady state general equilibrium interactions of the reallocative impacts of trade
and domestic financial sector reforms (considered as reductions in variable trade
costs and relaxations in credit constraints respectively).
The interaction effects between trade reforms and domestic financial sector re-
forms appear qualitatively important. On the one hand, trade and domestic financial
sector reforms can have complementary effects in increasing the average productiv-
ity and size of producing entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs face less restrictive credit
constraints as a result of financial sector reforms then investment can increase more
in response to a lowering of variable export costs. With fixed factor supplies, a
greater reallocation from low to high productivity entrepreneurs is thus required in
order to maintain factor market equilibrium. As a result, the positive effects of trade
liberalization on average productivity and producer size are enhanced if domestic
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financial sector reforms are more advanced. On the other hand, in such a case the
marginal gains for wages and household utility as a result of trade liberalization are
reduced. If credit constraints are less restrictive then effective borrowing costs are
lower, intermediate prices are reduced and real wages are higher. Thus, the marginal
benefits of trade liberalization in lowering prices and increasing real wages are re-
duced if much reallocative work has already been done through a well-functioning
domestic financial sector. In terms of the potential linkage between exports and
credit constraints, improvements in the relative ability to pledge exports to creditors
amplify the benefits of trade liberalization. A further insight of the Chapter is that
even in financial autarky the financial development of not just the domestic econ-
omy but also its trading partner can play a role in determining the real wages and the
efficiency of domestic production. In particular, domestic financial sector reforms
in one economy can be exported via the trade channel putting downward pressure
on foreign real wages.
The value added of the approach adopted below is to provide a framework which
allows analysis of the macroeconomic implications of reforms in one area, for ex-
ample the domestic financial sector, conditional on other policy variables, for ex-
ample the degree of access to international goods markets. Using this modeling ap-
proach to assess whether the interactions between these different reform measures
have quantitatively important empirical effects is an important next step. In the
rest of the Chapter, Section 2.2 first discusses the motivation and related literature.
Section 2.3 then provides an overview of the modeling approach focusing on the
credit constraints that entrepreneurs face. Section 2.4 provides details of the model
with Section 2.5 analyzing the steady state in trade and financial autarky to empha-
size the key mechanisms in the model. Section 2.6 then opens up the economies to
international goods trade. Section 2.7 concludes including a discussion of further
research and empirical implications.
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2.2 Motivation and related literature
2.2.1 Motivation
The modeling approach which I adopt is driven by two main features: first, the
importance of addressing firm heterogeneity in any analysis of trade and domestic
financial sector reforms and, second, the importance of analyzing the interactions
of these two types of reforms. As surveyed in, for example, Bernard et al. (2007a),
recent heterogeneous firm models of international trade are motivated by the ob-
servation that exporters tend to differ from non-exporters in important ways, for
example being larger and more productive. Surveys indicate that only a limited
subset of plants export, for example around 20% in the 1991 US Census of Manu-
factures (Bernard et al., 2003). There is also empirical support for the self-selection
of higher productivity firms into exporting rather than a causality running from ex-
porting to higher productivity, eg Clerides et al. (1998). At the same time, financial
constraints vary across firms and recent firm-level data suggests that the degree of
financial constraints faced by firms depends on their export status. For example,
using Spanish data Campa and Shaver (2002) find exporters to be less liquidity con-
strained whilst for UK data Greenaway et al. (2007) show that being an exporter
improves a firm’s liquidity and lowers its leverage.2 This linkage from export status
to a firm’s financial constraints is in addition to the growing empirical evidence on
the effects of financial constraints on export levels and patterns.3 Indeed, the analy-
sis of Greenaway et al. (2007) suggests that the stronger financial health of exporters
can be seen as ‘an outcome rather than a determinant of entry’ into exporting.
The importance of analyzing the interaction of trade and domestic financial sec-
tor reforms can be illustrated by observed patterns of policy indicators or by the joint
2Also, using World Bank survey data from developing and emerging economies Beck et al.
(2006b) find that the problem of bank corruption as a constraint to finance is less of a problem
for exporters.
3See, for example, the sector-level analysis in Manova (2006).
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presence of both reforms in many of the policy packages implemented by develop-
ing and emerging economies.4 As an example of the association between the two
reforms, Figure 2.1 plots five-year averages for the trade and banking sector tran-
sition indicators for Central and Eastern European countries compiled by the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).5 As expected, the levels
of the two policy indicators are positively associated - the second panel highlights
the often contemporaneous progress on both trade and financial sector reforms.6 In
addition, reforms in one sector can take place at a range of initial values for policies
in the other sector. Indeed, based on a new IMF dataset of de jure reform indicators
covering a wider sample of 91 countries over the period 1973-2005, Hauner and
Prati (2008) find that trade reforms tend to lead domestic financial reforms. Thus,
analysis of trade reforms assuming perfect credit markets would appear to be often
inappropriate. Whilst summary indicators of policy stance are clearly not perfect,
for example due to the lack of information on enforcement or their aggregate nature,
the above patterns serve to highlight the empirical importance of analyzing the po-
tential trade-offs and complementarities in the effects of trade and financial sector
reforms. Such analysis can provide insights into the appropriate design of reform
packages in individual countries and can also shed light on the political economy
implications of different combinations of reforms.
4See, for example, the chronology provided by Henry (2000) of reforms across 12 major emerg-
ing markets in the 1980s and early 1990s or the analysis of IMF programme conditionalities provided
in IMF (2001).
5The transition indicators represent an assessment of a country’s policies and institutions in each
area against specific criteria with scores assigned from 1 to 4.33 such that higher values indicate
improvements in the policy areas towards the levels in advanced economies. Appendix 2.A provides
further details on the transition indicators and the sample coverage.
6As shown in Appendix Figure 2.12, similar associations are present when controlling for country
and period fixed effects.
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Figure 2.1: EBRD transition indicators, 5 year averages: levels and changes
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(b) Change compared to previous period
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Note: Values of the transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 with higher values representing standards moving towards
those of advanced industrial economies. Averages taken over 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2007 (four year
average). Lines represent lowess smoother (locally weighted regression) with 95% confidence intervals.
2.2.2 Related literature
This work is related to three main strands of literature. The first concerns the
reallocative effects of trade reforms in the presence of heterogeneous productivity
firms as analyzed in a growing theoretical literature (see, for example, the theo-
retical models of Melitz, 2003; Baldwin and Forslid, 2006). In such models trade
liberalization increases investment and the demand for labor. With a fixed labor sup-
ply this leads to a rise in the minimum productivity of producers, shifts production
towards higher productivity firms and results in an increase in average productivity.
This reallocative process is supported in empirical studies such as Bernard et al.
(2006) in relation to the US, Pavcnik (2002) for Chile and Fernandes (2007) for
Colombia.
The second strand of related literature concerns the reallocative effects of finan-
cial sector reforms. Theoretical models, such as Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005)
and Caselli and Gennaioli (2006), illustrate how domestic financial development
(for example, contract enforcement or investor protection) can promote aggregate
productivity through reallocating resources to more productive firms.7 From an
7Also, in the context of international financial sector reforms, Aoki et al. (2010) emphasize that
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empirical perspective the beneficial impacts of financial sector reforms on alloca-
tive efficiency are supported in studies such as Wurgler (2000), Galindo et al. (2007)
and Abiad et al. (2008). For example, the latter paper finds domestic financial sector
liberalization to be associated with an improvement in the efficiency of the alloca-
tion of production (indicated by a fall in the dispersion of Tobin’s q) in a sample of
emerging economies.8
The third strand of related literature concerns the impact of financial frictions on
trade. This work builds on the analysis of Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) which pro-
vides one of the earliest theoretical papers to emphasize the impact of financial in-
stitutions on patterns of comparative advantage. Subsequent empirical papers, most
recently using sector-level data, such as Beck (2003), Hur et al. (2006) and Manova
(2006), support the view that financial frictions are an important determinant of
trade flows. As the trade literature has moved towards heterogeneous firm models
such as Melitz (2003) so a number of recent papers have used such frameworks
to analyze the role of financial frictions in determining export patterns, for exam-
ple Chaney (2005), Manova (2006) and Suwantaradon (2008).9 Chor et al. (2008)
extend this approach to consider how financial frictions in host economies affect ex-
porting and foreign direct investment patterns within a three-country model. Whilst
based on a similar broad modeling framework, this paper differs from these related
papers in a number of important features. First, the focus here is on the general
equilibrium macroeconomic effects of the interaction of trade and financial reforms
rather than solely the role of financial frictions in determining selection decisions
into exporting or foreign direct investment.10 Second, in line with the empirical evi-
the impact of capital account liberalization in shifting production across high and low productivity
entrepreneurs is dependent on the development of the domestic financial sector.
8Abiad et al. (2008) also find that trade openness improves the allocation of production across
firms but the issue of the interaction of the two reforms is not addressed.
9Suwantaradon (2008) highlights how financial frictions lead to selection into exporting and
production based on both a firm’s net worth and productivity, compared to solely productivity in the
standard Melitz set-up.
10Related work by Hsu (2006) also examines the productivity effects of trade liberalization in
the presence of financial frictions but with symmetric economies and within a different modeling
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dence, I allow for two-way interactions between exporting and financial constraints
(i.e. exporting decisions play a role in the credit constraints which in turn influences
the decision whether to export). Third, I solve for a non-symmetric rather than sym-
metric equilibrium to allow for the more realistic and policy-relevant case where the
level of financial development and trade costs may vary across countries.11
2.3 Overview of modeling approach
There are two economies in the model, home and foreign, who may trade in-
termediate goods. The primary feature of the model is the set of heterogenous
entrepreneurs in each economy which produce, with varying productivity, interme-
diate goods using labor inputs.12 As in the standard set-up of Melitz (2003), de-
pending on her productivity an entrepreneur may choose to produce output for the
domestic market or to pay additional costs to access also export markets. However,
as the entrepreneur’s investment is subject to financial constraints, her production
decisions link domestic financial conditions and international trade.
In order to capture the effects of financial frictions on the productive sector I
consider intermediate producers as entrepreneurs who maximize their own utility
and operate and own their own projects. For simplicity, as in Chaney (2008), I
abstract from entry and exit decisions which can be analyzed within the standard
Melitz model through the assumption of perfect competition in the productive sector
and a fixed cost of entry. Agency problems, such as inalienability of human capital
or ex post moral hazard etc., limit a firm’s access to finance. The extent of these
borrowing constraints may differ with a creditor’s nationality. This may be due to
framework based on the transfer of ownership across dynasties.
11The three-economy model of Chor et al. (2008) also solves for a non-symmetric equilibrium
where two countries in the North are identical whilst the South country is subject to financial fric-
tions. However, in this model Southern producers are restricted to domestic output only and financial
frictions only affect fixed costs of production.
12It is straightforward to extend the approach to encompass capital or other factor inputs but for
simplicity I focus on the labor input case.
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different legal systems or different informational and transaction costs. The degree
of borrowing constraints may also vary with the type of pledgeable output, namely
output for domestic or export markets. This might reflect the differential ability
of lenders to recover export output or to monitor exporting activities relative to
domestic output or activities respectively.
Agents in each country can access domestic credit markets consisting of one-
period risk-free debt contracts (with the underlying contracting problem assumed to
yield zero default in equilibrium). Borrowing of one unit of the home consumption
good from home creditors at time t requires a gross repayment of Rt+1 units of the
time t + 1 home consumption good. Similarly, borrowing a unit of time t foreign
consumption from foreign creditors requires a gross repayment of R∗,t+1 of the time
t+1 foreign consumption good. I now turn to the form of the borrowing constraints.
2.3.1 Domestic borrowing constraint
Domestic creditors face costs relative to the entrepreneur in recovering output
which has been pledged to them. This may be due to the inalienability of human
capital as emphasized in Hart and Moore (1994) or could reflect costs (in terms of
output) of recovery when there is ex post moral hazard such as in Aghion et al.
(1999) or costs of expropriation in the case of ex ante moral hazard. As in, for
example, Kiyotaki (1998) and Aoki et al. (2010), these financial frictions restrict
an entrepreneur’s borrowing so that debt repayments do not exceed the value to the
creditor of pledged output.13 Creditor recovery costs may differ with the creditor’s
nationality and the type of pledged receivables:
Assumption 1 Creditors in the home economy can recover a fraction 0 < θ ≤ 1
13Extending the model to add tangible assets, for example, capital or land, to the production
function would provide an additional form of collateral that could be pledged to creditors. The
creditor’s recovery rates on these assets would then affect the optimal ratio of factor inputs. However,
if creditors were unable to recover pledged output and could only recover pledged capital or land then
financial constraints would only affect relative export to domestic prices if domestic and exporting
activities had different production functions.
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of the domestic intermediate output which has been pledged to them by a home
entrepreneur. The corresponding fraction for domestic intermediate output pledged
by foreign entrepreneurs to foreign creditors is 0 < θ∗ ≤ 1.
The differential ability of home and foreign lenders to recover domestic outputs
pledged by entrepreneurs in their respective economies can be thought to represent
both the legal or judicial features of the economy and efficiency of the respective
financial systems.
Assumption 2 The recovery rate on export output pledged to a domestic creditor
is a fraction μ times the recovery rate on domestic output in home and μ∗ in foreign
with μθ ≤ 1 and μ∗θ∗ ≤ 1.
Assumption 2 is motivated by the firm-level empirical evidence from emerging
and developing economies of the linkage between exporting and credit constraints.14
On the one hand any additional organizational or informational problems in recover-
ing exports may reduce the relative ability of a creditor to recover exports compared
to domestic output. On the other hand, certain institutional features, such as require-
ments to repatriate export revenues, could work in the opposite direction increasing
the relative recovery rate on exports. Thus I allow μ to take values greater than or
less than one subject to the restriction that the export recovery rate θμ is bounded in
the unit interval (and similarly for θ∗μ∗).
The creditor will only lend an amount such that gross repayments are less than
or equal to the recovery value of output pledged to them. Thus the domestic credit
constraint for a home entrepreneur indexed by ϕ can be expressed as:
Rt+1bt+1 (ϕ) ≤ revd,t+1(θyd,t+1 (ϕ)) + revx,t+1(μθyx,t+1 (ϕ)) (2.1)
14The requirement to pay the additional fixed exporting cost could also, in a situation of hidden
information over entrepreneurial productivity, act as a signalling device of higher productivity which
could facilitate lending.
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where Rt+1bt+1 (ϕ) are gross repayments made by the entrepreneur in time
t + 1 domestic consumption goods for borrowing bt+1 (ϕ) at time t. The cred-
itor can recover a fraction θ of next period’s domestic output by the entrepreneur
yd,t+1 (ϕ) . This provides revenues of revd,t+1(θyd,t+1 (ϕ)) in units of the home con-
sumption good. Similarly revx,t+1(μθyx,t+1 (ϕ)) represents the maximum value to
the creditor, in units of the home consumption good, of the pledged export output
yx,t+1 (ϕ).
15 Thus exporting increases the potential pledgeable output to a creditor
but, as detailed below, requires additional investment. In this set-up all investment
is subject to the borrowing constraint. In contrast, in Chaney (2005) and Manova
(2006) borrowing constraints only affect the financing of exporting costs. However,
domestic production costs may also be subject to constraints and, due to the fungi-
bility of funds, applying different constraints to the two types of costs may not be
appropriate.16
2.4 Model
Each economy is populated by two sets of infinitely-lived agents, households
and entrepreneurs, of mass L and M respectively (L∗ and M∗ in foreign).17 Both
sets of agents maximize expected utility over a final consumption good which is
produced using intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are themselves pro-
duced by entrepreneurs using entrepreneurial and household labor inputs (with en-
trepreneurs not restricted to working on only their own projects). As mentioned
above, agents are able to access domestic credit markets only. In the subsections
below I first introduce the final goods and household sectors which provide the con-
15The subscripts d and x will be used throughout to denote domestic and exporting variables
respectively.
16In Antra`s and Caballero (2009) financial frictions (which apply in one sector) also apply to all
production costs although the nature of revenues does not affect the credit constraint (which in their
case limits total investment to a fraction of capital).
17Foreign variables are denoted throughout by ∗.
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text for the subsequent analysis of entrepreneurs’ optimal decisions.
2.4.1 Final goods sector
The non-traded final consumption good in each country is produced using a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) combination of domestic and imported inter-
mediate goods which are produced by home and foreign entrepreneurs respectively.
For example, home final good production, Yt , is given by:
Yt =
[ ∫
ω∈Ωd,t
yd,t(ω)
σ−1
σ
dω +
∫
ω∈Ω∗x,t
y∗x,t(ω)
σ−1
σ
dω
]σ/(σ−1)
(2.2)
where yd,t(ω) is the home final goods sector demand for an intermediate vari-
ety ω produced by a home entrepreneur; y∗x,t(ω) is the demand from the home final
goods sector for a variety ω produced by a foreign entrepreneur and exported to
home; Ωd,t denotes the set of available domestically produced intermediate goods
in home at time t; and, Ω∗x,t is the set of available intermediate goods in home which
were produced by foreign entrepreneurs and exported to home. The elasticity of
substitution in production between different intermediate good varieties is σ > 1.
For simplicity I assume that the elasticity of substitution between individual inter-
mediates does not vary between foreign or home intermediates.18 A corresponding
expression holds in the foreign economy with common substitution elasticities in
both countries. Due to selection effects into exporting, the set of home-produced
inputs available in home, Ωd,t, may differ from the set of home-produced interme-
diate inputs available in foreign, Ωx,t (and similarly for the set of foreign produced
intermediate inputs available in foreign and home, Ω∗d,t and Ω∗x,t respectively).
The final goods technology is open to all agents and takes place under perfect
18Relaxing this assumption does not change the results substantively if the elasticity between
home and foreign produced intermediates is above unity and less than the elasticity between varieties
from the same country. Similarly, I abstract from any bias in final goods production towards home-
produced intermediates.
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competition. Intermediate goods are purchased to maximize profits given the final
consumption good price (Pt at home and P ∗t in foreign) and the prices of individual
intermediate goods. Profit maximization yields the standard domestic and export
demand schedules for each intermediate good ω produced in home:
Domestic demand: yd,t(ω) =
(
pd,t(ω)
Pt
)−σ
Yt (2.3)
Export demand: yx,t(ω) =
(
px,t(ω)
P ∗t
)−σ
Y ∗t (2.4)
where pd,t(ω) is the domestic price of variety ω produced by the home en-
trepreneur with px,t(ω) the price charged for that variety when exported to the for-
eign country. With zero profits earned on final goods production, the aggregate
price indices in home and foreign are given respectively by:
Pt =
[ ∫
ω∈Ωd,t
pd,t(ω)
1−σ
dω +
∫
ω∈Ω∗x,t
p∗x,t(ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
(2.5)
P ∗t =
[ ∫
ω∈Ω∗d,t
p∗d,t(ω)
1−σ
dω +
∫
ω∈Ωx,t
px,t(ω)
1−σ
dω
] 1
1−σ
With no money in the model the real exchange rate is equal to the ratio of ag-
gregate prices indices in the foreign and home country, RERt = P ∗t /Pt.
2.4.2 Household sector
The representative household in each economy gains utility from consumption
of the non-traded final consumption good. In each economy the household labor
endowment (L in home and L∗ in foreign) is supplied inelastically in the domes-
tic economy and receives a per unit household real wage in terms of the respective
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country consumption good (w lt in home and wl∗t in foreign). Domestic borrowing
by the household (denoted by blt+1 for the home household ) is chosen to maximize
expected utility given wage income and debt repayments. Household sector borrow-
ing is assumed to be unconstrained. Whilst this is clearly an abstraction it greatly
simplifies the analysis since the steady state interest rates are then determined from
the household euler equation.
The preferences of the home household are given by:
U lt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t ln
(
clt
) (2.6)
where β is the household discount rate (common to home and foreign house-
holds) and clt is the household’s consumption of the home final good at time t.
Consumption and gross debt repayments (Rtblt in units of home consumption good)
are funded from wage income and new borrowings giving the household sector flow
of funds as:
clt +Rtb
l
t = w
l
tL+ b
l
t+1 (2.7)
The first order conditions with respect to domestic borrowing give standard un-
constrained Euler equations (with corresponding equations for the foreign house-
hold). With log utility the household consumes a fraction (1− β) of wealth in each
period (i.e. the return on last period savings plus the discounted present value of
future wage income).
2.4.3 Entrepreneurial sector
Similar to households, entrepreneurs maximize expected utility over consump-
tion and supply one unit of entrepreneurial labor in each period for which they
receive an entrepreneurial real wage (wet in home and we∗t in foreign). An en-
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trepreneur’s labor can be supplied to any producer, i.e. it is not restricted to use
in the operation of the entrepreneur’s own production project.19 However, a num-
ber of crucial characteristics distinguish entrepreneurs from households. First, they
have access to an investment project by which they can produce intermediate goods
for domestic and export markets. Second, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in the
productivity with which they produce intermediate goods indexed by ϕ. The pro-
ductivity distribution is invariant, with cumulative distribution function G(ϕ) and
density function g (ϕ). Third, as discussed in Section 2.3, entrepreneurs face credit
constraints which are affected by their choice over investment projects. Finally,
entrepreneurs are more impatient than households.
2.4.3.1 Investment projects
In each period the entrepreneur can choose to invest in a variety of projects.
First, the entrepreneur may choose not to produce and simply save through do-
mestic savings yielding a gross rate of return of Rt. Second the entrepreneur can
invest in the production of intermediate goods for the domestic market. Third, the
entrepreneur may choose to invest in production for both the domestic and export
markets (given the cost structure detailed below an entrepreneur will never produce
for export markets only).
Similar to the multiple factor version of Melitz (2003) developed in Bernard
et al. (2007b), intermediate goods production by home entrepreneurs requires a
composite labor input of entrepreneurial and household labor which incorporates
both a per period fixed cost, f , and a variable cost equal to 1/ϕ per unit of next
period output. There is a one period lag in production with next period’s output
requiring composite labor input today, lt (ϕ):
19Entrepreneurial labor income is required so that those entrepreneurs who do not produce in the
steady state and are constrained to zero borrowing have positive consumption levels.
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lt (ϕ) =
yd,t+1 (ϕ)
ϕ
+ f (2.8)
where yd,t+1 (ϕ) is next period’s production. The composite labor input is a con-
stant returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas aggregate over household and entrepreneurial
labor inputs, llt (ϕ) and let (ϕ) respectively:
lt (ϕ) = l
l
t (ϕ)
ζ let (ϕ)
1−ζ (2.9)
where 0 < ζ < 1. Cost minimization gives a composite wage wt which represents
the cost per unit of composite labor input, wt =
(
wlt/ζ
)ζ
(wet/ (1− ζ))1−ζ .
Producers of the final consumption good value a variety of intermediate inputs
and so, given the fixed cost, each entrepreneur produces a differentiated interme-
diate good under monopolistic competition. If the entrepreneur wishes to export
she must pay an additional fixed composite labor cost of fx per period. Exporting
also incurs a variable iceberg transportation cost τ > 1 per unit exported. Since
the fixed cost of production f is incurred whether or not the firm produces for the
domestic market then the firm will always be better off producing for both the do-
mestic and export markets than for the export market alone. In the former case an
entrepreneur’s total composite labor demand is given by:
lt (ϕ) =
yd,t+1 (ϕ)
ϕ
+
τyx,t+1 (ϕ)
ϕ
+ f + fx (2.10)
2.4.3.2 Entrepreneurial equity investment
The entrepreneur’s cost of composite labor investment in production projects,
wtlt (ϕ), is financed by borrowings, i.e. external funds, of bt+1 (ϕ), and own equity
investment, ie internal funds. At time t, the entrepreneur’s equity investment is
equal to her net worth entering the period, at (ϕ), plus the entrepreneurial wage
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received minus her consumption expenditure ct (ϕ). Thus the entrepreneur’s flow
of funds is:
at (ϕ)− ct (ϕ) + wet + bt+1 (ϕ) = wtlt (ϕ) (2.11)
An entrepreneur’s net worth entering time t + 1, at+1 (ϕ), is composed of the
gross returns on the equity investment made in the previous period, at (ϕ)−ct (ϕ)+
wet . I define the gross rate of return on this investment realized at time t+1 in units
of home consumption good as Ft+1 (ϕ). Thus the transition of net worth is given
by:
at+1 (ϕ) = Ft+1 (ϕ) (at (ϕ)− ct (ϕ) + wet ) (2.12)
The gross return varies with the entrepreneur’s investment choice. Consider the
case where the entrepreneur chooses to produce for domestic and export markets.
In this case, the gross return represents total real revenues from production minus
gross debt repayments:
at+1 (ϕ) = yd,t+1 (ϕ) pd,t+1 (ϕ) + yx,t+1 (ϕ) px,t+1 (ϕ) (2.13)
−Rt+1bt+1 (ϕ)
where the relative domestic and export prices compared with the aggregate price
level in the producer’s country of residence are given by pd,t (ϕ) = pd,t (ϕ) /Pt and
px,t (ϕ) = px,t (ϕ) /Pt respectively.
Given the flow of funds and the transition of net worth, the entrepreneur must
choose how to allocate her net worth state variable at between consumption ct (ϕ)
and equity investment to maximize discounted utility:
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ut (ϕ) =
∞∑
s=t
δs−t ln (ct (ϕ)) (2.14)
The entrepreneurial discount rate, δ, is assumed common across countries with
entrepreneurs assumed to be more impatient than households ie δ <β where β is
the household discount rate.20 The first order condition with respect to borrowing
is:
1
ct (ϕ)
=
(
δFt+1 (ϕ)
ct+1 (ϕ)
)
(2.15)
Combined with the net worth transition equation this yields the standard re-
sults with log utility that current consumption is a fixed fraction (1− δ) of current
wealth (defined as net worth plus the value of future entrepreneurial labor income
discounted by gross project returns). Using the Euler equation (Equation 2.15) and
net worth transition (Equation 2.12), the entrepreneur’s utility maximizing invest-
ment project choice is that with the highest return Ft+1 (ϕ).
2.4.3.3 Optimal investment project choice
The returns from the different investment projects are derived from the en-
trepreneur’s optimal choices over borrowing levels and production levels. This
maximization is subject to the flow of funds (Equation 2.11), the net worth transi-
tion (Equation 2.12) and definition of the gross equity investment return (Equation
2.13), domestic borrowing constraints (Equation 2.1), the demand from domestic
and overseas final goods producers (Equations 2.3 and 2.4 respectively).
For the home entrepreneur, the first order condition with respect to domestic
borrowing bt+1 (ϕ) is :
20A lower effective discount factor for entrepreneurs can equivalently be rationalized by assuming
a death probability π such that δ = πβ and that a new generation of entrepreneurs are born each
period such that the total population of entrepreneurs remains constant. The assumption of a lower
discount rate for entrepreneurs is widely adopted in the related literature on financial constraints to
ensure that the entrepreneur can never fully self-finance her investment.
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1/ct (ϕ) =
(
δ/ct+1 (ϕ) + λ
1
t (ϕ)
)
Rt+1 (2.16)
where λ1t (ϕ) is the multiplier on the domestic borrowing constraint (with cor-
responding complementary slackness condition holding).
The first order conditions with respect to domestic production, yd,t+1 (ϕ), and
export production, yx,t+1 (ϕ), give the following relative pricing conditions:21
pd,t+1 (ϕ) =
wtσ
ϕ (σ − 1)
1/ct (ϕ)
δ/ct+1 (ϕ) + θ
σ−1
σ λ1t (ϕ)
(2.17)
px,t+1 (ϕ)
pd,t+1 (ϕ)
= τ
δ/ct+1 (ϕ) + θ
σ−1
σ λ1t (ϕ)
δ/ct+1 (ϕ) + (θμ)
σ−1
σ
λ1t (ϕ)
(2.18)
How do prices differ from the case with no credit constraints? First, credit con-
straints introduce an additional pricing wedge vt+1 (ϕ) > 1 over the standard uncon-
strained marginal cost plus fixed mark-up pricing rule. For example, for domestic
production, the unconstrained relative price of a home entrepreneur pd,t+1 (ϕ) =
wtRt+1σ
ϕ(σ−1) . The additional wedge added to domestic prices due to credit constraints is
increasing in the cost of finance and the extent to which the constraint binds and is
decreasing with the credit multiplier:
vt+1 (ϕ) =
(
1− Rt+1
(
1− θ σ−1σ
)
ct (ϕ)λ
1
t (ϕ)
)−1 (2.19)
A similar additional pricing wedge applies to export prices whose value also de-
21In the absence of aggregate uncertainty and given the CES demand functions which the en-
trepreneur faces, the choice of investment in the intermediate output project is equivalent to a deci-
sion on relative prices.
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pends on the relative recovery rate on export output μ.
Second, compared to the case without credit constraints, export prices differ
from domestic prices due not only to the variable trade costs but also the differences
in their respective pricing wedges. In turn these pricing wedges depend on the
different treatment of export revenues to domestic revenues by creditors.22
Given the above optimal decisions of the entrepreneur it is possible to define the
different possible values of the gross return Ft+1 (ϕ) associated with the different
investment options. Comparison of these returns yields the optimal entrepreneurial
choice between no production (yielding return F 1t+1 (ϕ) = Rt+1); domestic only
production (yielding return F 2t+1 (ϕ)), and; domestic and export production (yield-
ing return F 3t+1 (ϕ)). Let the set of entrepreneurs in home and foreign be denoted
Ω and Ω∗ respectively. The set of home entrepreneurs who produce goods for do-
mestic final goods producers, Ωd,t+1 (where Ωd,t+1 ⊆ Ω), are the subset for whom
F 2t+1 (ϕ) ≥ F 1t+1 (ϕ) and the set who also export to foreign final goods producers,
Ωx,t+1 (where Ωx,t+1 ⊆ Ωd,t+1), are those for whom F 3t+1 (ϕ) ≥ F 2t+1 (ϕ) > Rt+1.
The investment decisions of foreign entrepreneurs can be characterized in a similar
manner.
2.4.4 Aggregate conditions
In equilibrium, in each period market clearing conditions must hold in both
economies for domestic entrepreneurial and household labor markets, credit mar-
kets, intermediate and final consumption goods markets. Funds market clearing im-
plies that total borrowings within each economy are equal to zero (Bt+1 = B∗∗,t+1 =
0). For each intermediate good, total demand from final goods producers must equal
entrepreneurial production. Final goods consumption also must equal final goods
22Interestingly, if export revenues confer a particularly strong financing advantage relative to do-
mestic revenues, i.e. if μ is relatively high, then it could be the case that “dumping” occurs, i.e.
export prices are below domestic prices, despite the presence of iceberg trade costs.
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output in each country, ie Ct = Yt and C∗t = Y ∗t and the value of final goods output
equals the value of inputs (by the zero profit condition for final goods producers).
In addition to these market clearing conditions, the home and foreign aggregate
pricing equations (Equation 2.5) must be satisfied. Finally, to close the model the
balance of payments must be in equilibrium, i.e. with financial autarky net exports
must equal zero:
NXt ≡
∫
Ωx,t
px,t (ϕ) yx,t (ϕ) dϕ−RERt
∫
Ω∗x,t
p∗x,t (ϕ) y
∗
x,t (ϕ) dϕ = 0 (2.20)
2.4.5 Equilibrium definition
To summarize, given household and entrepreneurial debt repayments and pro-
duction levels entering period t, an equilibrium is defined by a path of aggregate
relative prices {RERt, wt,w∗t , Rt+1, R∗,t+1}, aggregate quantities {Yt, Y ∗t , Ct, C∗t ,
Bt+1, B
∗
∗,t+1}, individual entrepreneurial investment choices as reflected in inter-
mediate goods relative prices {pd,t+1 (ϕ), px,t+1 (ϕ), p∗d,t+1 (ϕ), p∗x,t+1 (ϕ)}, en-
trepreneurial credit constraint multipliers {λ1t (ϕ), λ∗1t (ϕ) }, final goods producer
intermediate input demands {yd,t(ϕ), yx,t(ϕ),y∗d,t(ϕ) ,y∗x,t(ϕ)}, household and en-
trepreneurial consumption levels {clt, ct (ϕ), c∗lt , c∗t (ϕ)} and borrowing by home
and foreign households and entrepreneurs {blt+1, bt+1 (ϕ), bl∗∗,t+1, b∗∗,t+1 (ϕ) } which
are consistent with the optimal choices of households, entrepreneurs and final goods
producers described above and which satisfy the above aggregate equilibrium con-
ditions. In the sections below I focus on the properties of the steady state equilib-
rium given my interest in the long-run impact of the interactions between financial
sector and trade reforms.
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2.5 Domestic financial reforms with trade autarky
In order to illustrate the channels through which domestic financial reforms af-
fect aggregate productivity I first analyze the properties of the steady state equi-
librium with financial and trade autarky. Each entrepreneur’s productivity is in-
variant and so, with stable aggregate variables, the entrepreneurial project choice
decision (and hence aggregate value of production) will be constant provided each
entrepreneur’s net worth is stable. In this case, each entrepreneur’s consumption is
also stable and so aggregate consumption will be stable if household consumption is
unchanging. This gives the familiar condition from the household Euler equations
R = R∗ = 1/β. Given the assumption that entrepreneurs are more impatient than
households then from the entrepreneurial first order conditions all entrepreneurs will
be constrained by their respective domestic borrowing constraints. I can now pin
down entrepreneurial prices and production decisions which, along with aggregate
relative prices, can be used to specify the equilibrium.
2.5.1 Entrepreneurial production decisions
Substituting the steady state multiplier on the borrowing constraint λ1 (ϕ) =
(1/R−δ)/c (ϕ) > 0 into the optimal relative prices expressions (Equations 2.17 and
2.18) gives steady state entrepreneurial relative prices in home (if an entrepreneur
produces) of:
pd (ϕ) =
w
ρϕΘd
(2.21)
where Θd = δ + (β − δ)θ σ−1σ and ρ = (σ − 1) /σ. The term Θd can be thought
as the reciprocal of the effective borrowing rate faced by entrepreneurs (as credit
constraints fall the effective borrowing rate falls to the unconstrained rate of 1/β).
Thus, with a common θ, in the steady state the pricing wedges are constant across
entrepreneurs. Using the intermediate good demand functions these prices deter-
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mine entrepreneurial production levels and revenues.
The comparison between an entrepreneur’s gross returns from saving and from
production of intermediates for domestic sale gives the familiar condition that the
entrepreneur will only produce if her revenues exceed the borrowing costs associ-
ated with production. This is the case provided that the entrepreneur’s productivity
is sufficiently high, ϕ ≥ ϕd where ϕd is defined by:
pd (ϕd) yd (ϕd) =
fw
(β − ρΘd) ⇔ ϕ
σ−1
d =
wσ
Y
f (ρΘd)
1−σ
(β − ρΘd) (2.22)
Entrepreneurs who have a productivity lower than ϕd do not produce and, given
that their credit constraints still bind, end up in the steady state just consuming their
entrepreneurial wage each period. The mass of producing entrepreneurs is given by
M (1−G (ϕd)). Following Melitz (2003), aggregate productivity, ϕ˜ (ϕd), can be
defined as a weighted average of the productivities of producing entrepreneurs:23
ϕ˜ (ϕd) =
⎡⎣ 1
1−G (ϕd)
∞∫
ϕd
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
⎤⎦1/(σ−1) (2.23)
A tightening of the credit multiplier on domestic revenues (i.e. fall in θ) has
two partial equilibrium effects on the cutoff through raising the entrepreneur’s cost
of production and hence price. On the one hand the higher price charged by the
entrepreneur reduces revenues, increasing the term (ρΘd)1−σ. On the other hand
higher prices are reflected in reduced investment needs and hence repayments (in-
creasing the term (β − ρΘd)). Whilst the former would tend to increase the produc-
tivity cutoff the latter may reduce the cutoff. In partial equilibrium, the net effect of
these two forces is such that the former effect dominates and the partial derivative of
23As detailed in Melitz (2003), ϕ˜ (ϕd) is the weighted harmonic mean of producing entrepreneurs’
productivities with the weights given by their relative output shares.
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the domestic productivity cutoff with respect to the domestic financial development
θ is negative:
∂ϕd
∂θ
= −ϕd (1− θ) (β − δ)
2
Θd (β − ρΘd) < 0
Note that these comparative statics ignore the general equilibrium effect of fi-
nancial development on the cutoff via aggregate prices and quantities. This is an
important omission since, as shown below, the general equilibrium effect will tend
to mean that higher financial development leads to a higher domestic production
productivity cutoff.
2.5.2 Properties of the steady state autarky equilibrium
Using the properties of the intermediate demand functions, the autarky equilib-
rium can be defined by a system of five equations in the real wage, domestic interest
rate, domestic production cutoff, aggregate borrowing and final goods output. The
corresponding equations are the household Euler equation, the productivity cutoff
definition, labor and credit market clearing conditions and the aggregate pricing
equation.
Proposition 1 In financial and trade autarky, there exists a unique steady state
equilibrium in home referenced by relative prices {w,R}, the domestic production
cutoff {ϕd} and aggregate quantities {Y,B} from which all other endogenous vari-
ables can be derived. With domestic financial sector reforms (i.e. increases in the
credit multiplier θ) the steady state comparative statics are as follows:
• Average productivity of intermediate output rises through a reallocation of
production towards more productive firms as the domestic production pro-
ductivity cutoff, ϕd, increases.
• Real wages increase.
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• Aggregate consumption of the final good rises.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.1.
Thus by adding a simple credit constraint within this heterogeneous firm model,
financial sector reforms increase real wages and average productivity through a re-
allocative process very similar to that emphasized in relation to trade liberalization.
With households unconstrained, all the reallocative work is done by the wage rate
and labor markets.24 If the credit multiplier is relaxed then, for a given wage, en-
trepreneurs lower their prices, increasing revenues and profits. The rise in θ has an
intensive margin effect increasing investment of existing producers. Ceteris paribus,
in partial equilibrium there would also be an extensive margin effect since, with
profits higher, more firms are induced to produce (see Figure 2.2). However, with
lower prices and more varieties the real wage rate rises. This reduces revenues and
raises costs. With profits reduced, lower productivity firms exit production. As il-
lustrated in Figure 2.2, the overall effect is an increase in the productivity required
for entrepreneurs to make positive profits from domestic production.25 Equivalently
for labor market clearing to hold the mass of producing firms must fall if the rise
in θ induces greater labor demand across firms. Although the variety of intermedi-
ate inputs falls and the wage rises, the beneficial effects on unit costs of higher θ
and higher average productivity lead to an overall rise in final goods production and
consumption.
24The comparative static results for average productivity and real wages with respect to the credit
multiplier are similar to those in Aoki et al. (2010) when the credit constraint binds. However, in
their model, with households also constrained, as the credit multiplier rises there is adjustment of
the real interest rate as well as the real wage.
25Interestingly, in the model of Chor et al. (2008) the effect of a rise in financial development for
a country affected by credit constraints is to reduce the productivity cut-off for domestic production.
This is because in their set-up the wage rate is pinned down by the exogenous productivity of a
homogenous good sector. Thus, absent the general equilibrium wage effects, there is no requirement
for the productivity cut-off to rise to ensure that labor market clearing still holds. Instead there is an
adjustment via the free-entry condition in their model whereby the level of aggregate demand in the
economy must fall to ensure that the value of entry is still equal to the exogenously determined entry
cost.
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Figure 2.2: Impact of credit multiplier θ on entrepreneurial production in trade
autarky
2.6 Domestic financial reforms with trade openness
The two economies are now open to trade in goods and entrepreneurs can choose
whether to export intermediates in addition to selling them to domestic final goods
producers.
2.6.1 Entrepreneurial production decisions
When the economies are open to trade the relative price of exports to domestic
output for a given entrepreneur is defined as follows:
px (ϕ)
pd (ϕ)
=
τΘd
Θx
(2.24)
where Θx = δ + (β − δ) (μθ)
σ−1
σ is the reciprocal of the effective borrowing
rate when export output is pledged as collateral. Compared to the standard model,
the relative price of exports now depends not just on the trade costs but on how
export and domestic pledged output are treated by domestic creditors. If the relative
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pledgeabilty of export output, μ, rises then the relative price of export to domestic
sales falls. As the overall domestic financial development rises the relative price of
exports rises if μ < 1, i.e. if the fall in the pricing wedge is greater for domestic
production, and falls if μ > 1.
Again the comparison between an entrepreneur’s gross returns to domestic pro-
duction versus those for domestic and export production gives a productivity cutoff
ϕx above which the additional revenues from exporting as well as producing for
domestic sales exceed the additional costs. The exporting productivity cutoff is
defined by:
px (ϕx) yx (ϕx) =
fxw
(β − ρΘx) ⇔ ϕ
σ−1
x =
wσRER−σ
Y ∗
fx (τ/ρΘx)
σ−1
(β − ρΘx)
The partial equilibrium effect of greater overall financial development θ and the
ability to lend against export output, μ, is to reduce ϕx, i.e. increase the propen-
sity of intermediate producers to export. The ratio of the exporting to domestic
production cutoff is given by:
(
ϕx
ϕd
)σ−1
=
τσ−1fx
f
RER−σY
Y ∗
(
Θd
Θx
)σ−1(
β − ρΘd
β − ρΘx
)
(2.25)
The relative magnitudes of the exporting to domestic only productivity cutoff
(and hence the likelihood of exporting given domestic production) can be decom-
posed into three terms. First, as variable and relative fixed trade costs increase, i.e.
as τσ−1fx/f rises, the relative level of the exporting cutoff increases. Second, the
terms RER
−σY
Y ∗ reflect the relative scale of demand from foreign compared to domes-
tic final goods producers. The higher relative foreign demand the lower the cutoff
ratio ϕx/ϕd. The third term, reflecting financial constraints in the pledging of both
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domestic and export output, is the novel feature compared to the related literature.
Focusing on this third effect, if the relative ability of creditors to recover ex-
ports compared to domestic output, μ, rises then the partial equilibrium effect is
to increase the propensity of producers to export. However, the impact of changes
in overall financial development, θ, is ambiguous. This is because, in contrast to
Chaney (2005) and Manova (2006), domestic production is also subject to credit
constraints. Thus, a rise in θ will reduce both the domestic and export production
cutoffs in partial equilibrium. For μ less than one, a rise in overall financial devel-
opment from a low level initially will tend to increase the relative exporting cutoff
since it has a greater effect on the domestic production cutoff. As financial devel-
opment rises the elasticity of the relative cutoff with respect to θ falls. If the relative
recovery rate μ is greater than one then the effects are in the opposite directions.
In line with firm-level empirical evidence which suggests a partitioning of pro-
ducing firms into exporters and non-exporters I focus on situations where ϕx/ϕd >
1. Given this ordering of the production cutoffs, home entrepreneurs can be parti-
tioned into those who do not produce (ϕ < ϕd), those who produce for domestic
markets only (ϕd ≤ ϕ < ϕd) and those who produce for export as well as domestic
markets (ϕx ≤ ϕ). Similar expressions can be derived in foreign for ϕ∗d and ϕ∗x. The
average productivity of intermediate production with trade, ϕ˜T , can be expressed as
a weighted sum of the average productivity of domestic production, ϕ˜ (ϕd), and ex-
port production, ϕ˜ (ϕx), where the weights take into account the relative mass of
exporters to total producers and the relative level of export production (including
iceberg trade costs) to domestic production for a given entrepreneur.26
26See Appendix 2.C.1 for details.
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2.6.2 Properties of non-symmetric financial autarky steady state
equilibrium
The symmetric case can be shown to be unique without the need for specific
distributional assumptions. However, given that financial reforms in particular are
undertaken in a domestic economy without the need for corresponding reforms in
trading partners, it is of more interest to focus on the non-symmetric equilibrium.
Following the related literature I adopt the empirically plausible Pareto distribu-
tion for the numerical solutions where G(ϕ) = 1 − (ϕmin/ϕ)a with ϕmin > 0 the
lower-bound productivity and a is the distribution shape parameter.27 Under this
distributional assumption the non-symmetric steady state equilibrium under finan-
cial autarky is uniquely defined.
Proposition 2 In financial autarky with entrepreneurial productivity following a
Pareto distribution, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium with costly goods
trade which can be uniquely defined by a system of thirteen equations in relative
prices {w,w∗, R, R∗, RER}, domestic market production and exporting cutoffs
{ϕd, ϕx, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x} and aggregate quantities {Y, Y ∗, B, B∗} from which all other en-
dogenous variables can be derived. The corresponding equations are the home and
foreign household euler equations, the definitions of the four productivity cutoffs,
labor and credit market clearing conditions at home and abroad, the balance of
payments condition (ie balanced trade given financial autarky) and the two coun-
tries’ aggregate pricing equations.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.2.
27For simplicity the shape parameter a is common across countries (although the lower bound
productivity can be different across countries). Helpman et al. (2004) illustrate the empirical fit
of the Pareto distribution and note that the assumption that a > σ − 1 is required to ensure finite
variances of revenues.
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2.6.2.1 Numerical parameter values
In the numerical examples below I focus solely on the impact of differences
in credit multipliers between countries with all other parameters identical. For the
production and productivity distribution parameters I follow Bernard et al. (2007b)
in setting the elasticity of substitution between different varieties σ = 3.8 based
on the estimates from US data of Bernard et al. (2003), the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution at a = 3.4 and the minimum productivity ϕmin = 0.2. The dis-
count factors of households and entrepreneurs are set at β = 0.96 and δ = 0.92
respectively (yielding a steady state annual real interest rate of 4%). The share of
household labor costs in total labor costs is set at ζ = 0.985 following Bernanke
et al. (1999) since entrepreneurial production rather than their labor income is the
focus of the model. For simplicity the fixed costs of domestic and export production
are set equal to one composite labor unit in both countries. Labor endowments are
identical across countries with the masses of labor and entrepreneurs which rescale
the results set at L = L∗ = 100 and M = M∗ = 20 giving an export propensity
of producers of around 30% when variable trade costs τ = 1.4.28 This compares,
for example, to estimates of around 21% of plants in the 1991 US Census of Man-
ufactures Bernard et al. (2003). In developing economies, Aitken et al. (1997) find
that around 27% of a 1986 and 1989 sample of Mexican manufacturing plants were
exporters whilst the samples of Clerides et al. (1998) have 35% of Moroccan plant
as exporters (1984-1991), 9.5% of Colombian plants (1981-1991) and a comparable
number of 23% for Mexican plants (1986-1990).
2.6.2.2 Impact of reforms to home financial sector
Before considering trade and financial reform interactions I first illustrate how
home financial sector reforms affect both the home and the foreign economy for
28Such trade costs are of similar order to the 44% estimate of border-related trade barriers in the
representative trade costs outlined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
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given trade costs. This aids understanding of the mechanisms through which the
different reform policies interact. I compare the steady state equilibria with goods
trade (subject to symmetric iceberg trade costs τ = τ ∗ = 1.4) under different values
of home financial development (i.e. varying the credit multipliers θ and μ) with
foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1.
Entrepreneurial propensity to produce and export As illustrated in Figure 2.3,
as the home credit multipliers rise the domestic production productivity cutoff in
home rises via the same channels as in autarky (i.e. increasing investment via the
intensive margin with the resulting real wage rise increasing costs and causing lower
productivity firms to drop out of production).29 The higher wage costs also cause
the export production productivity cutoff in home to rise. In the foreign economy
the impact of changes in θ all take place via the trade channel. In particular in this
general equilibrium set-up home financial development affects not just home export
propensity (which has been emphasised in, for example, Chaney, 2005; Manova,
2006) but also the export propensities of foreign firms, as is also the case in the
three-country analysis of Chor et al. (2008).
In the home economy the rise in θ affects the export propensity (i.e. the ratio
ϕx/ϕd) through two channels. The first is an ambiguously signed partial equilib-
rium effect via the relative financing constraints on domestic and export revenues.
The second effect is general equilibrium via the real exchange rate reducing the
relative demand for foreign relative to home intermediates. In the home economy
the net effect in this illustration is that the propensity to export increases with home
financial development if the relative pledgeability of export output μ is high but
falls with θ for high μ. In the foreign economy it is only the general equilibrium
effect that is at work with a rise in home financial development causing a fall in
29It can also be shown analytically that the domestic production productivity cutoff in the home
economy rises with an increase in the relative pledgeability of exports, μ.
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relative demand for foreign intermediates resulting in a reduction in the foreign
entrepreneurs’ propensity to export. This reduces overall labor demand and the do-
mestic production cutoff in foreign falls slightly to ensure market clearing. Whilst
these results are illustrative they indicate a potential channel through which the fi-
nancial development in one economy can spill over to the production and export
patterns of trading partners.
Figure 2.3: Impact of home overall financial development on entrepreneurial
production cutoffs and propensity to export
(a) Domestic sales cutoff
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(b) Exporting cutoff
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(c) Entrepreneurial conditional export propen-
sity
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Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4. The varying lengths of the plots against θ for different values of μ reflect the
restriction that μθ ≤ 1 as detailed in Assumption 2.
Real wages and real exchange rate As in the trade autarky case the home real
wage rises with the home credit multiplier (Figure 2.4), i.e. the home final good
price falls. This reflects a combination of lower mark-ups for existing producers
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and a rise in the average productivity of domestic and imported inputs which more
than offset the reduction in varieties of inputs. In the foreign economy, the direct
mark-up effect is not present with the result being that the lower variety of imports
contributes to a fall in the foreign real wage as the home credit multiplier increases.
Thus the real exchange rate rises with the home credit multipliers as home and
foreign final goods prices fall and rise respectively.
Figure 2.4: Impact of home overall financial development on composite real
wages and real exchange rate under financial autarky
(a) Real wages
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(b) Real exchange rate
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Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
Intermediate output productivity and firm size As the home credit multiplier
rises lower productivity domestic producers and exporters exit in the home econ-
omy. This increases the weighted average home productivity of intermediate goods
producers and the average size of producing entrepreneurs (Figure 2.5). In the for-
eign economy there is a slight fall in the aggregate intermediate productivity and
firm size reflecting the slight decrease in the domestic production cutoff.
Exports From the properties of the demand functions for intermediate inputs, the
relative value of exports to total intermediate sales (both in units of domestic fi-
nal consumption good) at the entrepreneurial level is a function of the exporting
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Figure 2.5: Impact of home overall financial development on intermediate out-
put productivity and average size of producing entrepreneurs
(a) Intermediate output average productivity
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(b) Intermediate producer average size
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Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
Figure 2.6: Impact of home overall financial development on firm- and
aggregate-level export to total intermediate revenue ratios under financial au-
tarky
(a) Entrepreneurial export ratio
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(b) Aggregate export ratio
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and domestic production cutoffs and is identical across entrepreneurs. For a home
entrepreneur this ratio is given by:
exrat =
(
1 +
f (β − ρΘx)
fx (β − ρΘd)
(
ϕx
ϕd
)σ−1)−1
(2.26)
The impact of changes in θ on a home entrepreneur’s export ratio combines two
effects. First there is the impact on ϕx/ϕd which, as detailed in Equation 2.25,
embodies relative demand from home and foreign final goods producers, financing
differences between exports and domestic revenues and trade costs. Second, there is
the impact on relative net profits per variable unit sold between export and domes-
tic sales (i.e. (β − ρΘx) / (β − ρΘd)). The overall effect depends on the relative
ability of entrepreneurs to pledge exports compared to domestic output to creditors.
In the home economy, the illustrations suggest that an entrepreneur’s export ratio
increases with θ if μ is high enough but has an inverted U-shaped response if μ is
relatively low as illustrated in Figure 2.6. Changes in home θ only affect a foreign
entrepreneur’s export ratio in financial autarky via the impact on the propensity to
export, i.e. via the direct trade channel. With the foreign propensity to export falling
(ie ϕ∗x/ϕ∗d rising) with θ this implies a decrease in a foreign entrepreneur’s export
ratio as its trading partner’s financial development improves.
In the home economy the positive intensive margin effect on exports of im-
proved home financial development combines with a generally positive extensive
margin effect (for all but high levels of relative pledgeability of exports μ) to give
an overall increase in the ratio of aggregate intermediate exports to total sales. In
the foreign economy, the ratio of aggregate intermediate exports to total sales falls
as θ. This reflects both an intensive margin effect (through lower relative demand
from home final goods producers for foreign intermediate exports) and an extensive
margin effect through the rise in the exporting production cutoff.
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Household and entrepreneurial utility Household steady state consumption is
dependent upon household wage income and the net return on steady state house-
hold savings (which, from domestic funds market clearing, are defined by aggre-
gate entrepreneurial borrowing). Thus the effects of changes in home financial
development on household utility can be split into a household wage effect and
entrepreneurial borrowing effects. The latter can be categorized as a direct pledging
effect whereby a rise in θ for given revenues will increase entrepreneurial borrow-
ing capacity, an intensive margin effect on output via the wage and an extensive
margin effect on the mass of producing and exporting entrepreneurs who are able
to borrow. In the home economy a rise in θ leads to a rise in wages and a positive
direct pledging effect which more than offsets the extensive margin effects of higher
production cutoffs and thus increases household utility (Figure 2.7). In the foreign
economy, with financial autarky, there is no direct pledging effect from changes in
θ and the wage effect via the trade channel leads to a fall in household utility.
Turning to entrepreneurs, the steady state consumption of non-producing en-
trepreneurs, who are constrained and hence cannot borrow, is equal only to their
entrepreneurial wage income. The consumption of producing entrepreneurs de-
pends on both their entrepreneurial wage income and their profits from total sales
(which are increasing in entrepreneurial productivity).30 Focusing on the home
economy, as θ rises wages increase which unambiguously increases the utility of
non-producing entrepreneurs. However, for given productivity, higher θ implies
lower profits from production as wages and production costs rise. Thus, for low
productivity entrepreneurs utility rises with θ but for higher productivity producing
entrepreneurs the negative profit effect more than outweighs the positive income ef-
fect and utility falls with θ (see Figure 2.7). This feature can be viewed as similar in
nature to the interest group theory proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) whereby
30Appendix 2.C.2 provides further details on the composition of entrepreneurial steady state util-
ity.
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incumbent producers may oppose financial sector reforms because it reduces their
profits.
Figure 2.7: Impact of home overall financial development on steady state utility
under financial autarky
(a) Household utility
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Note: Home and foreign identical except credit multipliers. Foreign credit multipliers constant at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1.
Variable iceberg trade cost τ = τ∗ = 1.4.
2.6.2.3 Interaction of reforms to trade and to the domestic financial sector
Having illustrated how changes in home financial development affect both the
home and foreign economy in the presence of trade I now turn to the interaction of
financial sector and trade reforms. In particular I consider the level and marginal
effects on the home economy of symmetric changes in the iceberg variable trade
costs and how these effects vary with the home credit multipliers (with the foreign
credit multipliers set at θ∗ = 0.5 and μ∗ = 1).31 In doing so it is convenient to
define a trade freeness measure TF = τ1−σ which lies between zero and one with
TF = 0 as τ tends to infinity and TF = 1 for τ = 1.
Home entrepreneurial propensity to produce and export: trade liberalization
For given credit multipliers, the impact of trade liberalization between two economies
31Although asymmetric changes in trade costs can be analyzed within the model I focus on sym-
metric changes in trade costs to reflect, for example, the implementation of bilateral trade agreements
involving common tariff liberalization or the effect of common reductions in transport costs.
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who are already open to trade follows a similar pattern to that in the original Melitz
(2003) setup. A rise in trade freeness leads to a rise in the domestic production
cutoff, a fall in the exporting cutoff and rise in the propensity of producers to ex-
port in both countries. However, as illustrated in Figure 2.8, the magnitude of the
marginal impact on the domestic production cutoff of these changes in trade free-
ness appears to increase with home financial development. When home financial
development is relatively high the intensive and extensive margin effects of trade
liberalization on labor demand are amplified, leading to a greater required rise in
the domestic production cutoff to ensure labor market clearing. Whilst the marginal
fall in export prices through trade liberalization is reduced at higher levels of fi-
nancial development the marginal impact on overall labor demand is higher due to
the looser borrowing constraint. Although not illustrated, as in the standard model,
greater trade freeness increases export propensity and aggregate- and firm-level ex-
port ratios. The impact of the level of the credit multiplier is of unclear direction.
Figure 2.8: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home en-
trepreneurial production cutoffs
(a) Domestic sales cutoff
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Home real wages and real exchange rate: trade liberalization Trade liberaliza-
tion increases the variety of imported inputs used in final goods production. Whilst
the rise in the domestic production cutoff reduces the variety of domestic inputs
they are on average of a higher productivity. The net effect is a fall in the aggregate
price level and increase in home real wages. The real wage gains from trade opening
appear to be greater if overall financial sector development is lower and, for given
θ, if the relative pledgeability of export output is higher (Figure 2.9). The intuition
is that with θ high the aggregate price level at home is relatively low and thus the
less the impact of any additional fall in prices due to the trade liberalization. The
rise in trade freeness also increases the real wage in the foreign economy with the
marginal impact also greater if home financial development is relatively low. The
interplay of these two relative price changes suggests that if home development is
lower than that in foreign then the real exchange rate is less than one and is falling
with greater trade freeness.
Figure 2.9: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home com-
posite real wages and the real exchange rate
(a) Real wages
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Home intermediate output productivity and firm size: trade liberalization Ad-
ditional labor demand stimulated by increasing investment in export production as
trade freeness rises leads to a rise in the domestic production productivity cutoff.
This contributes to a rise in intermediate productivity and average size of producing
entrepreneurs (Figure 2.10). Reflecting the corresponding greater marginal effect
of trade liberalization on the domestic production productivity cutoff these effects
are enhanced at higher levels of financial development (and at higher levels of rel-
ative export pledgeability for given θ). Thus, in contrast with their impact on real
wages trade and financial sector reforms appear to have complementary effects on
aggregate productivity and firm-size.
Figure 2.10: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on home
intermediate productivity and average size of producing entrepreneurs
(a) Intermediate output average productivity
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Home household and entrepreneurial utility: trade liberalization In terms of
household utility, lower trade costs increase wage income. They also affect house-
hold saving (i.e. constrained entrepreneurial borrowing) via intensive and extensive
margin effects on total pledgeable output for exporters and domestic producers. As
θ rises the real wage gains fall whilst the extensive margin effects increase (as the
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Figure 2.11: Impact of symmetric changes in variable trade costs on steady
state home household utility under financial autarky
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change in cutoffs rises). Overall, these effect combine to reduce the benefits to
household utility from trade opening as θ rises for given μ (see Figure 2.11). This
result is intuitive - using one policy tool, ie trade opening, to improve the allocation
of production leads to less utility gain for consumer households if the resource al-
location is more efficient in the first place through stronger financial development.
However, the utility gains from trade liberalization are enhanced if, for given θ, the
relative ability to pledge export output compared to domestic output is increased.
Although not illustrated, for a given level of financial development, the util-
ity of entrepreneurs increases with trade openness. Entrepreneurial wage income
rises whilst producers gain from increased demand and a greater propensity to ex-
port (despite the rise in production costs through higher wages). In terms of the
interaction of trade reforms and financial reforms, the picture is somewhat complex
combining the relative effects on both wages and intensive and extensive productive
margins. However, the utility loss for higher productivity entrepreneurs in moving
from low to higher financial development (i.e. increasing θ) which was illustrated in
Figure 2.7 appears to be reduced when trade openness is higher. This is consistent
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with the interest group theory of financial development outlined in Rajan and Zin-
gales (2003) whereby the opposition of incumbent producers to financial reforms is
weakened when an economy is open to international trade.32
2.7 Conclusions
This Chapter provides a tractable extension of a two-economy heterogeneous
firm model to incorporate financial constraints affecting both domestic and export
production. In doing so it enables analysis of trade and domestic financial sector
policy changes across countries in a non-symmetric setting and provides some im-
portant insights into the mechanisms through which the two reforms can reallocate
production within the two economies, their potential similarities and their interac-
tions. In particular, numerical illustrations suggest that on the one hand domestic
financial sector reforms, in facilitating greater investment, can enhance the marginal
effects of trade liberalization in increasing average productivity and firm size. On
the other hand, at higher levels of financial development the marginal benefits of
trade liberalization in reducing aggregate prices and raising real wages and house-
hold utility may be reduced. The numerical illustrations also highlight the role of
exports as collateral in amplifying the benefits of trade liberalization and the chan-
nels through which domestic financial sector reforms may be transmitted to trading
partners.
The analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the interactions of trade and do-
mestic financial sector reforms within a general equilibrium heterogeneous firm
setting provides a novel addition to the existing theoretical literature and is comple-
mentary to a growing empirical literature on the impact of financial constraints on
trade and FDI. However, it also highlights the need for additional empirical research
32Rajan and Zingales also argue that opposition to domestic financial reforms will be reduced
when the economy is open to international finance, a feature from which the current model abstracts.
61
on the quantitative significance of these interaction effects since, as noted by Baner-
jee and Duflo (2005), the question of whether there are potential gains from adding
multiple sources of inefficiency to models to explain productivity differences across
countries is dependent upon their empirical relevance. The evidence from existing
studies on these interactions is limited. At the macro level, Chang et al. (2009)
provide support for the complementary effects of financial development and trade
openness on growth. At the firm-level, Topalova (2004), for example, considers
whether the impact on productivity of trade reforms in India varies across states by
financial depth and finds that although the point estimates are similar in states with
high or low credit to GDP they are only significant in the former. Further empirical
analysis on the interaction of the reallocative effects of trade and financial reforms
and their joint impact on aggregate productivity levels is of particular interest. A
focus for future work is thus to extend the model to a multi-sector set-up to derive
empirically testable predictions on the effects of reform interactions to be applied
to sectoral data on average firm-size and labor productivity. In addition to these
important empirical steps there is the potential to modify the model to address other
policy relevant issues. For example, to extend the analysis beyond the steady state
in order to examine the transitional impact of reforms or to incorporate the poten-
tial reallocative effects of international financial liberalization emphasized by Aoki
et al. (2010).
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2.A Appendix: EBRD transition indicators
Full details of the EBRD transition indicator score methodology are available
at www.ebrd.com. The transition indicators cover up to 29 Eastern European and
former Soviet Union economies from 1989 to 2007: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The transition indicator scores are based on a judgement made on an economy’s
progress relative to defined classifications. Scores range from 1 (little change from
centrally planned economy) through to 4+ (defined as 4.33) which represents norms
of advanced industrial economies. Trade measure also includes restrictions to cur-
rent account convertibility. In addition to the banking sector measure indicated in
the figures below there is also an indicator for non-bank financial institutions and
securities markets.
The trade and foreign exchange (FX) indicator ranges from a value of 1 through
to 4+ (graded by the EBRD as 4.33) with “1: Widespread import and/or export
controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange; 2: Some liberaliza-
tion of import and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in
principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent (possibly
with multiple exchange rates); 3: Removal of almost all quantitative and adminis-
trative import and export restrictions; almost full current account convertibility; 4:
Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart
from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement
in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major
non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full and
current account convertibility; 4+: Standards and performance norms of advanced
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industrial economies: removal of most tariff barriers; membership in WTO.”
The corresponding definitions for the banking reform and interest rate liberal-
ization transition indicator are “1: Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier
system; 2: Significant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited
use of directed credit or interest rate ceilings; 3: Substantial progress in establish-
ment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regula-
tion; full interest rate liberalization with little preferential access to cheap refinanc-
ing; significant lending to private enterprizes and significant presence of private
banks; 4: Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS stan-
dards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision;
significant term lending to private enterprizes; substantial financial deepening; 4+:
Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full conver-
gence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of
competitive banking services.”
Figure 2.12: EBRD transition indicators, 5 year averages: levels and changes
after removing country and period fixed effects
(a) Levels
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Note: Values of the transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 with higher values representing standards moving towards
those of advanced industrial economies. Averages taken over 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2007 (four year
average). Plots indicate residuals from regressions controlling for country and period fixed effects. Lines represent lowess
smoother (locally weighted regression) with 95% confidence intervals.
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2.B Appendix: Proofs
2.B.1 Steady state equilibrium with trade and financial autarky
- Proof of existence and uniqueness
The steady state equilibrium in home can be defined by the following system
of five equations in relative prices {w,R}, domestic market production cutoff {ϕd}
and aggregate quantities {Y,B} from which all other endogenous variables can be
derived:
1. Household Euler equation: R = 1/β
2. Domestic production cutoff: ϕσ−1d = w
σ
Y
f(ρΘd)
1−σ
(β−ρΘd)
3. Funds market clearing: B = 0
4. Labor market clearing: LζM−ζ/f = H (Θd, ϕd) where
H (Θd, ϕd) =
ρΘd
β−ρΘdA (ϕd)+1−G (ϕd) andA (ϕd) =
∞∫
ϕd
(ϕ/ϕd)
σ−1 g (ϕ) dϕ.
H (Θd, ϕd) is increasing in Θd and decreasing in ϕd.
5. Aggregate Pricing equation: wσ−1 = M (ρΘd)σ−1
∞∫
ϕd
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
To prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium first consider the labor
market clearing condition. H (Θd, ϕd) is continuously differentiable (provided g ′ (ϕd)
is defined) and tends to zero as ϕd → ∞ and tends to infinity as ϕd → 0. There is
thus a unique value of ϕd for which the labor market clearing condition holds. Sub-
stituting the equilibrium value of ϕd into the aggregate pricing equation uniquely
defines the real wage. The domestic production cutoff then uniquely defines final
goods output Y . The real interest rate and aggregate borrowing are defined by the
euler equation and funds market clearing respectively.
Comparative statics with respect to θ:
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• ∂ϕd
∂θ
> 0: From the labor market clearing condition, using the implicit func-
tion theorem the equilibrium cutoff value can be shown to be increasing in
θ.
• ∂w
∂θ
> 0: Using the definition of the real wage from the aggregate pricing
equation and the expression for ∂ϕd/∂θ it can be shown that the real wage is
increasing in θ.
• ∂Y
∂θ
> 0: In the productivity cutoff equation substitute in for wages from
the aggregate pricing equation. Using the labor market clearing condition
with some manipulation one obtains final goods output as a function of ϕd
independent of θ giving ∂Y/∂θ ∝ ∂ϕd/∂θ > 0.
2.B.2 Non-symmetric steady state equilibrium with financial au-
tarky - Proof of existence and uniqueness
Using the fact that pd(ϕd)yd(ϕd)
pd(ϕ′d)yd(ϕ′d)
=
(
ϕ
ϕ′
)σ−1
plus the domestic production pro-
ductivity cutoff then pd (ϕd) yd (ϕd) =
(
ϕ
ϕd
)σ−1
fw
(β−ρΘd) . Similar expressions can
be used to define exporting revenues in relation to ϕx and also for variable labor
demand. The steady state equilibrium can be defined by the following system of
thirteen equations in relative prices {w,w∗, R, R∗, RER}, domestic market produc-
tion and exporting cutoffs {ϕd, ϕx, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x} and aggregate quantities {Y, Y ∗, B, B∗}
from which all other endogenous variables can be derived:
Household Euler equations:
R = 1/β; R∗ = 1/β (2.27)
Domestic production cutoff definitions:
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ϕσ−1d =
wσ
Y
f (ρΘd)
1−σ
(β − ρΘd) (2.28)
ϕ∗
σ−1
d =
w∗
σ
Y ∗
f ∗ (ρΘ∗d)
1−σ
(β − ρΘ∗d)
(2.29)
Relative cutoffs ϕx/ϕ∗d and ϕ∗x/ϕd (which cancel out foreign and domestic final
goods production):
(
ϕx
ϕ∗d
)σ−1
=
(
RER w∗
w
)−σ
Υ (2.30)
(
ϕ∗x
ϕd
)σ−1
=
(
RER w∗
w
)σ
Υ∗ (2.31)
where:
Υ ≡ fx
f ∗
(
τΘ∗d
Θx
)σ−1(
β − ρΘ∗d
β − ρΘx
)
; Υ∗ ≡ f
∗
x
f
(
τ ∗Θd
Θ∗x
)σ−1(
β − ρΘd
β − ρΘ∗x
)
Composite labor market clearing conditions:
ϕ−ad = Γ1 − Γ2ϕ−ax (2.32)
ϕ∗
−a
d = Γ
∗
1 − Γ∗2ϕ∗
−a
x (2.33)
where:
Γ1 ≡ L
ζM−ζ
(1 + kρΘd/ (β − ρΘd)) fϕamin
; Γ2 ≡ fx (1 + kρΘx/ (β − ρΘx))
f (1 + kρΘd/ (β − ρΘd))
with k = a/(a − σ + 1). Γ∗1 and Γ∗2 are correspondingly defined using foreign
variables.
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Funds market clearing conditions:
B = B∗ = 0 (2.34)
Balance of trade conditions:
RER =
w
w∗
(
ϕ∗x
ϕx
)a
Ξ (2.35)
where Ξ ≡ Mfx(β−ρΘ∗x)
M∗f∗x (β−ρΘx)
(
ϕmin
ϕ∗min
)a
.
Aggregate pricing equations in home and foreign respectively:
1 = w1−σϕσ−1−ad Ψ1 + (RER w
∗)1−σ ϕ∗
σ−1−a
x Ψ2 (2.36)
1 = w∗
1−σ
ϕ∗σ−1−ad Ψ
∗
1 + (RER/ w)
σ−1 ϕ
σ−1−a
x Ψ
∗
2 (2.37)
where:
Ψ1 ≡ (ρΘd)σ−1 kMϕamin; Ψ2 ≡ (ρΘ∗x/τ ∗)σ−1 kM∗ϕ∗amin
Ψ∗1 ≡ (ρΘ∗d)σ−1 kM∗ϕ∗amin; Ψ∗2 ≡ (ρΘx/τ)σ−1 kMϕamin
Noting that the labor market clearing conditions define the domestic productiv-
ity cutoffs as functions of exporting cutoffs in each country and using the balance
of trade condition to substitute out for RER the relative cutoff equations define a
system in the two exporting cuts:
(
ϕx(
Γ∗1 − Γ∗2ϕ∗−ax
)−1/a
)σ−1
=
((
ϕ∗x
ϕx
)a
Ξ
)−σ
Υ (2.38)
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(
ϕ∗x(
Γ1 − Γ2ϕ−ax
)−1/a
)σ−1
=
((
ϕ∗x
ϕx
)a
Ξ
)σ
Υ∗ (2.39)
Each of these equations describe an upward sloping locus in {ϕ∗x, ϕx}. Dividing
the two equations gives a downward sloping curve which can be shown to intersect
(2.38) uniquely at positive values of the two exporting cutoffs. As mentioned I
focus on the case for which ϕx/ϕ > 1 and ϕ∗x/ϕ∗ > 1 which implies that parameter
values must satisfy ΥΥ∗ > 1.
For the equilibrium values of ϕx and ϕ∗x the wages can be uniquely obtained
from the aggregate pricing equations (again once the real exchange rate has been
substituted in):
w∗
σ−1
=
(
Γ∗1 − Γ∗2ϕ∗
−a
x
)1−σ−1
a
Ψ∗1 +
((
ϕ∗x
ϕx
)a
Ξ
)σ−1
ϕ
σ−1−a
x Ψ
∗
2 (2.40)
wσ−1 =
(
Γ1 − Γ2ϕ−ax
)1−σ−1
a Ψ1 +
((
ϕ∗x
ϕx
)a
Ξ
)1−σ
ϕ∗
σ−1−a
x Ψ2 (2.41)
Domestic production cutoffs can be obtained from the labor market clearing
conditions given the equilibrium values of ϕx and ϕ∗x which combined with equilib-
rium wages then determine equilibrium output from the domestic production pro-
ductivity cutoffs. From these variables all other individual steady state choice vari-
ables can be determined. Given the existence of a unique equilibrium the model can
be solved numerically using standard techniques.
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2.C Appendix: Trade steady state
2.C.1 Weighted average productivity
As in Melitz (2003) the home average productivity of intermediate production
with trade, ϕ˜T , can be defined as a weighted harmonic mean over of productiv-
ity levels reflecting the additional production (inclusive of iceberg transport costs)
of those firms who choose to export. The productivity levels are weighted by an
entrepreneur’s output relative to the domestic output of the average productivity
level.yd (ϕ˜T ) .
ϕ˜−1T =
1
1 + πx
⎡⎣ 1
1−G (ϕd)
∞∫
ϕd
yd (ϕ)
yd (ϕ˜T )
ϕ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
⎤⎦ (2.42)
+
πx
1 + πx
⎡⎣ 1
1−G (ϕd)
∞∫
ϕd
τyx (ϕ)
yd (ϕ˜T )
ϕ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
⎤⎦
where πx = 1−G(ϕx)1−G(ϕd) is the conditional probability of a producer exporting. This
expression can be simplified using the definitions of ϕ˜ (ϕd) and ϕ˜ (ϕx) from Equa-
tion 2.23 plus the relation between output levels yd (ϕ) /yd
(
ϕ
′)
=
(
ϕ/ϕ
′)σ
and
between relative export to domestic output:
ϕ˜σ−1T =
1
1 + πx
[
ϕ˜ (ϕd)
σ−1 + πx
τyx (ϕ˜ (ϕx))
yd (ϕ˜ (ϕx))
ϕ˜ (ϕx)
σ−1
]
(2.43)
=
1
1 + πx
[
ϕ˜ (ϕd)
σ−1 + πxτ 1−σRERσ
Y ∗
Y
ϕ˜ (ϕx)
σ−1
]
Thus, if the two economies are non-symmetric, the weighted productivity in-
cludes a relative demand term RERσY ∗/Y reflecting the differences in demand for
intermediates from export and domestic markets.
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2.C.2 Entrepreneurial utility
In the steady state, an entrepreneurs utility u (ϕ) = ln (c (ϕ)) / (1− δ) where
the steady state consumption level is equal to:
c (ϕ) = we + (1− δ) a (ϕ) (2.44)
The entrepreneur’s steady state net worth is given by:
a (ϕ) = yd (ϕ) pd (ϕ) + yx (ϕ) px (ϕ)− Rb (ϕ) (2.45)
If the entrepreneur does not produce then, as she has no collateral, her borrowing
is zero and she consumes all her wage income, i.e. a = 0. If the entrepreneur
producers then her borrowing is pinned down by the binding borrowing constraint
and so her net worth is given by:
a (ϕ) =
(
1− θ σ−1σ
)
yd (ϕ) pd (ϕ) +
(
1− (μθ)σ−1σ
)
yx (ϕ) px (ϕ)
=
(
ϕ
ϕd
)σ−1
fw
(β − ρΘd)
[(
1− θ σ−1σ
)
+
(
1− (μθ)σ−1σ
) fx (β − ρΘd)
f (β − ρΘx)
(
ϕd
ϕx
)σ−1]
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Chapter 3
Financial reforms and the
reallocation of production: looking
across firms and sectors
3.1 Introduction
How do financial sector reforms affect the efficiency of the allocation of produc-
tion across firms and across sectors within an economy? How do the reallocative
impacts of domestic versus international financial reforms differ? This paper devel-
ops a simple theoretical model to examine these questions, building on a workhorse
macroeconomic model of credit constrained investment.
The recent global financial crisis and economic downturn has sparked renewed
interest in the macro-financial linkages between household, corporate and bank-
ing sector financing conditions and real macroeconomic activity. Over the past
two decades a vast literature has developed on the amplification and propagation of
macroeconomic shocks through their impact on the balance sheets of banks and the
non-bank private sector (see, for example, Bernanke et al., 1999). Much of this
literature was motivated by the experience of the Great Depression and the role of
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financial factors in other economic downturns, such as in the Asian financial crisis
of the late 1990s. In parallel, studies examining the fundamental question of why in-
come levels differ across countries have increasingly focused on how inefficiencies
in the allocation of production within an economy can be first order determinants of
total factor productivity (TFP) differentials (Syverson, 2010). Financial factors are
one type of such micro-economic distortions that can limit the efficiency of the allo-
cation of production.1 Building on a standard macro model of credit constraints, but
focusing on the reallocative effects of financial reforms, this Chapter bridges these
two literatures with the objective of analyzing the general equilibrium mechanisms
by which domestic and international financial reforms affect the allocation of pro-
duction. As such it also aims to provide insights for the still challenging empirical
investigation of these effects.
To enable the examination of inter-sectoral, as well as inter-firm, reallocation
effects of domestic and international financial reforms, three empirically motivated
features are added to a baseline macro model of credit-constrained investment de-
veloped from Kiyotaki (1998). First, the model is adapted to a multi-sector set-up.
Second, credit constraints are allowed to vary across sectors, i.e. firms’ ability to
pledge revenues differs across their sector of production. Third, international bor-
rowing constraints are added to the model to allow examination of liberalization
of access to international financing. The credit constraints within the model are
interpreted as financial reform variables which can be adjusted by the authorities,
for example, through regulations on collateral requirements, or which are altered
through technological or institutional changes (for example, changes in information
gathering, monitoring or bankruptcy costs).
1For example, Abiad et al. (2008) find that financial liberalization leads to greater allocative ef-
ficiency across firms while Wurgler (2000) finds that more developed capital markets tend to be
associated with allocation of greater investment to sectors which are faster growing. Indeed, this
reallocative effect may outweigh the role of financial reforms in facilitating a rise in aggregate in-
vestment. For example, Tressel et al. (2009) find that in middle-income economies the primary
impact of financial reforms is on aggregate TFP rather than increased investment.
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Within the model, the individually optimal investment decisions of firms ad-
just to changes in their ability to borrow against future revenues. These partial
equilibrium decisions lead to general equilibrium adjustments in relative prices,
namely relative prices across intermediate goods sectors and the domestic inter-
est rate, in order to maintain equilibrium between the demand and supply of funds
for investment. These relative price changes lead to two reallocation mechanisms
- inter-sectoral and inter-firm - in response to financial reforms (i.e. when credit
constraints are relaxed). As credit constraints are relaxed, the resultant changes
in firms’ incentives to invest depend on their productivity, leading to reallocations
across firms, and on the sector of investment, shifting incentives to move production
across sectors.
The degree of financial reform in the economy thus determines how production
is allocated across firms and sectors. For example, as the recovery rate rises, the
benefit of greater leverage boosts the investment of productive entrepreneurs more
than that of the unproductive. As a result their share in total investment rises and
there is an intra-firm reallocation of investment towards the productive, raising ag-
gregate productivity (in line with the empirical evidence of Abiad et al., 2008). At
higher levels of the recovery rate, the rise in investment by the productive pushes
up the domestic interest rate until the unproductive find that their return from pro-
ducing falls to a level at which they prefer instead only to lend to the productive.
At lower levels of the recovery rate, the overall demand for investment funds falls,
and relative prices and the domestic interest adjust. Unproductive firms now find it
worthwhile to produce as well as to lend.
Relative to the single-sector model of Kiyotaki (1998), the additional intra-
sectoral mechanism in the model smooths out comparative static adjustments in
interest rates or productivity in response to financial reforms since now relative
prices across sectors, as well as the domestic interest rate, also adjust to maintain
equilibrium. But, on the whole the comparative statics are of a similar direction.
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For example, the domestic interest rate is non-decreasing with the recovery rate,
broadly similar to empirical patterns.
The structural characteristics of an economy act as conditioning factors in deter-
mining the equilibrium allocation of production for a given level of financial reform.
They also influence the impact of financial reforms, i.e. there is the potential for
reform complementarities.2 These structural characteristics include the dispersion
in productivity across entrepreneurs and the idiosyncratic uncertainty they face in
their productivity. The latter could be thought of as stability of the business environ-
ment in terms of the risk of government expropriation of returns or other firm-level
political and regulatory risks. The empirical literature finds similar factors to be im-
portant. Tressel et al. (2009), for example, find that property rights play a key role
in explaining the impact of financial, and trade, reforms in developing economies.
The model also points to the importance of not only the level of the aggregate credit
multiplier in determining the efficiency of the allocation of production but also the
difference in the credit multiplier across sectors. If this dispersion is high then in
general the magnitude of the impact of financial reforms on productivity and other
endogenous variables is lower.
The key features of the domestic autarky economy on the whole carry over into
the more complex case of allowing for international borrowing. However, closed
form solutions are not always possible due to the additional complexity introduced
by the international borrowing constraint. Equilibria are still partitioned by the do-
mestic recovery rate and policy complementarities continue to determine the impact
of financial reforms. The impact of financial reforms, both domestic and interna-
tional, again depends on the interaction of the direct effect of the changes in leverage
and the general equilibrium effects of changes in the domestic interest rate and rel-
ative prices. The relative impact of capital account liberalization on these transmis-
2This is in line with the “thresholds effects” view of Kose et al. (2009), as outlined in Chapter 4,
on the growth impact of financial integration.
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sion channels depends upon the state of domestic financial reforms. For example,
the leverage benefits of a relaxation in international credit constraints will be greater
at higher levels of the overall domestic credit multiplier, or pledgeability. However,
the relationship between changes in the degree of pledgeability and movements in
sectoral relative prices and real interest rates is non-monotonic.3 As a result the
comparative statics for capital account liberalization are often non-ambiguous.
The impact of international financial liberalization can also vary quite markedly
from that in which sectoral reallocations are switched off. For example, in the
single sector model, at low levels of recovery rates, the domestic interest rate is
pinned down to the productivity of the unproductive entrepreneurs and does not
change with financial liberalization, either domestic or international. In contrast,
when sectoral reallocations are allowed, return equalization of the unproductive
may require a rise in domestic interest rates upon international liberalization.
The structure of the remainder of this Chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 draws
out the main linkages with the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section
3.3 highlights the key features of the model with Section 3.4 detailing the set-up.
As a baseline, Section 3.5 uses the domestic autarky setting to explore the poten-
tial for non-linearities in the impacts of financial reforms and the roles of policy
complementarities. Section 3.6 then examines the impact of financial reforms when
the economy is opened up to international financial flows and, finally, Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The focus on the reallocative impact of domestic and international financial sec-
tor reforms in this paper is related to four key strands of literature. As mentioned
above, the first is the broad macro theoretical literature on the impact of finan-
3As with the real wages and interest rates in Aoki et al. (2010).
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cial frictions, including, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke et al.
(1999); Matsuyama (2008, 2007). In particular this model is based on the stripped
down credit multiplier model of Kiyotaki (1998) which is one of the main building
blocks of recent DSGE models incorporating credit constraints.
The second strand is the growing literature examining the role of distortions to
the allocation of production as a determinant of aggregate productivity. These in-
clude, for example, recent theoretical papers such as Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
and the empirical work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (for a review see, for exam-
ple, Syverson, 2010). Within this literature a number of papers examine different
channels through which contracting institutions determine TFP growth through the
production allocation channel including, for example, Caselli and Gennaioli (2006),
Buera et al. (2010) and Barseghyan and DiCecio (2008).
The third strand of related literature is a set of recent theoretical papers fo-
cusing on the impact of capital account liberalization within models of financially
constrained production. Depending on their focus these papers adopt a range of em-
pirically motivated modeling structures. For example Aoki et al. (2010) and Aoki
et al. (2009), on which this Chapter builds, incorporate labor market adjustments
in response to financial reforms, abstracting from the sectoral reallocations within
this Chapter. The work of Antra`s and Caballero (2009) focuses on the interaction
between international trade and capital flows within a model which incorporates
both labor and capital and variation in domestic financial frictions across sectors.
However, they abstract from reallocations across heterogeneous firms and make no
distinction between domestic and international borrowing constraints.
The final related, and motivating, area of literature is the vast empirical literature
on financial reforms and growth and productivity (see, for example, Levine, 2005,
for a review). This includes papers looking at the interaction between international
financial liberalization and growth (such as Henry, 2007; Kose et al., 2009) and
the reallocative effects of domestic financial reforms. For example, the impact of
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domestic financial liberalization on the efficiency of the allocation of production
has been examined at both the sector-level, for example in Wurgler (2000), and the
firm-level, for example by Abiad et al. (2008) and Galindo et al. (2007).
3.3 Key features of the model
The model builds upon the basic credit multiplier model of Kiyotaki (1998)
which looks at the inter-firm reallocation effects of domestic financial reforms. En-
trepreneurs with heterogeneous productivities invest in this period using their own
retained equity and borrowed funds in order to produce goods in the next period.
However, due to the inalienability of the entrepreneur’s human capital associated
with the investment project, creditors can only recover a fraction of next period’s
pledged revenues if they take over the project in the event of default. As a result,
an entrepreneur can only borrow a fraction, or credit multiplier, of next period’s
pledged revenues.4
In partial equilibrium, for the same amount of own equity investment, a higher
productivity entrepreneur can produce more next period and so can pledge greater
revenues to, and borrow more from, creditors than a less productive one. In gen-
eral equilibrium, the interest rate will equalize the supply and demand of domestic
funds. More productive entrepreneurs will borrow from the lower productivity types
who earn more from lending than producing themselves. As the credit multiplier
varies so the allocation of investment and production across entrepreneurs by their
productivity changes, leading to an adjustment in aggregate productivity.
Three key, empirically-motivated, features are added to this basic model to en-
able the examination of inter-sectoral, as well as inter-firm, reallocation effects of
domestic and international financial reforms - (i) a multi-sector set-up, (ii) allowing
4As in Tirole (2006) a Hart-Moore credit constraint based on inalienability of human capital
of the entrepreneur can be translated into a corresponding constraint motivated by moral hazard or
costly-state verification.
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Figure 3.1: The key features of the model
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Basic Kiyotaki (1998) credit multiplier model
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• Examines inter-firm reallocation of production across heterogeneous 
productivity entrepreneurs
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International finance
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Domestic autarky (ABK)
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International finance (ABK)
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This paper Aoki et al (2010) (ABK)
for the variation in credit constraints across sectors, and (iii) the addition of interna-
tional borrowing constraints. Figure 3.1 highlights these features, illustrating how
the model builds on Kiyotaki (1998) and departs from the approach taken in the
related work of Aoki et al. (2010).
First, to allow for inter-sectoral reallocations, entrepreneurs are able to produce
in two intermediate goods sectors which are then combined into a final good. The
relative prices of these intermediates, which are affected by financial reforms, help
to determine the allocations of production across both entrepreneurs and across sec-
tors.5
Second, in order to examine the impact of changes in access to international fi-
nance as well as domestic financial reforms, entrepreneurs are able to borrow from
5Along with the domestic interest rate, it is this relative price which leads to reallocations in
production rather than movements in the relative wage (and domestic interest rate) in the one-sector,
two factor, model of Aoki et al. (2010).
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abroad. Investment decisions are made subject to both an international and an over-
all borrowing constraint, and the ability to pledge revenues to foreign relative to
domestic creditors differs as in Aoki et al. (2009), Aoki et al. (2010) and Iacoviello
and Minetti (2006). In particular, foreign creditors are assumed to be in a weaker po-
sition to extract revenues from a project which they take over in the event of default.
This could be, for example, for reasons of higher transaction costs, informational
disadvantage or regulatory or legal factors.6 Senior domestic creditors will restrict
their lending so that total borrowing repayments are at most equal to the revenues
they can extract from the project if they take it over.
Third, the credit multiplier on next period revenues differs across intermediate
goods sectors.7 There is strong empirical support to suggest that there are sectoral
differences in financing obstacles.8 For example, Beck et al. (2006a) find sectoral
dummies have significant coefficients in regressions of the degree of self-reported
financing obstacles in a sample of over 10,000 firms across 80 countries surveyed
in 1999 and 2000 by the World Bank Business Environment Survey.
There are a number of intuitive rationales for variations in credit multipliers
across sectors. Perhaps the most simple is that policies, whether for political econ-
omy or regulatory reasons, may target different sectors. For example, this could be
in the form of directed credit towards certain sectors, or indeed politically-motivated
credit to individual firms. Legal and regulatory costs or treatment, such as capital
adequacy requirements or loan-to-value ratios, may also vary across sectors (as, for
example, under the Basel II capital adequacy rules), feeding through into variations
in credit multipliers across sectors.9
6See, for example, Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), for an overview of reasons why foreign lenders
may have relatively limited liquidation ability.
7To keep the model simple, this is the only difference between two sectors and so is needed to
make the addition of a sectoral set-up have meaning.
8Variations in borrowing constraints across sectors are also seen in, for example, the models of
Matsuyama (2008) and the aforementioned model of Antra`s and Caballero (2009).
9In reality, to add further complexity, there may also be regional variations in contracting insti-
tutions or legal costs within an economy. For example, within regions in India, World Bank (2009)
finds that contract enforcement costs (as a percentage of the value of the claim) vary from around
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A second rationale for differential credit multipliers across sectors relates to the
inalienability of entrepreneurial human capital as emphasized by Hart and Moore
(1994) and employed in the macro models of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiy-
otaki (1998). An entrepreneur’s human capital input may be easier to replace in one
sector than in an other. For example, this could be due to the complexity of the pro-
duction process. Figure 3.2 illustrates the variation in measures of the “complexity”
of different industries proxied by the dispersion of intermediate inputs (based on
US data). The more complex a project, the more difficult it may be to replace the
entrepreneur in the event of default, or to monitor the project, and hence the lower
the credit multiplier on next period’s revenues up to which the creditor would be
willing to lend.
Figure 3.2: Potential rationale for variations in financial constraints across sec-
tors - differences in “complexity” and asset tangibility across sectors
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Note: Data for US 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Asset tangibility measure from Braun and Larrain (2005) is the
industry median of the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets by U.S.-publicly listed firms during the 1986–
1995 period. Capital-labor and “complexity” measure from Cowan and Neut (2007) based on the 1992 US input-output
tables. The complexity measure is constructed as the negative of the Herfindahl index of intermediate inputs used by an
industry (i.e. the less concentrated the intermediate inputs used the more “complex” the industry).
A third related rationale concerns differences in production structures. For ex-
ample, sectors differ in their levels of tangible assets which can be pledged to cred-
itors (see the US industry variation in Figure 3.2). Although in the model of this
17-18% in Patna and in Hyderabad through to 34% and 39% respectively in New Delhi and Mumbai.
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Chapter the production structure is linear in investment (which depreciates 100%
between periods) there is a clear read across to a more complex production struc-
ture taking into account different capital-labor ratios and asset tangibility across
sectors.
The following section details the set-up of the model in terms of entrepreneurs’
objectives, technology and options to invest and borrow. It then outlines the equilib-
rium conditions for individual entrepreneurs (i.e. determined by the optimal return
from her investment and borrowing choices) and the aggregate market clearing con-
ditions.
3.4 Model
3.4.1 Set-up
There is a mass one of entrepreneurs who make investments to produce two
types of intermediate goods and who consume a final consumption good. An en-
trepreneur indexed by i maximises discounted log utility:
Ut (i) = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t ln (ct (i)) (3.1)
where β is the discount rate and ct (i) is the entrepreneur’s consumption of the
final good at time t.
The final good, which is the numeraire, is used for consumption as well as in-
vestment and is produced from a simple constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
technology combining the two intermediate goods. Final goods technology is open
to all agents and takes place under perfect competition. Aggregate output of the
final good, Yt, can thus be expressed as a function of aggregate production in the
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two intermediate sectors, Y1,t and Y2,t respectively:
Yt = Y
γ
1,tY
1−γ
2,t /(γ
γ (1− γ)1−γ) (3.2)
where 0 < γ < 1 indicates the relative weight in production of the final good of
the two intermediates. The relative demand schedules for each intermediate good
are standard and the relative price of the intermediates is given by:
1 = pγ1,tp
1−γ
2,t (3.3)
Differentiation in productivity across firms The intermediate goods are pro-
duced with a linear production technology which is identical across the two in-
termediate goods sectors j ∈ {1, 2}. With no aggregate uncertainty, the interme-
diate output of an entrepreneur in period t + 1 is given by a linear combination
of an entrepreneur’s investment input and her productivity at time t, ϕt (i), i.e.
yj,t+1 (i) = ϕt (i) ij,t (i). Without loss of generality an individual entrepreneur who
makes an investment does so in one sector or the other in a given period.10 The
intermediate good produced in sector j has price pj,t.
Productivity varies across entrepreneurs and, while there is no aggregate un-
certainty, individual entrepreneurs face shocks to their productivity which follow a
Markov process between a high and a low state (with productivities ϕp and ϕu re-
spectively, ϕp > ϕu).11 As in Kiyotaki (1998), the transition probabilities are such
thatProb (ϕt+1 (i) = ϕp|ϕt (i) = ϕp) = 1−δ andProb (ϕt+1 (i) = ϕu|ϕt (i) = ϕu) =
1− nδ. The transitions between states are assumed to be restricted in the following
10This could be, for example, due to an infinitesimally small additional fixed cost of producing in
more than one sector. As shown below, the production choices will be identical for entrepreneurs
with the same productivity levels. Thus a formulation in which entrepreneurs of a given productivity
level choose one production sector or the other yields identical output levels to the formulation
assuming that all entrepreneurs with a given productivity level split their output between the two
sectors if they choose to produce in both sectors.
11The expectations operator is now dropped for notational convenience.
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manner:
Assumption 3 The likelihood of an entrepreneur moving between high and low
productivity states is such that δ + nδ < 1.
This plausible assumption is consistent with the average likelihood of a produc-
tivity transition between periods being less than one in every two periods. This is
in line with assumptions in the related literature (see the discussion of parameter
values in Section 3.4.3 below). This assumption allows us to focus on stable steady
state equilibria. In such equilibria, the fraction of productive entrepreneurs is equal
to n/ (1 + n).
Variation in borrowing constraints across sectors Overall borrowing at time
t by an entrepreneur i is subject to the constraint that total repayments to foreign
and domestic creditors, respectively bj,t+1 (i) and b∗j,t+1 (i), are limited to a fraction
θj,t+1, of the expected value of the agent’s output in sector j at t + 1 (i.e. the value
that the creditor can recover if they take over the project). Due to difficulties in
enforcing contracts or operating projects across international boundaries, foreign
borrowing is restricted to be a fraction ψt+1θj,t+1 of the value of the output at t + 1
where ψt+1 is less than one and, for simplicity, is assumed to be identical across
sectors (Assumption 4). Thus the overall and international borrowing constraints
are respectively:
bt+1 (i) + b
∗
t+1 (i) ≤ θj,t+1pj,t+1yj,t+1 (i) (3.4)
b∗t+1 (i) ≤ ψt+1θj,t+1pj,t+1yj,t+1 (i) (3.5)
Assumption 4 The relative recovery rate by foreign creditors compared to the do-
mestic lead creditor is common across sectors and is equal to 0 ≤ ψt+1 < 1.
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The borrowing constraints are assumed to differ depending on the sectors in
which the agent produces such that revenues in sector two have a lower degree of
pledgeability than in sector one:
Assumption 5 The recovery rate by the domestic lead creditor is higher in sector
one than in sector two, i.e. 0 < θ1,t = θt ≤ 1 and 0 < θ2,t = κθt ≤ 1 where
0 ≤ κ < 1.
A further assumption on the credit multiplier and relative productivities is re-
quired to ensure that the additional return earned by productive entrepreneurs who
produce and borrow is greater than or equal to the return earned by unproductive
entrepreneurs on saving or producing.
Assumption 6 ϕu ≥ θj,t+1ϕp
An entrepreneur’s flow of funds The entrepreneur’s flow of funds is given by:
ct (i) + ij,t (i) = at (i) +
bt+1 (i)
Rt+1
+
b∗t+1 (i)
R∗t+1
where Rt+1 is the domestic interest rate from period t to t + 1 and R∗t+1 is the
corresponding interest rate on foreign borrowing. The supply of funds at the foreign
interest rate is assumed to be perfectly elastic.12 An entrepreneur’s net worth is
equal to the value of her intermediate goods output (realized due to last period’s
investment input) minus total repayments to foreign and domestic creditors:
at (i) = pj,tyj,t (i)− bt (i) + b∗t (i)
12This is a convenient simplification. Adding a more realistic debt elastic risk premium on top of
the foreign interest rate, either at the level of the firm or in aggregate, could be an interesting avenue
for future research using a similar model but would add considerable complexity to the set-up.
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3.4.2 Equilibrium conditions
Given her debt repayments and production levels entering period t, each en-
trepreneur will choose her investment in production, ij,t (i), her foreign and domes-
tic borrowing and consumption levels, bt+1 (i) and b∗t+1 (i) respectively, to maximize
discounted log utility over final goods consumption ct (i) subject to her state (de-
scribed by her productivity and her net worth at (i)), the production technology,
borrowing constraints, her flow of funds and aggregate prices.
With log utility the entrepreneur will consume a fraction (1− β) of her net
worth at (i) in each period. Thus the investment from own equity that an en-
trepreneur makes is equal to βat (i). The key question is therefore how can an
entrepreneur maximise the return earned on this investment through her production
and borrowing choices?
3.4.2.1 Production and borrowing options
Given prices for output next period and the cost of borrowing, the rate of return
earned by an entrepreneur from period t to t + 1, Rt+1 (ϕt (i)) , is dependent upon
her investment and borrowing decisions. An entrepreneur will only produce if the
return is at least equal to the opportunity cost of investing in production, i.e. the
return that could be earned on lending out her funds. This opportunity cost is the
domestic interest rate since, as there is no constraint on lending to foreigners, it
must be the case that the domestic interest rate is greater than or equal to the foreign
interest rate.13 Thus, Rt+1 ≥ R∗t+1 and the entrepreneur, if she borrows, will first
borrow from abroad up to the limit of the international borrowing constraint and
then borrow from domestic creditors.
The options available to an entrepreneur can thus be summarized as follows.
First, simply lend domestically (given that the domestic interest rate is higher than
13If the foreign interest rate is above the domestic interest rate then all entrepreneurs would decide
to invest abroad and there would be no funds for domestic investment and hence no consumption.
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Figure 3.3: Entrepreneur production and borrowing options
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the foreign) and receive interest rate Rt+1. An entrepreneur might not produce
and lend or also lend in the case that she produces (in which case her return from
production must equal Rt+1). Second, choose to produce in sector j but using only
internal equity funding, yielding a rate of return of pj,t+1ϕt (i). Third, produce in
sector j but finance via her own equity and borrowing from foreign creditors only.
The fourth option is to produce in sector j and borrow from both domestic and
foreign creditors. If this option is chosen then the return from production must be
higher than the domestic interest rate and hence the overall borrowing constraint
will bind.
The respective returns of these different production and borrowing combinations
are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The maximum rate of return from period t to t + 1
earned by an entrepreneur with productivity level ϕt (i) is thus defined by:
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Rt+1 (ϕt (i)) = max
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩Rt+1, maxj∈{1,2}
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ϕt (i) pj,t+1,
pj,t+1ϕt(i)(1−ψt+1θj,t+1)
1−pj,t+1ϕt(i)ψt+1θj,t+1/R∗t+1 ,
pj,t+1ϕt(i)(1−θj,t+1)
1−pj,t+1ϕt(i)θj,t+1J(Rt+1,R∗t+1,ψt+1)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ (3.6)
where J
(
Rt+1, R
∗
t+1, ψt+1
) ≡ ψt+1/R∗t+1 + (1− ψt+1) /Rt+1.
The partial equilibrium impact of domestic financial reforms, as proxied by a
rise in θ, is thus to increase returns for those entrepreneurs who borrow since it
allows greater leverage. This benefit is increasing in the productivity of an en-
trepreneur, since a higher productivity allows, ceteris paribus, for higher leverage
levels. As returns from production are increasing in productivity so the productive
entrepreneurs will always produce in equilibrium. The market interest rate is set by
the indifference of unproductive entrepreneurs between producing or lending to the
productive, i.e. Rt+1 (ϕu) = Rt+1.
Borrowing decisions The productive will always borrow to produce since their
return from doing so is above that of the unproductive and therefore always greater
than or equal to the domestic interest rate. Since total net domestic borrowing of
entrepreneurs is equal to zero, productive entrepreneurs will borrow domestically
from the unproductive. Unproductive entrepreneurs will not borrow domestically
but, if they produce, they will borrow from abroad up to the binding international
borrowing constraint since the foreign interest rate is less than or equal to their
return from production (the domestic interest rate). Furthermore, if the productive
are constrained in their borrowing then their returns are greatest when borrowing
from both domestic and foreign creditors because the marginal benefit of the extra
leverage for next period’s revenues exceeds the additional repayment.
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Decisions to invest in production in intermediate goods sectors A necessary
condition for an entrepreneur to invest in production in a sector today is that the
marginal benefit from equity investment in terms of the value of next period’s
marginal output is greater than or equal to the marginal opportunity cost of the
investment, i.e. ϕppj,t+1 ≥ Rt+1. If the productive entrepreneur is constrained then,
borrowing from both home and abroad, she would earn a positive excess return from
producing in sector j if the intermediate price earned next period is sufficiently high
relative to the interest rates:
pj,t+1ϕp > Rt+1/
(
1 + ψt+1θj,t+1
(
Rt+1/R
∗
t+1 − 1
))
This price cut-off for the productive falls with their productivity and, in partial
equilibrium, is decreasing in the credit multiplier θ. This reflects the net benefit of
the higher leverage (with the returns from the higher investment outweighing the
rise in repayments associated with increased borrowing). An entrepreneur is indif-
ferent between producing in one or the other sectors when her returns are equalised.
3.4.2.2 Equilibrium production combinations
In an unconstrained equilibrium, only the productive will produce and will do
so in both sectors. But, what productive combinations may occur in borrowing
constrained equilibria?
First, given the structure of final production, both intermediate goods must be
produced in an equilibrium. Second, due to their higher relative productivities,
productive entrepreneurs always produce (in at least one sector). Third, any com-
bination of relative prices and interest rate which yields return equalization across
sectors for the productive means that return equalization for the unproductive can-
not hold (and vice versa). In particular, for a given interest rate, the price in sector
two required to equalize returns across sectors is higher for the productive than the
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unproductive.14 This means that if the productive produce in both sectors then the
unproductive will produce, if in any sectors, in sector two and if the unproductive
are producing in both sectors then the returns for the productive are higher in sector
one.15
There are therefore four possible production combinations which may occur
in a credit-constrained equilibrium (see Appendix Figure 3.8). In Case A interest
rates are relatively high and the unproductive do not find it worthwhile to invest in
production. The productive invest in both sectors. If the domestic interest rate falls
and the relative price of intermediate sector two rises sufficiently high, it becomes
worthwhile for the unproductive to produce. This leads to Case B in which the
productive entrepreneurs invest in both sectors and the unproductive entrepreneurs
invest in sector 2. If the interest rate falls further and the relative price in sector two
also declines then the productive entrepreneur’s return from producing in sector 2
may fall below that in sector 1. In this range, Case C, the productive entrepreneurs
invest in sector one and the unproductive entrepreneurs do so in sector 2. Finally,
the interest rate may be sufficiently low that it is worthwhile for the unproductive
to move also into production in section 1. This leads to a Case D in which the
productive entrepreneurs invest in sector one and the unproductive entrepreneurs
invest in both sectors.16
For the purposes of defining the equilibrium, denote by χpj,t and χuj,t the share
of productive and unproductive entrepreneurs respectively who invest in sector j.
Thus, 1 ≥ χp1,t = 1 − χp2,t > 0 while for the unproductive 1 > χu1,t ≥ 0 and
14This is because the lower credit multiplier in sector two has a greater detrimental effect on the
relative returns of the productive (due to their higher leverage and because they borrow from home
and abroad). Thus, to compensate and maintain return equalization across intermediate sectors for
the productive, the price in sector two must be higher than for that required for return equalization
across sectors for the unproductive.
15See Appendix 3.B.1 and Appendix Figure 3.8 which illustrates the production options for given
intermediate prices and the domestic interest rate.
16Thus, in comparison to Aoki et al. (2010), since entrepreneurs have the choice to produce in two
different sectors, there are now three possible equilibria in which both the productive and unproduc-
tive entrepreneurs produce rather than one in their single sector set-up.
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1 ≥ χu2,t ≥ 0 and the share who do not invest, 1− χu1,t − χu2,t, is either zero or one.
3.4.2.3 Entrepreneurial returns
Given these four possible constrained equilibria cases, the domestic interest rate
and conditions for production of the unproductive are defined as:
Rt+1 = Rt+1 (ϕu) ≥ max
j∈{1,2}
{
pj,t+1ϕu (1− ψt+1θj,t+1)
1− pj,t+1ϕuψt+1θj,t+1/R∗t+1
}
and 0 = χuj,t
{
Rt+1 − pj,t+1ϕu (1− ψt+1θj,t+1)
1− pj,t+1ϕuψt+1θj,t+1/R∗t+1
}
for j ∈ {1, 2} (3.7)
(
1− χu1,t − χu2,t
) (
χu1,t + χ
u
2,t
)
= 0 (3.8)
The productive entrepreneur will always invest in sector 1. Her borrowing con-
straints will bind if her return is greater than the domestic interest rate:
Rt+1 (ϕp) =
p1,t+1ϕp (1− θt+1)
1− p1,t+1ϕpθt+1J
(
Rt+1, R∗t+1, ψt+1
) ≥ Rt+1 (3.9)
The productive entrepreneurs only invest in sector 2 in Cases A and B, i.e. when
their returns are equalized across sectors. In cases C and D the return for the pro-
ductive in sector one exceeds that in sector two and hence χp1,t = 1. Productive
returns and the share of productive entrepreneurs operating in sector one are thus
linked as follows:
Rt+1 (ϕp) ≥ p1,t+1ϕp (1− κθt+1)
1− p1,t+1ϕpθt+1J
(
Rt+1, R∗t+1, ψt+1
) and
0 =
(
1− χp1,t
){
Rt+1 (ϕp)− p1,t+1ϕp (1− κθt+1)
1− p1,t+1ϕpθt+1J
(
Rt+1, R∗t+1, ψt+1
)} (3.10)
The proportional excess return of the productive over the unproductive, denoted
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xt, is defined as follows:
xt = (Rt+1 (ϕp)−Rt+1)/Rt+1 ≥ 0 (3.11)
3.4.2.4 Aggregate conditions
In equilibrium, market clearing conditions must hold in each period for domestic
credit markets, intermediate and final consumption good markets. Credit market
clearing implies that total domestic borrowing repayments are equal to zero:
Bt+1 ≡ Bpt+1 +But+1 = 0 (3.12)
where Bpt+1 and But+1 are total domestic borrowing repayments by productive
and unproductive entrepreneurs respectively (where the unproductive, as domes-
tic lenders, have negative repayments). The total level of repayments of foreign
borrowing B∗t+1 is limited by the foreign borrowing constraints aggregated across
entrepreneurs:
B∗t+1 ≤ ψt+1θt+1
(
p1,t+1
(
ϕpI
p
1,t + ϕuI
u
1,t
)
+ κp2,t+1
(
ϕpI
p
2,t + ϕuI
u
2,t
)) (3.13)
which binds if Rt+1 > R∗t+1.
In order to provide a convenient expression for total investment levels denote
the share of net worth of productive entrepreneurs in total net worth at time t as st,
where:
st = (ϕp
(
p1,tI
p
1,t−1 + p2,tI
p
2,t−1)− Bp,∗t
)
/Zt (3.14)
The share of net worth at time t of those productive entrepreneurs investing in sector
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one is therefore given by χp1,tst.
The maximum constrained investment of entrepreneurs can be derived from sub-
stituting their flow of funds equation into the binding borrowing constraints. The to-
tal equity investment made by each entrepreneur is equal to β times their net worth.
Total own equity investment in sector 1 by the productive is therefore βχp1,tstZt
with a corresponding expression for sector two. Total investment of productive en-
trepreneurs in sector j is given by:
Ipj,t ≤
βχpj,tstZt
1− ϕppj,t+1θj,t+1J
(
Rt+1, R∗t+1, ψt+1
) for j ∈ {1, 2} (3.15)
which holds with equality if Rj,t+1 (ϕp) > Rt+1, i.e. if the overall borrowing
constraint binds. A similar expression can be derived for the unproductive invest-
ment in sector 1 from their foreign borrowing constraint (with their investment in
sector 2 derived as a residual from aggregate investment):
Iu1,t ≤
βχu1,t (1− st)Zt
1− ϕup1,t+1ψt+1θt+1/R∗t+1
(3.16)
which binds when R1,t+1 (ϕu) = R∗t+1.
Total demand for each intermediate good from final goods producers must equal
entrepreneurial production. The relative demands for intermediates from the final
goods producer implies:
ϕpI
p
1,t−1 + ϕuI
u
1,t−1
ϕpI
p
2,t−1 + ϕuI
u
2,t−1
=
γ
(1− γ)
(
p2,t
p1,t
)
(3.17)
Final goods market clearing gives: Yt +
B∗t+1
R∗t+1
= Cpt + C
u
t + It + B
∗
t where C
p
t
and Cut indicate total consumption of productive and unproductive entrepreneurs
respectively at time t.
Total investment It is the sum of investment by productive and unproductive
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entrepreneurs in different sectors:17
It ≡ Ip1,t + Ip2,t + Iu1,t + Iu2,t (3.18)
Summing the flows of funds across all entrepreneurs, and using the domestic
market clearing condition, provides the expression for aggregate net worth, Zt =
p1,tY1,t + p2,tY2,t − B∗t = Yt − B∗t . Substituting in this expression and optimal
consumption into the goods market clearing condition gives:
B∗t+1
R∗t+1
+ βZt = It (3.19)
In addition to these market clearing conditions, the aggregate pricing equation must
be satisfied (Equation 3.3).
In terms of the dynamics of net worth, irrespective of the sector in which they
decide to produce, the unproductive entrepreneurs earn a return of Rt+1 with the
productive entrepreneurs earning a return of (1 + xt)Rt+1. Thus the transition of
aggregate net worth is given by:
Zt+1 = βZt (st (1 + xt+1)Rt+1 + (1− st)Rt+1) = (1 + stxt+1)Rt+1βZt (3.20)
The growth rate of net worth gt+1 ≡ Zt+1/Zt therefore depends on the sav-
ings rate and the returns to investment aggregated over productive and unproductive
entrepreneurs. In period t + 1, the net worth of productive entrepreneurs reflects
the returns of those who remain productive between t and t + 1 and the returns of
unproductive who invested at time t who become productive at time t+ 1 :
17Aggregate productivity can then be defined as final goods output at time t over total investment
at time t− 1:
TFPt =
(
ϕpI
p
1,t−1 + ϕuI
u
1,t−1
)γ (
ϕpI
p
2,t−1 + ϕuI
u
2,t−1
)1−γ
/
(
γγ (1− γ)1−γ It−1
)
.
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st+1Zt+1 = βZtRt+1 (st (1− δ) (1 + xt) + (1− st)nδ)
Thus the transition of the share of net worth held by the productive is given by:
st+1 =
st (1− δ) (1 + xt) + (1− st)nδ
(1 + stxt)
(3.21)
It will also prove useful to define, Xt, as the net worth share-weighted excess
return of the productive, i.e., Xt ≡ stxt.
3.4.2.5 Equilibrium definition
Given initial levels of investment (I p1,t−1, Iu1,t−1, Ip2,t−1, Iu2,t−1), aggregate net
worth Zt and the productive entrepreneurs’ net worth share st, the equilibrium dy-
namics of the economy are described by a path for relative prices, interest rates, ex-
cess returns, the allocation of productive entrepreneurs across sectors, entrepreneurial
net worths, investment levels, and foreign borrowings (p1,t, p2,t, Rt+1, Rt+1 (ϕp),
xt+1, χ
p
1,t, χ
u
1,t, χ
u
2,t, I
p
1,t, I
p
2,t, I
u
1,t, I
u
2,t, It, B
∗
t+1, st+1, Zt+1) that satisfy the follow-
ing equations: the relative demands for intermediates (Equation 3.17); the aggregate
pricing equation (Equation 3.3); the definitions ofRt+1 (ϕp) and xt+1 (Equations 3.9
and 3.11 respectively); the condition for return equalization across sectors for the
productive entrepreneur (Equation 3.10); the condition for the domestic interest rate
to be greater than or equal to the returns earned by the unproductive with maximum
leverage and the sectoral conditions for production (Equation 3.7 for each sector
and (Equation 3.8); the upper bound on investment of the productive in sectors 1
and 2 (Equation 3.15 for each sector) and on the investment of the unproductive in
sector 1 (Equation 3.16); goods market clearing (Equation 3.19); the definition of
aggregate investment (Equation 3.18); the aggregate international borrowing con-
straint (Equation 3.13); the transition of aggregate net worth (Equation 3.20); the
transition for the share of net worth held by the productive (Equation 3.21). In each
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period this gives 16 equations in 16 unknowns.
3.4.3 Parameter values
Where possible, closed form solutions are derived for steady state comparative
statics. Graphical illustrations and, when necessary, numerical solutions require
baseline parameter values which, on the whole, are set to follow those of Aoki et al.
(2010). A range of sensitivity analysis is conducted around the baseline values.
High productivity entrepreneurs are assumed to produce 1.2 units of output for
every unit of investment, i.e. ϕp = 1.2, while the productivity of low productiv-
ity entrepreneurs is ϕu = 1.05. As noted by Aoki et al. (2010) this is somewhat
lower than the ratio of 75th to 25th of plant level productivity in the US of around
1.3. It is also below comparative ratios of 2.5 and 2.3 found by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009). The baseline parameters for the idiosyncratic shocks to productivity are set
at n = 0.1 and δ = 0.15. Taking each period as a year this means that the proba-
bility of a productive entrepreneur receiving an adverse shock in a year is 15% and
the probability of a favorable productivity shock for an unproductive entrepreneurs
is 1.5%. This implies a steady state share of productive agents of 9% who expect
to remain with high productivity for 6.7 years (i.e. 1/δ). These parameter values
satisfy Assumption 3 which allows us to focus on steady state equilibria and are
also in line with the related literature.18 The discount factor β is set at 0.96 which,
combined with the high productivity parameters, implies that in autarky net worth
growth reaches up to 15 percent in the unconstrained equilibrium. The parameters
18For example, in a model with transfer of talent across finite-lived generations, Caselli and Gen-
naioli (2006) set transition probabilities to match evidence on intergenerational correlation of talent
(as proxied by IQs) and the fraction of talented managers. This gives a calibrated value for the
likelihood of a talented individual having talented offspring of 0.46 and of an untalented individual
having untalented offspring of 0.96. Translated into the current set-up, this would be equivalent to
setting δ + nδ = 0.58. Note, however, that these are the transition probabilities across generations.
In a model using the transition of productivity across years for a given individual, the symmetric
transition probabilities used by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) are 0.25, i.e. states change every four
years, which is also broadly in line with the assumption.
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for the relative weight in final goods production of the sector one intermediate and
for the relative credit multiplier in sector two are set at γ = 0.7 and κ = 0.9 respec-
tively to provide some, but not extreme, differentiation across sectors. Finally, as
in Aoki et al. (2010) the baseline value for ψ is one half (i.e. foreign creditors are
assumed only to be able to recover half the net project value that domestic creditors)
and the foreign real interest rate is set at 4%.
3.5 Domestic financial reforms with a closed capital
account
Before moving to the set up with a liberalized capital account, this section high-
lights the key features of the model equilibria in the baseline case of financial au-
tarky, focusing on the two reallocation mechanisms at play during financial reforms,
i.e. inter-sectoral and inter-firm. The discussion below first considers the nature of
the equilibria in the model and then the comparative statics of financial reforms on
the steady state equilibria, including conditioning factors and reform complemen-
tarities.
3.5.1 Recovery rates and the partitioning of equilibria
The different types of potential competitive equilibria are partitioned by the
value of the state variable, namely the share that productive entrepreneurs have
in total net worth st. This is because st determines the returns from different pro-
duction and borrowing choices through expectations of relative prices in the next
period and the domestic interest rate (Proposition 3). Since the level of recovery
rates in the economy influences these returns, the cut-offs for the state variable can
be expressed as a function of θt+1.19
19See Appendix Figure 3.9 for a graphical illustration.
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Proposition 3 For given model parameters, the type of equilibria at time t is uniquely
determined by the state variable of the share of the productive entrepreneurs in total
net worth entering the period, st:
• st > sA(θt+1): unconstrained equilibria with only productive investing in
production.
• sB(θt+1) < st ≤ sA(θt+1): constrained equilibria (A) in which only the
productive invest in production (in both sectors).
• sC(θt+1) < st ≤ sB(θt+1): constrained equilibria (B) in which the produc-
tive invest in production in both sectors and the unproductive also invest in
production in sector two only.
• sD(θt+1) < st ≤ sC(θt+1): constrained equilibria (C) in which the produc-
tive only invest in production in sector one and the unproductive invest in
production in both sectors.
• st ≤ sD(θt+1): constrained equilibria (D) in which the productive invest in
production in sector one and the unproductive in sector 2.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.2.
The channel through which the state variable affects these relative prices is
through the investment decision of entrepreneurs. For example, if there is a rise in
the share of net worth held by the productive, i.e. st rises, then the partial equilib-
ria effect would be for the productive entrepreneurs to increase their investment via
two mechanisms. First, their own equity investment relative to Zt (i.e. βst) would
increase directly. Second, increasing their own equity investment would increase
expected revenues next period, which can be pledged to facilitate greater borrowing
to finance investment. But, if st rises there is a lower share of domestic net worth
available for domestic lending by the unproductive, pushing up the interest rate. To
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maintain a given pattern of returns associated with an equilibrium (e.g. productive
return equalization in the example of a case A equilibria) relative prices of inter-
mediates must adjust.20 This general equilibria adjustment in relative prices and
the interest rate can have two reallocative effects. First, it will affect the incentives
to invest of high and low productivity firms differently leading to a reallocation of
production across firms. Second it will lead to a change in the incentives to produce
in different sectors. The overall effect is to reduce borrowing as a share of total net
worth in the economy.
For given st and θt+1, the unique value of st+1 is given by the transition Equation
3.21. The model steady states are stable and unique and can be partitioned by the
level of recovery rates within the economy.21
Proposition 4 In the financial autarky steady state, there are five possible types of
locally stable equilibria partitioned by the level of recovery rates, θ, which corre-
spond to the different production combinations outlined in Proposition 3.
• θ > θA: unconstrained equilibria with only the productive entrepreneurs
investing in production in both sectors.
• θB < θ ≤ θA: constrained equilibria type (A);
• θC < θ < θB: constrained equilibria type (B);
• θD < θ ≤ θC: constrained equilibria type (C);
• θ ≤ θD: constrained equilibria type (D).
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.3.
20Similarly in Kiyotaki (1998) the interest rate adjusts while in Aoki et al. (2010) both the domes-
tic interest rate and the other relative price in their model, i.e. wages, adjust.
21Although not the focus of this Chapter, transitional dynamics may also differ markedly depend-
ing on the nature of the constrained steady state with jumps to the new steady state for type A and C
equilibria and smoother, concave, transitional dynamics for type B and D.
99
3.5.2 Domestic financial reforms and the reallocation of invest-
ment across firms and sectors
In domestic autarky closed form solutions for the comparative statics of financial
reforms can be derived as detailed in Proposition 5 (and as illustrated in Appendix
Figure 3.10).
Proposition 5 The comparative statics of financial reform in the autarky constrained
steady state equilibria are such that:
1. the domestic interest rate: ∂R/∂θ ≥ 0 (= 0 in Case D);
2. relative intermediate prices: ∂(p2/p1)/∂θ < 0 in Case A, > 0 in Cases B and
C and = 0 in Case D
3. the share of net worth of the productive and their excess returns: ∂s/∂θ ≥ 0,
∂x/∂θ ≥ 0 in Case B and D (< 0 in Cases A and C);
4. the growth rate of aggregate net worth ∂g/∂θ = β((1 +X) ∂R/∂θ+R∂X/∂θ) >
0 in Cases A, B, D and ≷ 0 in Case C
5. the share of productive entrepreneurs investing in production in sector 1:
∂χp1/∂θ < 0 for 0 < χp1 < 1 (i.e. Cases C and D);
6. investment levels: ∂Ip1/∂θ > 0 in Cases B, C and D and ≷ 0 in Case A,
∂Ip2/∂θ > 0 for Ip2 > 0 (i.e. Cases A and B), ∂Iu1 /∂θ > 0 for Ip1 > 0 (i.e.
Case D) and ∂Iu2 /∂θ < 0 for Cases B and C and < 0 for Case D.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.4.
Looking across steady states, the reallocation in production in response to do-
mestic financial reforms (as proxied by increases in pledgeability of revenues, θ)
when the economy is financially constrained involves movements in resources across
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sectors and between productive and unproductive firms. To illustrate the two real-
locative channels the steady state comparative statics of this model can be compared
to those of the model of Kiyotaki (1998) in which sectoral reallocations are switched
off (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Domestic financial reforms and the steady state impact of realloca-
tions across firms and sectors - the autarky case
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Note: Base parameters are γ = 0.7;κ = 0.8;θ = 0.7;ϕp = 1.2;ϕu = 1.05; n = 0.1; δ = 0.15; β = 0.96. Model
with inter-firm and inter-sectoral reallocations is the base model. The model without sectoral reallocations is adapted from
Kiyotaki (1998).
As the recovery rate θ rises, the greater leverage benefits boost the investment
of the productive entrepreneurs more than that of the unproductive. As a result
their share in total investment rises, i.e. as in Kiyotaki (1998) there is an intra-firm
reallocation of investment towards the productive, raising aggregate productivity (in
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line with the empirical evidence of Abiad et al., 2008).
The nature of the intra-sectoral reallocations in response to financial reforms
depends on the constrained equilibria type. These reallocations reflect two channels.
The first is the direct impact through the partial equilibrium increase in relative
returns in sector one due to its higher relative recovery rate. The second effect is
through the adjustment in relative prices.
Except for in Case D where the unproductive produce in both sector, in con-
strained equilibria, the rise in investment induced due to a rise in the recovery rate
leads to an increase in the domestic interest rate so as to maintain funds market
equilibrium in which available credit is a fixed share of investment to net worth. In
Case D the direct impact of a higher θ induces a reallocation of investment of the
unproductive towards sector two since the investment of the productive in sector
one rises and the relative outputs across the two sectors is held constant by the fixed
relative price.
In the equilibria other than Case D, relative prices of intermediate goods also
adjust in response to changes in the domestic recovery rate θ. For example, when
the productive produce in both sectors and the unproductive do not produce (i.e.
case A), a rise in the interest rate dampens relative returns in sector one (given the
greater pledgeability of that sector) and so the relative price of sector two falls.
But, the return effect dominates and the share of productive entrepreneurs in sector
one falls and the overall share of investment in that sector. In the cases where the
unproductive also produce the rise in the domestic interest must be accompanied by
a rise in the price of sector two in order that their return indifference is maintained.22
In case B when the productive also produce in both sectors, this induces a rise in
the investment, and in the share of entrepreneurs, of the productive in sector two,
crowding out the unproductive. But the direct effect of the rise in θ on production in
sector one dominates resulting in a rise in the share of investment in sector one. In
22Recall that in these cases R = p2ϕu
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case C, while there is no shift in the number of producers in each sector the direct
effect on relative returns of the rise in θ also dominates the impact of the relative
price adjustment and the overall share of investment in sector one rises.
The additional intra-sectoral mechanism in this model smooths out the adjust-
ment process relative to that in Kiyotaki (1998). But, on the whole the comparative
statics are in a similar direction. For example, the domestic interest rate is non-
decreasing with θ (Figure 3.4). The improvement in pledgeability increases the
ability to borrow and hence relative prices must adjust to dampen the potential rise
in borrowing and maintain the fixed share of investment to net worth. This requires
a rise in the domestic interest rate in all equilibria but type D, in which the interest
rate is pinned down to the productivity of the unproductive entrepreneur. The non-
decreasing relationship from the model is broadly similar to empirical patterns (see
Figure 3.5).
The positive real interest rate effect is one of two channels through which changes
in pledgeability affect the steady state growth rate of aggregate net worth. The sec-
ond is the potentially offsetting (Cases A and C) or magnifying (Cases B and D)
reduction in the importance of the excess returns of the productive entrepreneurs,
X . The overall effect of a rise in θ on the growth rate of aggregate net worth is
positive in all but Case C for which it is ambiguous.
3.5.3 Conditioning factors, reform complementarities
Structural characteristics act as conditioning factors, determining the type of
equilibria for a given level of financial reform. They also influence the impact of
domestic financial reforms, i.e. there may be reform complementarities. These
structural characteristics include the dispersion in productivity across entrepreneurs
and the idiosyncratic uncertainty they face in their productivity, which could be
thought of as a risk of government expropriation of returns or idiosyncratic political
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Figure 3.5: Real lending interest rates (ex post) and financial reforms (five-year
averages, 1973-2003)
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Note: Nominal lending interest rate deflated by CPI inflation. Index of domestic financial reforms is the overall reform index
of Abiad et al. minus restrictions on international capital flows (with the resultant index rescaled to lie between zero and one
where a higher value is less restrictions). Capital account restrictions classed as high if over 0.5 (again corresponding index
from Abiad et al. rescaled to lie between zero and one) and low otherwise. Regressions include period and country fixed
effects.
Source: Abiad et al. (2010), World Bank World Development Indicators and author’s calculations.
and regulatory risk. The empirical literature finds similar factors to be important.
For example, Tressel et al. (2009) find that “variation in the quality of property rights
helps explain the heterogeneity of the effectiveness of financial and trade reforms
in developing countries. The evidence suggests that sufficiently developed property
rights are a precondition for reaping the benefits of economic reform”.
The likelihood of the economy being in different steady state equilibria depends
crucially on the structural parameter values. The closed form comparative statics of
the recovery rate cut-offs for the different equilibria types are given in Proposition
8 in the Appendix and in Appendix Figure 3.11. For example, if the difference
in credit constraints across sectors is sufficiently high, i.e. κ relatively low, or the
share of productive entrepreneurs relatively low, then the cut-off for θ above which
lies the range for the unconstrained steady state may be greater than 1, i.e. the
unconstrained state is not possible.
Similarly, an economy is more likely to be in the unconstrained equilibrium if
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there is a higher steady state share of productive entrepreneurs and if the divergence
between the credit multipliers in the two sectors is lower. The likelihood that the
unproductive produce is decreasing in the share of productive entrepreneurs (n) and
their relative productivity differential (ϕp/ϕu) and increasing in the probability that
the productive suffer an adverse productivity shock (δ, for given n). It may also be
the case that the cutoffs do not lie within the possible range for θ.
The potential for reform complementarities implies, for example, that the impact
of financial reforms depends on the dispersion of credit multipliers across sectors.
If this dispersion is high, i.e. a lower κ, the marginal impact of changes in θ on the
domestic borrowing potential, and hence the change in relative prices through the
aggregate investment constraint, is lower and as a result in general the magnitude of
the impact of financial reforms on the key endogenous variables is reduced. In line
with the empirical results of Tressel et al. (2009) cited above, a more stable business
environment, as proxied by a lower probability of adverse productivity shocks for
the productive entrepreneur (δ falls), also plays a role in determining the impact
of financial reforms. The partial derivative of the reform impact with respect to δ
varies but in general at lower levels of θ the marginal impact of financial reforms is
higher if the probability of adverse shocks to the productive is lower.
3.6 Allowing for capital account liberalization
The key features of the domestic autarky economy carry over into the set-up
allowing for international borrowing. This includes the partitioning of equilibria by
the domestic recovery rate and the role of policy complementarities in determining
the impact of financial reforms. However, closed form solutions are not always
possible due to the additional complexity introduced by the international borrowing
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constraint.23 Numerical solutions are required in many cases and the continuity of
the ranges of θ for the different equilibria and the non-ambiguity of the comparative
static results are no longer guaranteed.
Proposition 6 sets out the different possible steady state equilibria in the inter-
national finance case. The possibility of interest rate equalization is restricted to
equilibria in which only the productive produce. In the cases that the unproductive
entrepreneurs also produce, the steady state equilibria are only defined for R > R∗
since if the international borrowing constraint does not bind then there are insuffi-
cient equations for the number of endogenous variables.
Proposition 6 With financial integration, there are six possible types of unique
steady state equilibria, all locally stable, which may exist.
• Unconstrained equilibria - For θ > θA,IF > θA, the entrepreneurs are un-
constrained and only the productive entrepreneurs produce, in both sectors,
and they borrow from home and abroad.
• Type A without interest rate equalization (denoted A,IF,R>R∗) - The productive
entrepreneurs produce only and the international borrowing constraint (IBC)
binds, i.e. R > R∗, if θ is in the set:
AIF,R>R∗ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩θ ∈ [0, ϕu/ϕp) : θ ≤ θA,IF RA,IF,R>R∗ (θ) > R
∗
RA,IF,R>R∗ (ϕu) (θ) < RA,IF,R>R∗ (θ)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ .
where θA,IF is the upper bound for the range of values for which X IFA (θ) is
positive.
• Type A with interest rate equalization (denoted A,IF,R=R∗) - Only the produc-
23In particular, with international finance the ratio of investment to net worth is no longer an
exogenous constant.
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tive entrepreneurs produce and RA,IF,R=R∗ (θ) = R∗ if θ is in the set:
AIF,R>R∗ = {θ ∈ [0, ϕu/ϕp) : XA,IF,R>R∗ (θ) ≥ 0 RA,IF,R=R∗ (ϕu) (θ) < R∗} .
• Type B (denoted BIF ): The IBC binds and the productive produce in both
sectors and the unproductive in sector two only. The relevant set for θ is
defined by:
BIF =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩θ ∈ [0, ϕu/ϕp) : XB,IF (θ) ≥ 0 RB,IF (θ) > R
∗
I
u
B,IF,2 (θ) > 0 1 > χ
p
B,IF
(θ)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
• Type C (denoted CIF ): The IBC binds with the productive producing in sector
one and the unproductive in sector two if θ lies in the following set:
CIF =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩θ ∈ [0, ϕu/ϕp) : θ ≤ θC,IF RC,IF,1 (ϕp) (θ) > RC,IF,2 (ϕp) (θ)RC,IF (θ) > R∗ RC,IF,2 (ϕu) (θ) > RD,IF,1 (ϕu) (θ)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
where θC,IF is the upper bound for the range of values for which X IFC (θ) is
positive (with θC,IF > θC).
• Type D (denoted DIF ): The productive produce in sector one and the unpro-
ductive in both sectors with the IBC binding. The relevant set for θ is:
DIF =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩θ ∈ [0, ϕu/ϕp) :
XD,IF (θ) ≥ 0 IuD,IF,1 (θ) > 0 IuD,IF,2 (θ) > 0
RD,IF,1 (ϕp) (θ) > RD,IF,2 (ϕp) (θ) RD,IF (θ) > R
∗
RD,IF,1 (ϕu) (θ) = RD,IF,2 (ϕu) (θ)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.6.
Numerical solutions illustrate that the influence of structural conditioning fac-
tors on the type of equilibria is on the whole in a similar direction to that in autarky
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(see Appendix Figure 3.12). For example, increasing the probability of adverse pro-
ductivity shocks to the productive, i.e. increasing δ, increases the range over which
the unproductive produce in both sectors, leading to the lowest TFP. In addition, for
some parameter values there may not exist a steady state equilibrium.
The impact of financial reforms, both domestic and international, again depends
on the interaction of three different effects: the direct leverage effect and general
equilibrium changes in the domestic interest rate and relative prices. The relative
magnitude of these effects due to capital account liberalization depends upon the
state of domestic financial reforms. The leverage benefits of a relaxation in interna-
tional credit constraints, ψ, will be greater at higher levels of overall pledgeability.
In contrast the price and real interest rate impacts vary with θ.24 This differential
nature of the relationship between the domestic interest rate and domestic finan-
cial reforms by the level of capital account liberalization is also suggested in the
available data (Figure 3.5).
As a result the comparative statics for capital account liberalization may be am-
biguous.25 However, it can be shown that capital account liberalization increases the
excess return for productive entrepreneurs and their share of net worth (Proposition
7).
Proposition 7 International financial reforms: In each type of steady state in which
the international borrowing constraint is not binding, for given θ, opening up the
capital account through loosening the restrictions on foreign borrowing (i.e. in-
creasing ψ) increases the productive entrepreneurs’ excess return and share of net
worth relative to their value in autarky. This is due to the additional leverage possi-
24As with the real wage and interest rate impact in Aoki et al. (2010).
25The sensitivities of the key variables to domestic financial reforms, i.e. changes in θ, are in
general in a similar direction to in the autarky case (see Appendix Figure 3.13). However, the
additional complexity of the model means that in some cases they are now ambiguous or differ in
direction to those in financial autarky. For example, with international finance, the domestic interest
rate the equilibria in which the unproductive produce in both sectors (type D) is now decreasing in θ
(whereas it is constant in the Case D autarky equilibrium).
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ble through foreign borrowing. The sensitivity of the domestic interest rate to a rise
in ψ varies across steady states. In case A with the IBC binding R = R∗ but the
sensitivity is ambiguous for R > R∗ (and also in Case C). In Case B the interest
rate rises with capital account liberalization but falls in Case D.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.6.
As in the autarky case we again can compare this model to one with only inter-
firm reallocations.26 Numerical illustrations highlight that the impact of interna-
tional financial liberalization can vary quite markedly from that in which sectoral
reallocations are switched off.
This is seen for example in the response of the domestic interest rate and the
excess return of productive entrepreneurs (Figure 3.6). For very high levels of do-
mestic recovery rates, with only the productive producing, the leverage benefits of
an increased ability to borrow from abroad boosts the returns in sector one more
than in sector two (given the higher pledgeability in that sector). Relative prices in
sector two must rise to maintain return equalization for the productive. The domes-
tic interest rate rises as the increased demand for funds for investment more than
offsets the increased availability of funds from abroad. This channel is similar to
the baseline one-sector model. However, with two sectors, productive entrepreneurs
also shift into sector one since the leverage benefit of the liberalization for this sec-
tor more than offsets the reduction in relative returns due to the fall in sector one’s
relative price. Although the rise in the domestic interest rate induces a greater share
of unproductive investment in total investment, the overall effect of the higher pro-
duction for both productive and unproductive is to increase TFP. At middle levels
of domestic financial development, greater international financial liberalization can
lead to a fall in domestic interest rates. The relaxation of the overall borrowing con-
straint has a greater impact on the supply of funds requiring a fall in the domestic
26This is based on the numerical steady state solutions of an extension of the baseline model of
Kiyotaki (1998) to add international borrowing constraints as described in Section 3.4.
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interest rate to maintain market clearing for investment funds. At lower levels of do-
mestic financial reforms, return equalization of the unproductive may require a rise
in domestic interest rates upon international liberalization. In contrast, in the single
sector model the domestic interest rate is here pinned down to the productivity of
the unproductive entrepreneurs.
Thus, in general, both domestic and international financial reforms lead to higher
interest rates as the ability to borrow for investment rises. Production shifts towards
productive entrepreneurs and across sectors in response to the relative price move-
ments and aggregate productivity rises. This is broadly in line with the stylized
facts which show a higher level of TFP as domestic financial reforms rise (see Fig-
ure 3.7). But, once the role of structural factors, for example, firm-level uncertainty
and relative productivity, is taken into account (as proxied by country fixed effects in
Figure 3.7) the relationship between TFP and financial reforms is more ambiguous.
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Figure 3.7: TFP and financial reform indices (five-year averages, 1973-2003)
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Note: TFP estimates taken from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) and financial reform index data from Abiad et al. (2010)
and Tressel and Detragiache (2008). Index of domestic financial reforms is the overall reform index of Abiad et al. minus
restrictions on international capital flows (with the resultant index rescaled to lie between zero and one where a higher value
is less restrictions). Capital account restrictions classed as high if over 0.5 (again corresponding index from Abiad et al.
rescaled to lie between zero and one) and low otherwise. Regressions include period and country fixed effects.
3.7 Conclusions
This Chapter has set out a simple extension of a stripped down version of a
standard credit multiplier model used in the macro literature to examine the inter-
sectoral and inter-firm reallocation effects due to domestic and international finan-
cial reforms. Financial factors affect the domestic interest rate through adjustments
in constrained investment demand. In turn the relative prices necessary for firms
to produce must adjust to offset changes in their cost of finance. This provides
an alternative channel of relative price adjustment to the wages channel which is
emphasized by Aoki et al. (2010).
The non-linearities in the impacts of domestic and international financial re-
forms, and the role of conditioning factors, fit with the nuanced empirical evidence
on the impact of financial reforms on TFP and growth. However, this advantage
must be set against the clearer analysis of patterns of propagation and amplifica-
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tion of shocks that can be achieved through using more standard one-sector credit
multiplier models.
Nevertheless this relatively simple model has the potential to be used for a range
of further research questions. The first is to examine the nature of the transitional
dynamics in response to liberalization of domestic financial reforms and capital
account liberalization. Indeed, the initial motivation for this research project was
to provide such a theoretical framework to take to the sectoral empirical data. The
second set of questions is how the results are sensitive to modifications of the set
up. For example, the production structure could be expanded to include labor and
capital (which in a model of constant returns and fixed labor supply would pin
down the steady state growth rate).27 Another interesting extension is to follow the
approach of Matsuyama (2007) where the productivity in each sector varies as well
as the credit multiplier. This may be intuitive since, for example, a potentially high
return sector may also be one in which it is harder for a creditor to take over and
operate efficiently in the case of default. Finally, the framework could be used to
explore the political economy of financial reforms, along the lines of Rajan and
Zingales (2003). For example, the different credit multipliers across sectors may
be used to highlight the macro impact of directed credit policies on productivity,
which is perhaps of increasing interest given the increased role of the state in many
financial sectors due to the global financial crisis.
27At a first pass the main results of the model would seem to go through when adding a simple
labor side but adding wage elastic labor supply would require additional assumptions, for example,
on the labor elasticity parameter, to pin down unique steady states for a given θ.
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3.A Appendix: Additional figures
Figure 3.8: Entrepreneurial investment options for given domestic interest rates
and next period intermediate prices
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Figure 3.9: The different autarky equilibria possible for values of the state
variable st by value of the credit multiplier θt + 1
Note: Base parameters are γ = 0.7;κ = .8;ϕp = 1.2;ϕu = 1.05;n = 0.1;δ = 0.15;β = 0.96.
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Figure 3.11: The role of conditioning factors in determining the range of au-
tarky equilibria cut-offs
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Figure 3.12: The role of conditioning factors in determining the range of inter-
national finance steady state equilibria
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Figure 3.13: Domestic financial reforms with international finance - steady
state comparative statics
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3.B Appendix: Proofs
3.B.1 Equilibrium production combinations
In an unconstrained equilibria, the domestic interest rate is pinned down by
the productivity of the productive. Only the productive will produce. To identify
the productive combinations in a constrained equilibrium note that (i) given the
structure of final production it must be the case that both intermediate goods are
produced; (ii) due to their higher relative productivities and returns from production,
the productive must always produce in at least one sector; (iii) return equalization
cannot hold for both the productive and unproductive (since for any intermediate
price and domestic interest rate the returns of the productive are higher than the
unproductive); (iv) if return equalization holds for the productive the unproductive
prefer, if they produce at all, to produce in sector two; (v) if return equalization
holds for the unproductive then the productive must produce in sector one.
The last two points can be seen from examining the conditions for return equal-
ization. Return equalization for a constrained productive entrepreneur occurs along
the following locus in (p2,t+1, Rt+1) space:
p2,t+1 − (1− θt+1) p1,t+1 (p2,t+1)
1− κθt+1 − p1,t+1 (p2,t+1)ϕp (1− κ) θt+1J
(
Rt+1, R∗t+1, ψt+1
) = 0
(3.22)
Denoting the left-hand side by Γp(p2,t+1, Rt+1), the implicit value of p2,t+1 de-
fined by Γp = 0 is downward sloping in Rt+1. If p2,t+1 is above (below) this locus
then the productive would prefer to produce in sector two (one) only. Return equal-
ization for a constrained unproductive entrepreneur pins down a unique value of
p2,t+1 given R∗t+1 such that:
p2,t+1 − (1− ψt+1θt+1) p1,t+1 (p2,t+1)
1− κψt+1θt+1 − p1,t+1 (p2,t+1)ϕu (1− κ) θt+1ψt+1/R∗t+1
= 0 (3.23)
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If p2,t+1 is above (below) this unique value then the unproductive would prefer
to produce in sector two (one) only. It can be shown that this unique value is less
than the value of p2,t+1 given by evaluating Γp(p2,t+1, Rt+1) at Rt+1 = R∗t+1, i.e.
the price in sector two required to equalize returns across sectors is higher for the
productive than the unproductive. This is because the lower credit multiplier in
sector two has a greater detrimental effect on the returns of the productive (due to
their higher leverage and because they borrow from home and abroad). Thus, to
compensate and maintain return equalization for the productive, the price in sector
two must be higher than that required for return equalization for the unproductive.
This implies that if return equalization holds for the productive the unproductive
prefer, if they produce at all, to produce in sector two. If return equalization holds
for the unproductive then the productive must produce in sector one.
The above five restrictions mean that there are four possible production combi-
nations for the constrained equilibria:
• If constrained return equalization holds for the productive then the productive
produce in both sectors. The unproductive may or may not choose to produce
but if they do so they would produce in sector two. This gives two constrained
productive combinations, type A and B respectively.
• If the productive prefer to produce in sector one only, then the unproductive
must produce in sector two. If the unproductive returns are equalized across
sectors then they may produce in sector two only, a type C equilibria, or in
both sectors, a type D equilibria.
If the productive prefer to produce in sector two only, then the price in sector
two is such that the unproductive would also prefer to produce in sector two. Thus
this cannot be an equilibria as the intermediate goods must be produced in both
sectors.
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3.B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The dynamics of the system can be described by the non-linear difference equa-
tion in st+1 = f (st) and the transition of Zt+1 = (1 + stxt)Rt+1βZt. Below we
define ρt+1 ≡ p2,t+1/p1,t+1 and normalize aggregate quantities by Zt (denoting nor-
malized variables by an upper bar) and drop the time subscript on other parameters
(excluding θt+1).
3.B.2.1 Constrained Equilibria Type A
Return equalization pins down ρt+1 in terms of Rt+1. Given Rt+1 and st, con-
strained investment demands and the aggregate investment equation determine the
productive entrepreneurs’ investment in each sector and their distribution across
sectors. The relative demands for goods can then be used to determine Rt+1.
The constrained investment equations for each sector are given by:
I
p
1,t =
βχp1,tstρt+1 (1− κ)
(1− θt+1) (1− κρt+1)
I
p
2,t =
βst
(
1− χp1,t
)
(1− κ)
(1− κθt+1) (1− κρt+1) = I
p
1,t
(
1− χp1,t
)
(1− θt+1)
χp1,tρt+1 (1− κθt+1)
Plugging these expressions into the equation for relative demands for interme-
diate output in the following period gives χp1,t = γ (1− θt+1) / (1− Ωθt+1) where
Ω (κ, γ) ≡ κ + γ (1− κ). Using these expressions relative prices as an increas-
ing function of st can be pinned down from the goods market/investment clearing
condition (β = Ip1,t + I
p
2,t):
1 =
st (1− κ) (1− ρt+1κ)
(1− Ωθt+1) ((1− γ) + γρt+1) ⇔ ρt+1 =
1− Ωθt+1 − (1− γ) (1− κ) st
γ (1− κ) st + κ (1− Ωθt+1)
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The excess return of the productive can be expressed in terms of relative prices
and hence st and is decreasing in the latter.
xt (st) =
1− Ωθt+1 − st
Ωθt+1st
When this expression is plugged into the difference equation we obtain st+1 =
(1− δ) (1− Ωθt+1) + nδΩθt+1, i.e. st+1 jumps immediately to the SS value.
If this equilibria is to exist then xt (st) ≥ 0, i.e. st ≤ sA (θt+1) ≡ (1− Ωθt+1).
Above this range the productive are unconstrained. A further condition is that the
unproductive do not find it worthwhile to invest, i.e. Rt+1(st) > p2,t+1(st)ϕu. With
some manipulation this gives the following condition:
st >
(1− Ωθt+1) (ϕu − κθt+1ϕp)
(1− Ωθt+1)ϕu − γ (1− κ) θt+1ϕp ≡ sA (θt+1) > sA (θt+1)
So, if sA (θt+1) < st ≤ sA (θt+1) then an equilibria of type A is possible.
3.B.2.2 Constrained Equilibria type B
In this equilibria, the productive produce in both sectors and the unproductive
in sector two. Rt+1 and ρt+1 are thus determined by the conditions for the return
equalization for the productive and Rt+1 = p2,t+1ϕu. The excess return of the
productive is equal to xt = (ϕp − ϕu) / (ϕu − κθt+1ϕp). This gives a concave
function for the transition equation st+1 = f(st) with a positive gradient around the
steady state of less than one. Investment levels I p1,t, I
p
2,t, I
u
2,t and χ
p
1,t are determined
by the two equations for constrained intermediate investment by the productive, the
relative demand for intermediates and goods market clearing condition. The share
of productive investing in sector one can be shown to be decreasing in st :
χp1,t (st) =
γ (1− θt+1) ((ϕp − ϕu) + (ϕu − κθt+1ϕp) /st)
ϕp (1− κθt+1)
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For this equilibria to exist st must be above a lower bound so that χp1,t < 1:
st > sB (θt+1) ≡
γ (1− θt+1) (ϕu − κθt+1ϕp)
ϕp (1− κθt+1)− (ϕp − ϕu) γ (1− θt+1)
The upper bound of the range for this equilibria is determined by the condition
that Iu2,t > 0 (since it can be shown that the derivative of productive investment
with respect to st is positive). This upperbound is equal to the lower bound of
case A, i.e. sB (θt+1) = sA (θt+1) (since in both cases the unproductive investment
is zero, Rt+1 = p2,t+1ϕu and return equalization holds for the productive) where
sB (θt+1) < sB (θt+1). So if sB (θt+1) < st ≤ sB (θt+1) then an equilibria of type B
is possible with st+1 = f(st) which is a concave function with a unique fixed point.
3.B.2.3 Constrained Equilibria type C
The productive produce in sector one and the unproductive in sector two. The
domestic interest rate is determined by Rt+1 = p2,t+1ϕu. Again, constrained invest-
ment levels can be plugged into the investment/goods market clearing condition to
give an expression for ρt+1 (st) and the excess return of the productive can then be
defined as a decreasing function of st:
xt (st) =
ϕp − ρt+1 (st)ϕu
ρt+1 (st)ϕu − θt+1ϕp =
γ (1− θt+1)− st
st (1− γ (1− θt+1))
As in case A when this expression is plugged into the difference equation we
obtain a constant value for st+1 = (1− δ) γ (1− θt+1) + nδ. The condition for this
equilibria to exist are that the excess return of the productive is greater than or equal
to zero (ϕp  ρt+1 (st)ϕu and ρt+1 (st)ϕu > θt+1ϕp which is greater than one by
Assumption 6), the unproductive do not have an incentive to produce in sector one,
i.e. ρt+1 (st) > 1, and that the return for the productive from producing in sector
one is greater than in sector two. It is the latter two conditions that are binding. The
lower bound for st is defined as follows:
123
ρt+1 (st) > 1 ⇔ st > sC (θt+1) =
γ (ϕu − θt+1ϕp)
(1− γ)ϕp + γϕu
The upperbound is defined by the condition xt (ρt+1 (st)) > (ϕp − ϕu)/(ϕu −
κθt+1ϕp) which is equivalent to the following restriction on st:
st ≤ sC (θt+1) ≡ γ (1− θt+1) (ϕu − κθt+1ϕp)
ϕp (1− κθt+1)− (ϕp − ϕu) γ (1− θt+1) = sB (θt+1)
So, if sC (θt+1) < st ≤ sC (θt+1) then an equilibria of type C is possible with
st+1 = (1− δ) γ (1− θt+1) + nδ.
3.B.2.4 Constrained Equilibria type D
Relative intermediate goods prices are equal and R = ϕu. The excess return
of the productive is equal to xt = ϕp−ϕuϕu−θt+1ϕp and, as in case B, the transition equa-
tion st+1 = f(st) is an upward sloping concave function with an absolute gradient
around the steady state of less than one. The investment levels are linear functions
of st determined by the constrained investment of the productive, the goods market
clearing condition and relative demand for intermediates. If investment of the un-
productive in sector 1 is to be positive then the share of net worth of the productive
must be low enough, which implies the following condition:
st < sD (θt+1) =
γ (ϕu − θt+1ϕp)
γϕu + (1− γ)ϕp = sC (θt+1)
3.B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
3.B.3.1 Proof of stability of autarky steady state equilibria
The first order difference non-linear equation defining the transition of the dy-
namics of the economy is:
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st+1 = f(st) =
st (1− δ) (1 + xt) + (1− st)nδ
(1 + stxt)
(3.24)
where from the previous proof in Section 3.B.2 depending on the equilibria, xt
is a constant or a function of st. In a steady state equilibria sss = f(sss). Taking a
first order expansion around the equilibria we have st+1 = f(sss)+f ′(sss)(st−sss)
where |f ′(sss)| < 1 is the condition for local (asymptotic) stability. In the equilibria
in which xt is a function of st (i.e. equilibria of type A or type C) then it can be
shown that st+1 is equal to a constant. In those equilibria (type B and D) in which
xt is a constant then local stability also holds since:
f ′(sss) =
(1− δ − nδ) (1 + x)
(1 + sssx)2
=
(1− δ − nδ) (1 + x)
(1 + sssx) ((1− δ − nδ) (1 + x) + nδx+ nδ/s)
which is positive and less than one, given Assumption 3 that 1 > n + nδ.
3.B.3.2 Partitioning of steady state equilibria by θ
Applying the results from Section 3.B.2 we can derive the steady state equilibria
conditions (where steady state values are denoted with no time subscript).
Range for Type A equilibria: θB < θ ≤ θA In this steady state we have sA =
(1− δ) (1− Ωθ) + nδθ and xA = δ(1−θΩ(1+n))θΩ(1−δ−θΩ(1−δ(1+n))) . Two conditions define the
range of θ for Case A in which productive returns are equalized and unproductive do
not invest. First, productive entrepreneurs are constrained and receive non-negative
excess returns from investing: xA ≥ 0. Second, the unproductive do not find it
worthwhile to invest.
From Section 3.B.2 the first condition requires s ≤ sA (θ) ≡ (1− Ωθ) which
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implies that θ ≤ ((1 + n) Ω)−1 ≡ θA. The second condition requires R > p2ϕu
which is equivalent to 1+x(θ)
1+θκx(θ)
< ϕp/ϕu where the LHS is increasing in θ. Thus the
lower bound for θ for steady state equilibria of Type A is given by θ > θB where
θB can be implicitly defined by:
δ (1− θBΩ (1 + n))
1− δ − θBΩ (1− δ (1 + n)) −
ϕp − ϕu
ϕu − κθBϕp = 0
Range for Type B equilibria: θC < θ ≤ θB In the Type B equilibria, from
the previous proof in Section 3.B.2, we have xB (θ) = (ϕp − ϕu) / (ϕu − κθϕp).
Defining X ≡ sx, then rearranging Equation 3.20, we obtain the unique steady
state solution for XB (θ)
0 = X2B + (δ (1 + n)− (1− δ)xB (θ))XB − nδxB (θ)
If xB (θ) > 0 the solution to the above quadratic equation has one positive and
one negative root (from Vie`te’s formula). The positive root is increasing in xB
and X ′B (θ) > 0. We can also show that sB (θ) is increasing in xB and hence
dsB/dθ > 0.
Three equations define p2B , p1B and RB: unproductive entrepreneurs’ indiffer-
ence between saving and investing, i.e. R = p2ϕu; return equalization for the pro-
ductive; the aggregate pricing equation relating p2B and p1B . The first two equations
give relative prices as follows:
p2B (θ)
p1B (θ)
= 1 +
(ϕp − ϕu) (1− κ) θ
ϕu (1− κθ) > 1
From Section 3.B.2 we can obtain an expression for the share of the productive
operating in sector one which is decreasing in θ:
χp1 (θ) =
γ (1− θ) ((ϕp − ϕu) + (ϕu − κθϕp) /sB (θ))
ϕp (1− κθ)
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This steady state equilibria will occur in the range of parameter values for which
the following conditions must be satisfied:
• The productive entrepreneur is constrained and earns a positive return from
investing i.e. xB ≥ 0. This is satisfied since Assumption 6 holds.
• The productive entrepreneur has positive production in both sectors (χp1B (θ) <
1). Thus we can define a lower bound of θ for case B, θC , such thatχp1B (θC) =
1:
1 =
γ (ϕp − ϕu) (1− θC) (1 + 1/XB (θC))
ϕp (1− θCκ)
• The unproductive entrepreneurs find it worthwhile to invest in sector two, i.e.
I¯u2 (θ) > 0. The cut-off at which I¯u2 (θ) = 0 provides the upperbound on the
range of θ for case B (which is the lower bound for case A since in both cases
the same relative prices hold and the unproductive do not produce). This
upperbound θB ∈ (0, ϕu/ (ϕpκ)) can be shown to be defined uniquely by:
1 + 1/XB (θB) =
ϕp (1− κθB)
(ϕp − ϕu) (1− θBΩ)
where θB > θC .
Range for Type C equilibria: θD < θ ≤ θC From Section 3.B.2, in steady state
equilibrium sC (θ) = (1− δ) γ (1− θ) + nδ and we have the following positive
solution for XC :
XC = δ
(
1
Λ (θ)
− (1 + n)
)
where Λ (θ) ≡ (1− γ (1− θ)), X ′C (θ) < 0 and XA > XC . The excess return
of the productive entrepreneurs is given by:
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xC (θ) =
δ (1− Λ (θ) (1 + n))
1− δ − Λ (θ) (1− δ (1 + n))
If we define h (R) ≡ ϕpp1 (R) /R then p2C/p1C = RC/ϕucan be expressed in
terms of the excess return of the productive h (θ) = 1+xC(θ)
1+θxC(θ)
. From the relative
demand equation we then have:
p2C
p1C
=
1− γ
γ
ϕp
ϕu
(
XC (θ)
h (R)− 1−XC (θ)
)
The conditions for Case C are as follows:
• The productive entrepreneurs are constrained and earn a positive excess return
from investing in sector one: XC ≥ 0, xC ≥ 0
• The return of productive entrepreneurs in sector two is less than in sector one.
This implies that xC (θ) > ϕp−ϕuϕu−κθϕp > 0. Since xC is decreasing in θ this
upperbound on θ for the equilibrium of type C binds relative to the condition
above that xC ≥ 0. The cutoff θC is defined by:
ϕp − ϕu
ϕu − κθCϕp =
δ (1− Λ (θC) (1 + n))
1− δ − Λ (θC) (1− δ (1 + n))
This is equivalent to xB (θC) = xC (θC). This is also the lower bound for
case B since at this value of θ in both equilibria production by the productive
entrepreneur would be in sector one only and the excess return is identical.
• The unproductive find it worthwhile to invest in sector two, i.e. , ϕup2C =
RC , and I
u
2 > 0 which holds from the relative demand expression.
• The unproductive do not find it worthwhile to invest in sector one. This re-
quires that p2 > p1. Using the above expression for relative prices and substi-
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tuting in for xC as a function of XC we obtain the following condition:
XC (θ) <
γ (ϕp − ϕu)
ϕp (1− γ) + γϕu
As XC is decreasing in θ, the lower bound for the type C equilibria is such
that θD i.e. θ > θD where θD is defined by equality of the above expres-
sion, or equivalently, xC (θD) = (ϕp − ϕu) / (ϕu − θDϕp) (since this is the
expression for xC when p2 = p1and p2C/p1C = RC/ϕu).
Range for case D: θ ≤ θD From Section 3.B.2 in steady state equilibrium sD (θ)
is defined by the steady state solution of Equation 3.20 when xD (θ) = ϕp−ϕuϕu−θϕp . The
conditions for a Case D equilibrium are as follows:
• The productive entrepreneur is constrained and earns a positive return from
investing in sector one: xD > 0 which holds by Assumption 6 on relative
productivities.
• The return of the productive entrepreneur in sector two is less than in sector
one,
ϕp−ϕu
ϕu−θϕp >
ϕp−ϕu
ϕu−κθϕp which holds since κ < 1.
• The unproductive find it worthwhile to invest in sector two and sector one
and have positive investment in both. The necessary pricing conditions hold.
From the investment demand equations, goods market clearing and relative
demand expression we can solve for investment levels such that I¯u2D (θ) =
(1− γ) β (1 +XD (θ)) > 0 and Iu1D (θ) = βγ
(
1− XD(θ)((1−γ)ϕp+γϕu)
(ϕp−ϕu)γ
)
.
Thus the upper bound value for θ for this type of equilibria is defined by
I
u
1D (θ) > 0, i.e. if θ < θD where
XD (θD) =
γ (ϕp − ϕu)
ϕp (1− γ) + γϕu
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WithXD increasing in θ, there is a positive solution for this cutoff iffϕp (1− γ) >
ϕuγ.
3.B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Type A steady state equilibria From Section 3.B.3 ∂sA/∂θ < 0, ∂xA/∂θ < 0
and χp1A = γ (1− θ) / (1− θΩ) and so is decreasing in θ. From the definition of
the excess returns of the productive and return equalization, relative prices (ρA =
p2A/p1A) can be expressed as a function of θ:
ρA (θ) = (1 + θxA (θ)) (1 + κθxA (θ))
−1
i.e. ρA (θ) is increasing in θx (θ) which in turn is decreasing in θ, i.e.ρ′A (θ) < 0.
From the aggregate pricing equation this gives p′2A (θ) < 0. From the goods market
clearing condition Ip1 + I
p
2 = β and from the relative demand for intermediates
I
p
1/I
p
2 = ρA (θ) γ/ (1− γ) which is decreasing in θ and hence Ip1 (Ip2) is decreasing
(increasing) in θ.
Defining λ = ϕpp2/R then rearranging we have λ = 1+xA(θ)1+κθxA(θ) and so, using
the expression for relative prices we obtain the following solution for RA which is
increasing in θ :
RA (θ) = ϕp (1 + κθxA (θ))
1−γ (1 + θxA (θ))
γ (1 + xA (θ))
−1
The steady state growth in aggregate net worth is given by gA = (1 +XA)RAβ.
Using the expressions for RA and (1 +XA) we obtain:
gA = βϕp (1 + κθxA (θ))
1−γ (1 + θxA (θ))
γ (1 + θΩxA (θ))
−1
Taking logs and differentiating we can show that gA is decreasing in θxA (θ) and
hence increasing in θ.
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Type B steady state equilibria From Section 3.B.3 we can see that ρB (θ)
is increasing in θ. Thus p′2B (θ) > 0, p
′
1B
(θ) < 0 and RB (θ) = p2
B
(θ)ϕu
is also increasing in θ. The excess return for the productive is given by xB =
(ϕp − ϕu) / (ϕu − κθϕp) and is increasing in θ and hence s′B (θ) > 0 and X ′B (θ) >
0. The steady state growth rate in aggregate net worth gB = (1 +XB)RBβ there-
fore increases with θ. The equilibrium value of χp1B (θ) =
γ(ϕp−ϕu)(1−θ)(1+1/XB(θ))
ϕp(1−θκ)
is decreasing in θ. Plugging in relative prices and χp1B (θ) into the investment equa-
tion we obtain the following expressions for investment by the productive which are
both increasing in θ (and hence Iu2B is decreasing in θ):
I
p
1B (θ) =
γβ (ϕu (1− θ) + ϕpθ (1− κ)) (1 +XB (θ))
ϕp (1− θκ)
I
p
2B (θ) =
β (1− χp1B (θ))XB (θ)ϕu
(ϕp − ϕu)
Type C steady state equilibria From Section 3.B.3 we can see that sC , XC and
xC are decreasing in θ. Expressing h ≡ ϕpp1/R as function of xC we obtain:
h =
1 + xC
1 + θxC
=
γ (1− θ)
θ + δ (1− θ) (γδ + nδ (1− γ))
where h′C (θ) < 0. Since p2Cϕu = RC this means that p′2 (θ) > 0, p′1 (θ) < 0
and R′C (θ) > 0. Plugging the expressions for RC and XC as functions of xC into
the growth of aggregate net worth gives the following expression whose partial
derivative with respect to θ is ambiguous:
gC = βϕ
γ
pϕu (1 + xC (θ))
1−γ (1 + θxC (θ))
γ (1 + (1− γ (1− θ))xC (θ))−1
In Type C equilibria, χp1C = 1. From the goods market clearing condition I
u
2C =
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β− Ip1C and from relative demand for intermediates 1−γγ
(
p1C
p2C
)
=
ϕuI¯u2C
ϕpI¯
p
1C
and so Iu2C
(Ip1C) is decreasing (increasing) in θ.
Type D steady state equilibria In Type D equilibria, χp1D = 1, p2D = p1D = 1
and RD = ϕu. The excess returns of the productive are given by xD = ϕp−ϕuϕu−θϕp and
are increasing in θ and hence so is sC . The growth of net worth is also increasing in θ
as XD increases with θ. The constrained investment by the productive is increasing
in θ : Ip1D (θ) = βXD (θ)ϕu/ (ϕp − ϕu). From the goods market clearing condition
and the relative demand expression the investment of the unproductive in sector
two is given by I¯u2D (θ) = (1− γ)β (1 +XD (θ)) and is increasing in θ. Hence the
investment of the unproductive in sector one falls with θ.
3.B.5 Sensitivity of equilibria cutoffs in autarky
Proposition 8 The sensitivity of the autarky equilibria cutoffs is such that:
1. θA is decreasing in n, κ and γ. For a given θ, an economy is more likely to be
in the unconstrained equilibrium if there is a higher steady state share of pro-
ductive entrepreneurs, if the divergence between the credit multipliers in the
two sectors is lower and if the relative weight on the sector one intermediate
in the final good production is higher.
2. The cut-off θB above which the unproductive entrepreneurs do not produce is
also decreasing in the share of productive entrepreneurs, n, the lack of dis-
persion in credit multipliers across sectors, κ, and the weight on the sector
one intermediate good in final goods production, γ. In addition, for given θ,
the likelihood that the steady state is one in which the unproductive do not
produce is increasing in the relative productivity differential, ϕp/ϕu, and de-
creasing in the probability that the productive suffer an adverse productivity
shock, δ.
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3. The cut-off θC below which the productive only invest in sector one is de-
creasing in ϕp/ϕu, γ, κ and the share of the productive in steady state (i.e.
rises with n) and increasing in the probability of an adverse shock for the
productive δ.
4. The upper-bound for Case D, θD, in which the unproductive entrepreneur
produces in both sectors whilst the productive just produces in sector two,
θD, is also increasing in γ and decreasing in n. θD is also decreasing in
the relative productivity differential of entrepreneurs and increasing in the
probability that the productive suffer an adverse productivity shock, δ.
Proof.
• The comparative statics of θA ≡ ((1 + n) (κ+ γ (1− κ)))−1 are clear from
its definition.
• The cut-off θB is defined by:
δ (1− θBΩ (1 + n))
1− δ − θBΩ (1− δ (1 + n)) −
ϕp − ϕu
ϕu − κθBϕp = 0
The LHS is decreasing in θB . Thus θB is decreasing in γ, decreasing in κ,
decreasing in ϕp/ϕu, decreasing in n and increasing in δ.
• Comparative statics of θC ≡ 1− n(1+n)γ are clear from its definition.
• The cut-off θD is defined by:
δ (1− Λ (θD) (1 + n))
1− δ − Λ (θD) (1− δ (1 + n)) −
ϕp − ϕu
ϕu − θDϕp = 0
θD is increasing in γ and δ and decreasing in ϕp/ϕu and n.
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3.B.6 Proof of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7
The following sections outline the properties of the international financial steady
state equilibria providing the proofs for the partitioning results in Proposition 6 and
the comparative statics in Proposition 7. In the cases B to D where unproductive
entrepreneurs do produce, it can be shown that the equilibrium is only defined for
R > R∗. If the IBC does not bind then there are insufficient equations for the
number of endogenous variables. This means that there are now five possible con-
strained equilibria types - Type A with R > R∗, Type A with R = R∗, Type B,
Type C and Type D.
3.B.6.1 Case A International Finance
The constrained equilibrium with only the productive investing is pinned down
by 11 equations in 11 unknowns: p2, p1, I¯ , I
p
1, I
p
2 , χ
p
1, B
∗
, x,X , R, g. For a givenR,
relative prices can be solved from the aggregate pricing equation and return equal-
isation for productive entrepreneurs. The quantities I¯ , Ip1, I
p
2 , χ
p
1, B
∗
can then be
solved using the equations for the relative demand for intermediates, intermediate
investment in the two sectors, goods market clearing and definition of total invest-
ment. This leaves the international borrowing constraint (IBC) to pin down the
domestic interest rate as greater than or equal to R∗.
For a given interest rate the price of intermediate good one is determined by
return equalisation plus the aggregate pricing equation:
Ψ1 ≡ 1− κθ − p1ϕp (1− κ) θJ (R,R∗, ψ)− (1− θ) p1/p2 (p1) = 0
where, by the implicit function theorem, ∂p1/∂R > 0. Plugging in the invest-
ment levels of the productive into the relative demand expression we obtain the same
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expression as in autarky for χp1 = γ (1− θ) / (1− θΩ) (since international finance
does not change the relative credit multiplier across sectors). Using this result and
the expressions for constrained investment we can then express the international
borrowing constraint as follows:
X
x (1− θΩ) (1− ψθΩ+ xθΩ (1− ψ)) ≤ 1 holds with equality if R > R
∗
Case A with binding international borrowing constraint In this case two equa-
tions uniquely define equilibrium x and X , namely the binding international bor-
rowing constraint and the steady state solution for the difference equation in s and x
which can be expressed as F (x,X) = X2 + (δ (1 + n)− (1− δ) x)X − nδx = 0.
The solutions are decreasing in θ and increasing in ψ:
X = δ
(
1− θΩψ
θΩ (1− ψ) − (1 + n)
)
x =
δ (1− θΩψ) (1− θΩ (1 + n (1− ψ)))
θΩ ((1− δ) (1− θΩ) + nδθΩ (1− ψ))
From the definition of s we have s is increasing in X and hence s is decreasing
in θ and increasing in ψ:
s =
(1− δ) (1− θΩ) + θΩnδ (1− ψ)
(1− ψθΩ)
Substituting the aggregate pricing equation into the return equalization condi-
tion and the definition of x we can uniquely determine p1 and R from the following
two equations:
ς1(p1, R, θ, ψ) ≡ 1− κθ − p1ϕp (1− κ) θJ (R,R∗, ψ)− (1− θ) p1
p2 (p1)
= 0 (3.25)
ς2(p1, R, θ, ψ) ≡ p1ϕp
R
(1− θ)− (1 + x (θ)) (1− p1ϕpθJ (R,R∗, ψ)) = 0 (3.26)
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Both equations can be shown to be upward sloping in (p1, R) space. Using
standard comparative static results the partial derivative of the equilibrium value of
R with respect to θ is given by:
∂R
∂θ
=
∂ς2
∂p1
∂ς1
∂θ
− ∂ς1
∂p1
∂ς2
∂θ
∂ς1
∂p1
∂ς2
∂R
− ∂ς1
∂R
∂ς2
∂p1
=
(+) (−)− (−) (+)
(−) (−)− (+) (+)
Thus whether the domestic interest rate increases or decreases with θ depends upon
the relative sensitivities of p1 and R, defined by the two loci, to θ. The denominator
of ∂R/∂θ can be shown to be positive and so R increases with θ if ∂p1
∂θ ς1=0
<
∂p1
∂θ ς2=0
, i.e. if the fall in p1 required to ensure return equalisation across sectors
when θ changes is of greater magnitude than the price fall as a result in the fall in
the excess return of the productive. Similar results hold for ∂R/∂ψ which is also
therefore ambiguous. With X decreasing with θ and R ambiguous then g ′ (θ) is
ambiguous.
Range of θ for Case A with binding international borrowing constraint
For this case to occur we require that X(IF, CaseA IBC bind) ≥ 0, that R > R∗
and that the unproductive do not find it worthwhile to invest.
The first condition is satisfied by:
θ ≤ 1
Ω (1 + n (1− ψ)) = θ
IF
A
This cutoff is increasing in ψ (and hence greater than the corresponding cutoff in
autarky) and decreasing in n, k and γ. This is also the binding constraint for xA ≥
0. For θ above this value entrepreneurs are unconstrained and only the productive
produce.
As the sensitivity of R to θ is ambiguous, the range of values of θ for which
R > R∗ may not be continuous or may be empty. The value of θ for which R = R∗,
θ̂IF , is implicitly defined by the following equation:
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ς†1(θ̂IF ) ≡
(
1 + κθ̂IF x
(
θ̂IF
))
1 + θ̂IF x
(
θ̂IF
) −
⎛⎝ R∗
(
1 + x
(
θ̂IF
))
ϕp
(
1 + θ̂IF x
(
θ̂IF
))
⎞⎠1/(1−γ) = 0
As ς†1(θ̂IF ) is a continuous function then it can be shown that if R∗ < ϕp there
exists at least one solution for θ̂IF between 0 and θIFA .
The unproductive if she did produce would do so in sector two. The condition
that her return from production must be less than the domestic interest rate is given
by:
RA,IF,R>R∗ (ϕu) (θ) < RA,IF,R>R∗ (θ) ⇒ p2ϕu (1− ψκθ)
1− p2ϕuψκθ/R∗ < R
As with the case of the sensitivity of R to θ the sensitivity of R (ϕu) to θ is also
ambiguous.
Case A if international borrowing constraint does not bind In this case R =
R∗ and p1 is uniquely defined by return equalization for the productive across sec-
tors with p′1 (θ) < 0 and p′1 (ψ) = 0 . x is defined as a function of p1 and the
exogenous parameters:
x (R = R∗) =
1− p1/p2 (p1)
θ (p1/p2 (p1)− κ)
where x′ (θ) ∝ p′1 (θ) (1− θ) + p1
(
p1ϕpθ
R
− 1
)
∝ κ (1− θ) + p1
p2(p1)
(1−θ)γ
(1−γ) > 0.
We can thus obtain the value for X from F (x,X) = 0 where X ′ (θ) > 0, s′ (θ) > 0
and s′ (θ) > 0.
This case occurs in the range for which X(IF, CaseA IBC not bind) > 0 and
R (ϕu) (IF, CaseA IBC not bind) > R
∗
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Range of θ for Case A with non-binding international borrowing constraint
The conditions for this equilibria are that XA,IF,R>R∗ (θ) ≥ 0 and that the unproduc-
tive prefer not to production. The first condition requires that θ be less than the value
at which 1 = p1/p2 (p1). The second condition is that RA,IF,R=R∗ (ϕu) (θ) < R∗.
This range is defined by the values of θ for which:
p2 (θ)ϕu (1− ψκθ)
1− p2ϕuψκθ/R∗ < R
∗
3.B.6.2 Case B International Finance
The domestic interest rate and intermediate price p1 are determined by return
equalisation for productive and return indifference for the unproductive:
Ψ1 ≡ 1− κθ − p1ϕp (1− κ) θJ (R,R∗, ψ)− (1− θ) p1/p2 (p1) = 0
Ψ2 ≡ 1− p2ϕu
(
1− ψκθ
R
+
ψκθ
R∗
)
= 0
These two equations give a two loci in (p1, R) the intersection of which deter-
mines the equilibrium value. From the second equation we obtain p1(R, θ, ψ) where
p′1,R < 0, p
′
1,θ > 0 and p′1,ψ > 0. Substituting into the first equation, we obtain the
unique value of R which is increasing in θ and in ψ.
Substituting in the solutions for prices and domestic interest rate into the excess
return of the productive we obtain:
1 + xIFB =
[
ϕu − κθϕp
ϕp (1− κθ) −
(ϕp − ϕu)ψκθ (R/R∗ − 1)
ϕp (1− κθ)
]−1
> (1 + xB)
Thus x is increasing in both θ and ψ. From the expression for x we can deter-
mine X and s which have similar comparative statics with respect to θ and ψ from
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F (x,X) = 0.
Given x,X , prices and the domestic interest rate we can pin down the quantities
as the solution of five linear equations (relative demand, binding IBC, goods market
clearing, investment of the productive in each sector) in five unknowns.
A
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I¯p1
I¯p2
I¯u2
χp1
B
∗
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
0
β
0
βX/x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where A is defined by:
A =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− γ) p1ϕp −γp2ϕp (1− γ) p1ϕu 0 0
p1ϕp κp2ϕp κp2ϕu 0 − (ψθR∗)−1
1 1 1 0 −1/R∗
A1 0 0 −βX/x 0
0 A2 0 βX/x 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where A1 ≡ 1− ϕpp1θJ (R,R∗, ψ) and A2 ≡ 1− ϕpp2κθJ (R,R∗, ψ).
Range of θ for Case B with binding international borrowing constraint
This equilibria will occur in the range of θ for which productive net worth weighted
excess returns are greater than zero, i.e. XB,IF (θ) ≥ 0 (requiring θ above a
certain value) and for which the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign rate
(again requiring θ to be above a certain value), the unproductive produce in sec-
tor two and the share of productive producing in sector one is less than unity, i.e.
RB,IF (θ) > R
∗
, I
u
B,IF,2 (θ) > 0 and 1 > χpB,IF (θ). Given the complexity of the so-
lutions to these conditions it is unclear whether they form a continuous non-empty
range for θ.
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3.B.6.3 Case C International Finance
We have χp1 = 1 and χu1 = 0, χu2 = 1. Return indifference for the unproduc-
tive pins down p2 as an increasing function of R. Using the constrained invest-
ment level of the productive, the relative demand expression and the goods market
clearing condition we can, with some manipulation, obtain an expression for the
international borrowing constraint defined in terms of x and X .
1 =
X
x (1− θ) (E1 + x (E1 − 1 + θ))
where E1 ≡ 1−ψθ+1−γγ ϕu(1−ψκθ)ϕp . Combining this with the equationF (x,X) =
0 gives a system in X and x which can be solved uniquely. The solution for X is
given by:
X = δ
(
E1
E1 − 1 + θ − 1− n
)
and can be shown to be decreasing in θ and increasing in ψ (and hence so are x
and s). Given the value of x we can solve for R as a function p1 from the definition
of x and then substituting this into the return indifference for the production we
obtain the following implicit solution for p1:
0 = J1 ≡ p2 (p1)ϕu − p1ϕp (1− ψθ + xθ (1− ψ))
(1 + x) (1− ψκθ)− p1ϕpψθ
R∗ (1− κ+ x (1− θκ))
where ∂J1/∂p1 < 0. As p1 tends to zero J1 tends to infinity. As p1 tends
to R
∗(1+x)(1−ψκθ)
ϕpψθ(1−κ+x(1−θκ)) then J1 tends to minus infinity. Thus there is a unique equilib-
rium value of p1 from which we can derive p2 and then R from return indifference
for the unproductive:
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p2 (p1 (θ))ϕu =
(
1− ψκθ
R
+
ψκθ
R∗
)−1
The sensitivity of the domestic interest rate to θ is ambiguous. Given relative
prices, domestic interest rate and s we can obtain investment levels and foreign
borrowing.
Range of θ for Case C with binding international borrowing constraint
This equilibrium falls in the range of θ for which XC,IF ≥ 0, the productive prefers
to produce in sector one than sector two (RC,IF,1 (ϕp) (θ) > RC,IF,2 (ϕp) (θ)), the
unproductive prefers to produce in sector two than sector one (RC,IF,2 (ϕu) (θ) >
RD,IF,1 (ϕu) (θ)) and the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign rate (RC,IF (θ) >
R∗). The first condition is equivalent to the condition that:
θ ≤ θC,IF = γϕp − n (1− γ)ϕu
γϕp (1 + n (1− ψ))− n (1− γ)ψκϕu
where θIFA > θIFC and θIFC > θIF
3.B.6.4 Case D International Finance
Productive entrepreneurs invest in sector one only, i.e. χp1D = 1, and the unpro-
ductive entrepreneurs invest in both sectors. The unproductive returns are equalized
across sectors and are equal to R. This gives a unique solution for p1 implicitly
defined by:
Λ ≡ p2 (p1)− (1− ψθ) p1
1− κψθ − p1ϕu (1− κ) θψ/R∗ = 0
p1 is increasing in R∗, θ, ψ and κ. From the unproductive’s return indifference,
the domestic interest rate can then be expressed as function of p1 and is decreasing
in R∗, θ and ψ (and ambiguous in κ).
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Substituting the relative prices and domestic interest rate into the definition of
the excess returns of the productive gives the following expression:
1 + x =
ϕp(
p1
p2(p1)
− κ)
ϕu(1−κ)
(1−θ)
(
1− p1ϕpψθ
R∗
)
− ϕp(1−ψ)θ
(1−θ) (
p1
p2(p1)
− κ)
It can be shown that x is increasing in θ through both the direct effect and the
indirect effect on p1 (and hence X and s are also increasing in θ). Similarly x is
increasing in ψ through the direct and indirect effects. Given relative prices,R,
x and X the investment levels and foreign borrowing can then be pinned down.
Range of θ for Case D with binding international borrowing constraint
The conditions for Case D to be the steady state constrained equilibrium are that
the net worth share weighted excess returns of the productive are non-negative (i.e.
XD,IF (θ) ≥ 0), the unproductive have positive production in both sectors with
their returns equalized across sectors (i.e. IuD,IF,1 (θ) > 0 I
u
D,IF,2 (θ) > 0 and
RD,IF,1 (ϕu) (θ) = RD,IF,2 (ϕu) (θ) ), that the productive prefer to produce in sec-
tor 1 (i.e. RD,IF,1 (ϕp) (θ) > RD,IF,2 (ϕp) (θ) ) and that the domestic interest rate
exceeds the foreign (RD,IF (θ) > R∗).
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Chapter 4
Thresholds in the process of
international financial integration
4.1 Introduction
The worldwide financial crisis has dramatically driven home the downside risks
of financial globalization. Many emerging market and developing economies had
to grapple with surges of capital inflows earlier in this decade. Sharp reversals were
then seen during the crisis as financial linkages served as a channel for the global
financial turmoil to reach their shores. More recently capital inflows to emerging
markets have been resurgent, bringing their own policy challenges. These experi-
ences have re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization
and its implications for growth and volatility, especially for developing countries.1
In theory, financial globalization should facilitate efficient international alloca-
tion of capital and promote international risk sharing. These benefits should be
much greater for developing countries. These countries are relatively capital scarce
and labor rich, so access to foreign capital should help them increase investment
1As an example, in the wake of the financial crisis, IMF staff have re-evaluated the appropriate-
ness of capital controls and indicated that they may be a legitimate part of the policy mix in response
to surges in capital inflows (see, for example, Ostry et al., 2010).
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and grow faster. Developing countries also have more volatile output growth than
advanced industrial economies, which makes their potential welfare gains from in-
ternational risk sharing much greater.
However, the empirical literature has not been able to conclusively establish the
growth and stability benefits of financial integration. In particular, cross-country
studies have not yielded robust evidence that financial openness has a positive ef-
fect on growth. Studies using microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data or those
that look at specific events such as equity market liberalizations do detect signifi-
cant growth effects, but it remains an open question whether these effects scale up
when one considers the more general concept of financial openness and its effects
on growth. Moreover, for developing countries with low to intermediate levels of
financial openness, there is equally sparse evidence that financial integration has
delivered its other presumed benefit–improved risk sharing and better consumption
smoothing.
Kose et al. (2009) survey this extensive literature and propose an alternative
framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implications of financial globaliza-
tion in order to pull together the different strands of evidence. These authors point
out that in theory financial globalization should catalyze domestic financial mar-
ket development, improve corporate and public governance, and provide incentives
for greater macroeconomic policy discipline. Such indirect benefits may be more
important than the traditional financing channel emphasized in previous analyses.
Indeed, recent work stimulated by the phenomenon of global current account im-
balances suggests that developing countries that are more open to certain types of fi-
nancial flows but overall are less reliant on foreign capital and finance more of their
investment through domestic savings have on average experienced better growth
performance.2
A major complication, however, is that there seem to be certain “threshold” lev-
2See Aizenman et al. (2007), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) and Prasad et al. (2007).
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els of financial and institutional development that an economy needs to attain before
it can get the full indirect benefits and reduce the risks of capital account liberaliza-
tion. It has generally been the case that industrial countries—which typically have
better institutions, more stable macro policies, and deeper financial markets than
developing countries—have been the main beneficiaries of financial globalization.
This has led many authors to argue that developing countries should focus on build-
ing up their institutional capacity and strengthening their financial markets before
opening up their capital accounts (e.g., Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). How to
balance these considerations against the potential benefits to be gained from finan-
cial integration is a pressing policy question, now that developing countries again
face difficult choices about whether and how to liberalize capital account transac-
tions further.
Framing the issue this way generates a set of pointed questions that are rele-
vant for translating academic analysis of financial globalization into implications
for policies toward capital account liberalization. How can countries improve the
benefit-risk trade-off associated with integration into international capital markets?
Is there a well-defined threshold level of economic characteristics beyond which
the trade-off improves and makes opening of the capital account beneficial and less
risky for a developing country?
There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature, mostly of recent vin-
tage, suggesting that financial sector development, institutional quality, trade open-
ness, and the stability of macroeconomic policies all play important roles in real-
izing the benefits of financial openness. For instance, a deep and well-supervised
financial sector is essential for efficiently intermediating foreign finance into pro-
ductive investments. It can also be helpful in reducing the adverse effects of capital
flow volatility. Similarly, countries with better institutions (less corruption and red
tape, better corporate and public governance) attract relatively more FDI and port-
folio equity flows, which are more stable than debt flows and are also more likely
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to promote indirect benefits. The existing literature points to the existence of such
threshold effects but lacks a unifying framework that can be used to interpret the
results and derive policy implications.
Our main contribution is to provide a unified empirical framework for studying
the concept of thresholds in the process of financial integration and for analyzing
the policy implications of this framework for the process of capital account liberal-
ization. We then provide a new set of results on thresholds in different dimensions
using a common empirical approach. In the process, we tackle a number of complex
measurement issues that need to be dealt with in order to provide more coherence
to the existing literature. We also make a modest methodological contribution by
showing how to adapt semiparametric estimation techniques to estimate key inter-
action relationships in growth regressions in a flexible manner.
We report some initial progress on framing and addressing a more difficult set
of practical questions directly related to various policy choices. For instance, what
are the confidence intervals around different threshold conditions? This is important
for determining the policy relevance of the estimated thresholds and for identifying
zones that are clearly hazardous or clearly safe for undertaking financial opening.
We take an agnostic approach towards various measurement issues on which there is
no consensus in the literature, including how best to measure financial development
and financial openness. We also try to account for possible differences in threshold
conditions across different types of cross-border flows.
Based on an analysis of data over a period of three decades prior to the re-
cent financial crisis, we find that there are indeed clearly identifiable thresholds in
variables such as financial depth and institutional quality. Although there are dif-
ferences in the results we obtain from various methodologies and the confidence
intervals tend to be large, some of the key thresholds are fairly precisely estimated
and have practical empirical content. We also find that the thresholds are lower for
foreign direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities compared to those for debt
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liabilities.
We begin, in Section 4.2, by reviewing some of the existing literature and pro-
viding a synthesis that enables us to map out some of the key issues that need to
be addressed in analyzing threshold effects. In Section 4.3, we tackle a number of
measurement issues, including how to measure financial openness and the different
threshold variables. In Section 4.4, we discuss the empirical strategy to get at the
issue of thresholds. Our basic results, including some stylized facts to motivate the
more detailed analysis, are in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we conduct a variety of
sensitivity tests on our baseline results. We then present a number of extensions
in Section 4.7. We conclude, in Section 4.8, by highlighting the main findings and
discussing their policy implications.
4.2 Synthesis of Theory and Evidence
In prior research, a number of avenues have been explored to reconcile the
strong theoretical prediction that financial integration should boost long-run growth
in developing economies with the weak empirical evidence. Some authors have
argued that countries that do not have the right initial conditions can experience
growth surges due to financial integration but they inevitably experience crises,
which pulls down their long-run growth. Others have argued that countries that
lack certain structural features are not able to derive the full benefits of financial
integration even if they can escape crises.3
Kose et al. (2009) synthesize these two lines of argument into a framework that
characterizes variables that influence the relationship between financial integration
and growth as a set of “threshold conditions.” Figure 4.1 schematically depicts this
framework and lists the main threshold conditions. These include an economy’s
structural features–the extent of financial sector development, institutional quality,
3For a comprehensive review of the related literature see Appendix Tables 4.9 to 4.13.
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and trade integration–and also the macroeconomic policy framework.
Figure 4.1: Thresholds in the Process of Financial Integration
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Source: Kose et al. (2009).
In theory, financial development enhances the growth benefits of financial glob-
alization and reduces vulnerability to crises. Domestic and international collateral
constraints play a particularly important role in financially underdeveloped low-
income economies where access to arm’s length financing is limited. A number of
recent studies show how, in different theoretical settings, the interaction of these
constraints can lead to unpredictable and possibly adverse effects of capital account
liberalization.4 Shifts in the direction of capital flows can induce or exacerbate
boom-bust cycles in developing countries that lack deep financial sectors (Aghion
and Banerjee, 2005). Moreover, mismanaged domestic financial sector liberaliza-
tions have been a major contributor to crises associated with financial integration
(Mishkin, 2006).
Cross-sectional studies generally find significant positive interaction effects be-
tween foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial depth (ratio of private credit to
4See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Aghion et al. (2004); Mendoza et al. (2007); Aoki
et al. (2010).
148
GDP) on growth (see Appendix Tables 4.9 and 4.10). However, the implied finan-
cial depth thresholds for obtaining a positive coefficient on financial openness vary
substantially within and across studies. For example, across Hermes and Lensink
(2003), Alfaro et al. (2004), and Carkovic and Levine (2005) the estimated credit
to GDP thresholds vary from 13 percent to 48 percent. There are mixed results
from studies where financial depth is interacted with other financial openness mea-
sures. Bekaert et al. (2005) and Hammel (2006) find higher growth following equity
market liberalizations in countries with higher private credit, stock market turnover
and stock market capitalization, respectively (see also Bekaert et al., 2009; Mukerji,
2009). Using broader measures of financial openness, Prasad et al. (2007) find evi-
dence of high/low interaction effects among non-industrial countries (see also Klein
and Olivei, 2001; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Masten et al., 2008) but Kraay (1998) and
Arteta et al. (2003) do not.
The quality of corporate and public governance, the legal framework, the level
of corruption, and the degree of government transparency can affect the allocation
of resources in an economy. Some authors argue that precursors of crises such
as flawed macroeconomic and structural policies can also be traced back to weak
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). Since capital inflows make more resources
available, the quality of institutions matters more for financially open economies.
Post-mortems of the Asian financial crisis have pinned a large portion of the blame
on crony capitalism that reflected corruption and weak public governance (Haber,
2002; Krueger, 2002). Indeed, an intermediate degree of financial openness with
selective capital controls may be most conducive to crony capitalism, as it gives
politically well-connected firms preferential access to foreign capital (Johnson and
Mitton, 2003). Weak protection of property rights in poor countries means that for-
eign financing may not be directed to long-gestation, investment-intensive, and low-
initial profitability projects (including infrastructure) where such financing could be
particularly useful given domestic financing constraints (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
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Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2009) find interaction effects between insti-
tutional quality and financial openness in promoting growth but Kraay (1998) and
Quinn and Toyoda (2008) do not (see Appendix Table 4.11). Klein (2005) finds
that only intermediate levels of institutional quality are associated with a positive
correlation between growth and capital account liberalization, hinting at the pos-
sibility of nonlinear threshold effects. Countries with better corporate and public
governance receive more of their inflows in the form of FDI and portfolio equity;
these are more stable than debt flows and also confer more of the indirect bene-
fits of financial integration (Wei, 2001). Some authors have used a country’s level
of income as a proxy for overall institutional development and interacted that with
financial openness (see Appendix Table 4.12). Edwards (2001) and Edison et al.
(2004) find evidence of a positive linear interaction and an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship, respectively. However, Arteta et al. (2003), Carkovic and Levine (2005)
and Quintin et al. (2008) do not find robust evidence of such relationships.
Trade openness reduces the probability of crises associated with financial open-
ness and mitigates the costs of crises if they do occur. Economies that are more open
to trade have to undergo smaller real exchange rate depreciations for a given current
account adjustment, face less severe balance sheet effects from depreciations and,
as a result, are less likely to default on their debt. This makes them less vulnerable
to sudden stops and financial crises (Calvo et al., 2004; Cavallo and Frankel, 2008).
Trade integration puts an economy in a better position to continue servicing its debt
and export its way out of a recession (Edwards, 2004). Eichengreen (2001) note
that financial integration without trade integration could lead to a misallocation of
resources as capital inflows may go to sectors in which a country doesn’t have a
comparative advantage (also see Aizenman and Noy, 2008).
Capital account liberalization is more likely to be successful if it is supported
by good fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. Weak or incompatible policies
can increase the risk of crises from an open capital account. For instance, the combi-
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nation of a fixed exchange rate and an open capital account has been implicated in a
number of currency crises (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Wyplosz, 2004). Similarly,
managing capital inflows can be especially complicated in developing economies
with large fiscal deficits and procyclical fiscal policy (Ishii et al., 2002; Calvo et al.,
2004; IMF, 2007). These findings have been used to argue that capital account lib-
eralization can serve as a commitment device for sound macroeconomic policies
(Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007). Arteta et al. (2003)
report evidence of threshold effects related to macro policies in generating positive
growth effects of financial openness. Mody and Murshid (2005) find that better
macro policies enhance the impact of financial openness on investment growth.
In summary, there is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature that serves
as a basis for positing the existence of threshold conditions. However, this literature
is disparate and does not provide clear guidance about the precise nature of the
threshold relationship or how one would translate the theory into a reduced-form
empirical framework. Some models suggest the existence of nonlinear threshold
effects but the form of nonlinearity is not clear.
The empirical literature has reported many interesting results but the robustness
of these results and the estimated thresholds vary widely. Moreover, each of these
studies typically focuses on one conditioning variable and one indicator of financial
openness, and most of them use a simple linear interaction specification. The extent
to which countries satisfy different potential thresholds or the trade-offs between
different threshold variables has not been examined, nor has the economic signif-
icance of the threshold levels. Finally, the potentially wide confidence intervals
around the thresholds have not been emphasized. Thus, while there is a great deal
of evidence that threshold conditions matter, the existing literature is not organized
around a consistent framework, making it difficult to draw policy conclusions about
capital account liberalization.
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4.3 Measurement and Data
In this section, we discuss our approach to several key measurement issues and
present our dataset. We take an agnostic approach to some of the complex measure-
ment issues. Our approach will be to pick baseline measures of certain variables
and then conduct extensive robustness tests of those baseline results using alterna-
tive measures. A detailed description of the variables in our dataset, as well as their
sources, are presented in Appendix 4.A.
There is an important distinction between traditional de jure measures of open-
ness, i.e., restrictions on capital account transactions, and de facto openness. Capital
controls are the relevant policy tool, but there can be differences in their degree of
enforcement over time. Besides, when analyzing how financial openness influences
growth, what matters is how much an economy is actually integrated into interna-
tional capital markets.
We use as our baseline measure of financial openness the sum of a country’s
total stocks of external assets and liabilities, expressed as a ratio to nominal GDP.
This is a summary measure of a country’s total exposure to international financial
markets. We also look at stocks of liabilities—cumulated measures of inflows into
a country—that may be most relevant for developing economies as well as various
measures of gross and net flows. In some of our analysis, we also look at de jure
capital account openness based on an indicator of the proportion of years in which
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER) indicates the absence of capital account restrictions. For each of the
threshold categories, we have to choose an appropriate measure that is conceptually
sound and for which data are available for our broad sample of countries.
a. Financial depth: We use the ratio of private credit to GDP as a proxy for financial
depth, recognizing that this is a narrow definition of financial development.
We also examine a range of alternative measures of de facto financial depth
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and development, such as the sum of stock market capitalization and credit to
GDP, the ratio of M2 to GDP etc., as well as institutional measures such as
creditors’ rights.
b. Institutional quality: The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) cover six
aspects of institutional quality: voice and accountability; political instability
and violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and
control of corruption Kaufmann et al. (2005). We use a simple average of
these six indices as a proxy for aggregate institutional quality. These data are
available only from 1996 and show strong persistence across time for each
country; hence, we use the average of the available data as a fixed institutional
variable.
c. Regulation: We use an index of the rigidity of labor regulations from the In-
ternational Finance Corporation’s Doing Business Database. It captures an
economy’s ability to adapt to changing business conditions, including finan-
cial flows. These data are available only from 2003, so we use the average for
each country as a fixed regulation variable.
d. Trade openness: We use the sum of exports and imports of goods and services,
expressed as a ratio to GDP. We also include a measure of policy openness to
trade, defined as the proportion of years for which the trade regime is an open
one, as defined by Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
e. Macro policies: The monetary and fiscal policy stances are measured by the
degree of variation in consumer price inflation and the average ratio of gov-
ernment revenue to expenditure, respectively, over the relevant period. Whilst
these macroeconomic outcomes are subject to exogenous shocks, their mea-
surement over five-year periods can provide a broad indication of the policy
stance.
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f. Overall development: We use the level of initial per capita GDP (either at the
beginning of the sample or the initial year of each five-year period measure).
Our dataset comprises a total of 84 countries. We do not include the transition
economies of Eastern Europe since their data for the pre-transition years are suspect
and we need longer time series for our analysis. We also exclude small economies
(population under 1 million) and a number of poor economies for which data avail-
ability, especially on capital flows, is limited. The dataset covers the period 1975-
2004, giving us a maximum of six non-overlapping five year-averaged observations
for each country. When presenting basic stylized facts, we group the countries
into industrial (21), emerging market (21), and other developing countries (42) (see
Appendix Table 4.7). The emerging market countries are those from the group of
non-industrial countries that are most financially open.5 This group accounts for
the vast majority of capital flows (either net inflows or gross inflows plus outflows)
into or out of the non-industrial countries. In the formal empirical analysis, we do
not use these coarse distinctions; instead, we directly control for the level of devel-
opment and the degree of financial openness. Our econometric analysis includes
the full sample of countries as it is based on a framework that should be consistent
across industrial and developing countries. Indeed, for identifying threshold effects,
it is best to include as many countries as possible at different stages of development.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
We now discuss some issues that we need to confront in our formal empirical
analysis and describe how we tackle them. Our empirical framework builds on
standard cross-country growth regressions as we are interested in capturing thresh-
5The countries in the group of emerging markets roughly correspond to those included in the
MSCI Emerging Markets Index. The main differences are that we drop the transition economies
because of limited data availability and add Singapore and Venezuela.
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old effects at the national level.6 Our focus is on medium- and long-run growth
rather than business cycle and other short-run fluctuations. Hence, we use five-
year averages of the underlying data for our baseline results. Business cycles are
more persistent in developing economies than in industrial ones but a five-year win-
dow is a reasonable compromise for filtering out cycles in both types of countries
(Agenor et al., 2000; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). Time averages of the annual data
also smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in variables such as capital flows. We use
two broad categories of cross-country econometric models to investigate potential
thresholds in the relationship between financial openness and growth. Both methods
attempt to explain a country’s growth over a five-year period, Δyit, as a function of
a set of standard controls for growth models, xit , country and time period specific
effects, δi and γt respectively, financial openness, FOit , and its relationship with a
threshold variable, THit:
Δyit = f(xit, FOit, THit, δi, γt) + εit
where i indexes the country and t the time period, and εit is an idiosyncratic
error term.
The first approach we consider is parametric - a standard linear dynamic panel
data model with various interaction functions between the threshold and financial
openness variables. The second approach is a semi-parametric one - a partial linear
model wherein the relationship between growth and the standard controls plus fixed
effects is assumed to be linear but the relationship between growth and the financial
openness and threshold variables is modeled as a nonparametric function.
6We are aware of concerns of authors such as Durlauf et al. (2005) about cross-country growth
regressions. Our view is that, despite their limitations, these regressions can help develop some
useful policy messages related to threshold conditions for financial integration.
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4.4.1 Parametric approach
The dynamic linear panel data model is of the following form:
Δyit = δi + γt + x
′
itθ + g(FOit, THit) + εit
where θ is a vector of coefficients on the set of standard controls and where
the vector of standard controls xit includes the initial income per capita levels.
A key empirical issue is how to define the thresholds relationship in the function
g(FOit, THit). Based on the literature cited earlier, we explore three specific para-
metric assumptions for this function:7
a A linear interaction between financial openness and the threshold variable:
g(FOit, THit) = βFOFOit + βTHTHit + βFOTHFOitTHit
This approach tests if the level of a particular variable affects the marginal
effect of financial openness on growth in a linear manner.
b A quadratic interaction that allows for nonlinear effects of the threshold vari-
able:
g(FOit, THit) = βFOFOit + βTHTHit + βFOTHFOitTHit
+βTHsqTH
2
it + βFOTHsqFOitTH
2
it
This allows for the possibility that, beyond a certain level, the threshold vari-
able becomes more or less important in determining the marginal effect of
7These are among the most widely used parametric specifications in the literature. Other ap-
proaches include interactions of capital account openness with cubic terms in institutional quality,
with a quadratic spline or with quantile dummies for institutional quality such as in Klein (2005).
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financial openness on growth.
c A high-low cut-off based on the sample median of a threshold variable:
g(FOit, THit) = βFOFOit + βFOTHhighD(THit > THmediant)
+βTHTHit
where D(THit > THmediant) is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the threshold variable for a country is above the median value for all
countries in that time period.
This approach sets the threshold exogenously and provides a simple way of testing
if the level of a particular variable matters in terms of the quantitative effect of
openness on growth outcomes. We also examine the impact of varying the high-low
cut-off to check the appropriateness of the median approach.8
The interpretation of reduced-form growth regressions is typically bedevilled
by concerns about endogeneity and the direction of causality. For instance, capital
may flow disproportionately to fast-growing economies, making financial integra-
tion dependent on growth rather than the reverse. Similarly, financial development
and growth may both be driven by common factors such as the legal or broader
institutional frameworks. It is difficult to come up with convincing and effective
instruments to deal with these issues. Hence, we use system generalized method
of moments (GMM) techniques for dynamic panels to get around these problems.
This involves estimating a system comprising a first-differenced equation to elimi-
nate country fixed effects and an additional equation in levels. Appropriately lagged
values of levels and first-differences, respectively, can then be used as instruments
8An alternative approach would be to use sample-splitting methodologies to endogenously deter-
mine the threshold (Hansen, 2000). Unfortunately, however, such models cannot be applied to the
dynamic panel approach that we employ.
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in these equations to address endogeneity concerns. This approach is increasingly
being used in a variety of related contexts.9 In addition to the system GMM estima-
tion we also provide basic fixed effects estimates as a consistency check.
4.4.2 Semi-parametric approaches
Next, we turn to a nonparametric technique that allows us to model in a more
flexible manner the relationship between growth, on the one hand, and the financial
openness and threshold variables on the other. To keep the model tractable, we
assume that the relationship between growth and the standard controls plus fixed
effects is linear as before. The resulting semiparametric model is written as follows:
Δyit = δi + γt + x′itθ + h(FOit, THit) + εit
where we estimate the parametric coefficients and the nonparametric relation-
ship h(FOit,THit).
A few recent papers in the growth literature have used partial linear models to
examine the relationship between growth and a regressor of interest. For exam-
ple, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) examine the nonparametric effects of inequality on
growth while Imbs and Rancie`re (2007) look at the relationship between external
debt and growth. However, these papers focus on the relationship between growth
and a nonparametric function of a single variable rather than a function of two vari-
ables as is the case with the interaction effects we consider.
Yatchew (1998, 2003) provides a detailed guide to a variety of methods that can
be employed to estimate the parametric coefficients and a multidimensional non-
9See Bond et al. (2001), for a detailed technical discussion of its application to empirical growth
models. In related work, Chang et al. (2009) use this methodology to explore linear interaction
effects of institutional features and trade openness. Aghion et al. (2009) look at interaction effects
between financial development and the exchange rate regime. Roodman (2006, 2008) provides
a detailed review of the practical implementation of this methodology in a manner that obviates
potential concerns related to its somewhat mechanical application and small sample problems.
158
parametric function such as h(FOit, THit).10 In particular, as in Banerjee and Du-
flo (2003) and Imbs and Rancie`re (2007), we focus on the Robinson (1988) double
residuals approach. This involves two stages. First, nonparametric regressions of
growth and each of the other control variables on financial openness and the thresh-
old variable are estimated to give E(Δyit|FOit, THit) and E(zit|FOit, THit) where
zit denotes the matrix of xit plus the fixed effects with corresponding vector of co-
efficients κ. Various nonparametric estimation methodologies can be employed, for
example local regression or kernel estimation. The residuals from these regressions
are then used to estimate the parametric coefficients κ using an OLS regression:
Δyit − E(Δyit|FOit, THit) = Δyit − E(zit|FOit, THit)′κ− h(FOit, THit)
= (zit − E(zit|FOit, THit))′κ + εit
These OLS estimates of κˆ can then be used to construct an expression for the
residual growth with the estimated parametric effects removed:
Δyit − z′itκ ≈ h(FOit, THit) + εit
The nonparametric form of h(FOit, THit) can be estimated using standard meth-
ods such as local regression. For details on the required assumptions and conver-
gence properties, see Robinson (1988) and Yatchew (2003). We use OLS regres-
sions in the different stages of the partial linear estimation, with time and country
fixed effects included where appropriate.11
The use of semi-parametric methods allows for a more flexible examination of
10See also Yatchew and No (2001) for estimation of a partial linear model with two variables
entering the nonparametric expression. We implement these partial linear estimations using S-plus
coding following the examples in Yatchew (2003).
11As discussed below, in the case of the non time-varying institutional quality index we do not
include country dummies in the nonparametric estimation.
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the nature of threshold effects in the relationship between financial openness and
growth than is possible with parametric approaches. However, there are trade-offs
among different approaches. For example, the flexibility of the semi-parametric es-
timates comes with other assumptions, such as that of a linear relationship for other
control variables and the choice of the nature of the nonparametric estimation ap-
proach. More importantly, nonparametric relationships are somewhat more difficult
to interpret and to translate into policy implications.
A key issue concerns the significance and empirical content of the estimated
thresholds. To have policy relevance, our analysis requires more than just a demon-
stration of statistically significant conditional correlations between certain variables
and growth. We need to construct confidence intervals around our estimates of the
marginal effects of openness on growth, conditional on a particular level of a given
threshold variable. We also need to know if the magnitudes of the threshold effects
are economically significant and if the estimated thresholds lie within the range
of the sample used in the estimation (otherwise, the thresholds would be of little
practical value in terms of understanding differential growth outcomes).
4.5 Basic Results
We motivate our empirical analysis by documenting a set of stylized facts for
data averaged over the full sample period. We then present our baseline econometric
results that rely on a finer temporal breakdown of the data. As much of the existing
literature has analyzed the interaction between financial openness and financial de-
velopment, we will focus our initial exposition on the latter as a threshold variable
in order to illustrate our framework.
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4.5.1 Stylized facts
We begin by exploring if there are obvious threshold effects in the data. For this
exercise, we limit the sample to non-industrial countries split into two groups—
emerging markets (EMs) and other developing countries (ODCs). Our interest is in
whether, within each of these groups, the levels of certain variables are associated
with differences in average growth rates. Table 4.1 compares unconditional and
conditional growth rates over the period 1975-2004 for countries that are above
or below the within-group sample medians for different variables that have been
posited as threshold variables. After sorting countries within each group by these
group-specific thresholds, we then report cross-sectional averages within each cell.
There are three main results that can be gleaned from this table. First, EMs,
which are more integrated into international capital markets than ODCs, have a
higher average growth rate than ODCs over the period 1975-2004, but this effect be-
comes smaller when we control for other standard variables that influence growth.
Second, unconditional growth rates in EMs are greater for those countries with
higher (within-group above-median) levels of the illustrative threshold indicators
for financial depth, trade openness, institutional quality, regulation and macro poli-
cies, although this difference is not always statistically significant. These effects
are less pronounced in ODCs, except that the institutional quality threshold is even
more important for ODCs than for EMs. The picture is less clear when looking at
overall development and financial openness as threshold variables. Growth rates
are higher for countries with lower initial GDP per capita, reflecting convergence
effects. In both groups, growth rates are higher for countries with lower relative
financial openness.
Third, for conditional growth rates the patterns are less pronounced, although
the positive association of growth with higher values of certain threshold variables
persists (e.g., private credit, trade, reduced regulation and lower inflation variability
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Table 4.1: Long-term Growth in Emerging Markets and Other Developing
Countries
 
  
Unconditional growth (% per 
annum) 
Conditional growth (% per 
annum) 
  EM ODCs EMs ODCs 
Overall  
2.284 
(1.937) 
0.820 
(0.650) 
0.441 
(0.533) 
-0.159 
(-0.043) 
Splitting sub-samples:      
By private credit to GDP  High 
3.158 
(3.113) 
0.656 
(0.451) 
0.733 
(0.673) 
-0.255 
(-0.197) 
 Low 
1.490 
(1.410) 
0.983 
(0.877) 
0.176 
(0.503) 
-0.064 
(0.139) 
Difference in means 1.668* -0.327 0.557 -0.191 
By average WBGI 
institutional quality index High 
2.416 
(1.878) 
1.217 
(0.853) 
0.394 
(0.418) 
0.369 
(0.127) 
 Low 
2.165 
(1.937) 
0.422 
(0.451) 
0.483 
(0.633) 
-0.688 
(-0.117) 
Difference in means 0.251 0.795* -0.089 1.057** 
By trade openness  High 
2.923 
(3.017) 
1.074 
(0.710) 
0.644 
(0.583) 
0.129 
(0.127) 
 Low 
1.704 
(1.096) 
0.566 
(0.493) 
0.256 
(0.503) 
-0.448 
(-0.094) 
Difference in means 1.218 0.508 0.388 0.577 
By rigidity of 
employment index  Less rigid 
2.958 
(2.440) 
0.787 
(0.493) 
0.563 
(0.533) 
-0.012 
(-0.094) 
 More rigid 
1.544 
(1.253) 
0.790 
(0.927) 
0.306 
(0.568) 
-0.344 
(-0.168) 
Difference in means 1.414 -0.003 0.257 0.333 
By st. dev of CPI inflation Low 
3.381 
(3.365) 
1.509 
(1.542) 
1.074 
(0.968) 
0.398 
(0.379) 
 High 
1.078 
(1.147) 
0.215 
(0.346) 
-0.255 
(-0.242) 
-0.841 
(-0.810) 
Difference in means 2.303*** 1.294*** 1.329*** 1.239*** 
By initial GDP per capita High 
1.105 
(1.085) 
0.798 
(1.034) 
-0.166 
(-0.098) 
0.146 
(0.276) 
 Low 
3.357 
(3.155) 
0.842 
(0.493) 
0.993 
(0.968) 
-0.464 
(-0.506) 
Difference in means -2.253*** -0.044 -1.159** 0.611 
By de jure financial 
openness (IMF measure) High 
1.537 
(1.211) 
0.730 
(0.452) 
0.048 
(-0.098) 
0.026 
(-0.043) 
 Low 
2.964 
(2.431) 
0.901 
(0.927) 
0.799 
(0.813) 
-0.327 
(-0.183) 
Difference in means -1.427 -0.171 -0.751 0.353 
By de facto gross financial 
openness  High 
1.502 
(1.262) 
0.738 
(0.853) 
0.036 
(-0.248) 
-0.163 
(0.009) 
 Low 
2.995 
(2.440) 
0.902 
(0.493) 
0.810 
(0.660) 
-0.155 
(-0.094) 
Difference in means -1.493* -0.164 -0.774 -0.008 
Note: The numbers shown are average annual growth rates (medians are shown in parentheses below the means). The symbols
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, of a t-test of mean
equality across sub-samples. High/low sub-samples are defined relative to medians within groupings. See Appendix Table
4.7 for definition of emerging market (EM) and other developing country (ODC) sub-samples and Appendix Table 4.8 for
variable definitions. Conditional growth indicates residuals from a cross-section regression of growth on log initial GDP per
capita, average investment to GDP, average years of schooling and average population growth rate.
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among EMs). Table 4.1 also suggests that the difference between the growth rates
of EMs and ODCs is generally more pronounced at higher levels of the threshold
variables (except for institutional quality, GDP per capita and financial openness).
These stylized facts are suggestive of systematic threshold or conditioning effects
in the relationship between financial openness and growth. We now turn to a more
formal empirical analysis of these effects.
4.5.2 Basic empirical analysis
Our regression analysis is based on five-year averages of the underlying annual
data. We begin with a limited set of controls that have been identified in the litera-
ture as being relatively robust determinants of long-term per capita GDP growth—
initial income (at the start of each five-year period), which picks up convergence
effects; the level of investment to GDP; a proxy for human capital; and population
growth. We report the results of baseline growth regressions using these controls in
the first panel of Table 4.2. The first column shows the results of OLS regressions
with country fixed effects (FE). The population growth rate does not seem to mat-
ter for medium-term growth. However, when we switch to generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimation to deal with endogeneity issues (column 2), only the
level of investment remains statistically significant. Nevertheless, we retain these
four controls in the first stage of our analysis. FE and GMM are the two basic
specifications that we will build upon in our further analysis.12
12Both specifications always include time effects to capture common factors affecting growth
across all countries in each five-year period.
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4.5.2.1 Financial depth as a threshold
In panel 2 of Table 4.2, we include a broad measure of de facto financial open-
ness. As is typical in the literature, we find that the correlation between financial
integration and growth is weak or even slightly negative. This highlights the key
discrepancy between theory and evidence on the growth effects of financial inte-
gration. Consider a simple exercise where we look at whether the correlation is
different between countries with high and low levels of financial depth (above or
below the sample median). The third panel of Table 2 shows that there is a striking
difference. When we interact the indicator for a high degree of financial depth with
the financial openness variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is strongly
positive and nearly the same in magnitude as the negative coefficient on the finan-
cial openness variable itself. In other words, the overall effect of financial open-
ness is negative for economies with comparatively low levels of financial depth and
slightly positive but insignificant for those with higher levels.13 Repeating the ex-
periment using different percentiles of the financial depth variable rather than the
median as the cutoff yields similar positive significant interaction coefficients for
cutoffs from the 15th to the 60th percentile with FE estimates and from the 30th to
the 65th percentile with GMM estimates (see Figure 4.2).
In panel 4, we allow for a linear interaction term between domestic financial
depth and financial openness. Neither the coefficient on financial openness nor the
one on the interaction term is significantly different from zero. The level of financial
depth does not seem to matter for the correlation between financial openness and
growth. Could this non-result be driven by the fact that, once a country has attained
a certain level of financial depth, further improvements don’t matter that much?
In panel 5, we allow for an additional interaction of financial openness with
the square of the financial depth variable. The coefficients on both the linear and
13The median levels of financial development that determine the high-low cutoffs are calculated
separately for each period.
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Figure 4.2: High/Low Interaction Coefficients for Gross Financial Openness
and Private Credit to GDP at Different Sample Splits
(a) Fixed effects specification (b) System GMM specification
Note: Specifications include base controls of Panel 3 of Table 4.2. Percentile cutoffs calculated for each period on the basis
of the distribution of private credit observations in that period.
quadratic interactions are now strongly significant in both the FE and GMM esti-
mates, with the first coefficient being positive and the second negative in both cases.
That is, greater financial depth leads to an improvement in the growth effects of fi-
nancial integration but only up to a certain level of financial depth.
Where is the threshold and is it an economically reasonable one? We can calcu-
late the level of the threshold, for a given level of credit to GDP, from the interaction
terms. The overall financial openness coefficient in this case takes an inverted U-
shape as the threshold variable rises. It is thus possible to calculate the cutoffs at
which its sign changes. Based on the FE estimates, the threshold level below which
the marginal effect of financial openness on growth is negative corresponds to a
credit to GDP ratio of 71 percent (−0.0825 + 0.1761 ∗ 0.71− 0.0845 ∗ 0.712 = 0).
Above this level, the coefficient is positive before turning negative for credit to GDP
above 137 percent. Based on the GMM estimates, the corresponding threshold lev-
els are credit to GDP ratios of 50 percent and 126 percent, respectively. For refer-
ence, the median levels of credit to GDP for industrial countries, EMs and ODCs are
0.71, 0.32 and 0.19, respectively (calculated across all period-country observations
for each group).
With both estimation methods, the vast majority (over 90%) of ODC obser-
vations lie below the lower threshold and have a negative financial openness co-
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efficient. For emerging and industrial economies, a much higher fraction of ob-
servations lie between the lower and upper thresholds and have a positive financial
openness coefficient: about two-fifths for emerging economies and four-fifths for in-
dustrial countries (relative to the GMM-based threshold). Thus, the threshold level
seems plausible and of practical relevance for developing countries contemplating
capital account liberalization. In the remaining discussion, we focus on the lower
threshold, which is the relevant one for developing and emerging economies.14
Since the threshold we have derived is static, it is interesting to see how different
groups of countries are doing relative to this threshold over time.15 In 1975-79, the
proportion of countries in each group above the GMM-based lower threshold (pri-
vate credit to GDP ratio of 0.50) was as follows: industrial countries—62 percent;
emerging markets—25 percent; and ODCs—2 percent. By 2000-04, the propor-
tions had increased to 100 percent, 48 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Figure
4.3 shows how the credit to GDP ratio has changed for each of the emerging market
countries from 1985-89 to 2000-04, and how these levels match up against the esti-
mated FE and GMM thresholds. For most of the emerging markets, the data points
lie above the 45-degree line, implying increases in financial depth over time by this
measure. The fraction of emerging markets above the GMM threshold rises from
25% in 1975-79 to 48% in 2000-04, while the number above the FE threshold goes
from 0% to 38%. It is worth noting that a country like China comes out looking
very good by this measure despite the weaknesses in its financial sector, which is
dominated by state-owned banks. This is a useful reminder of the potential pitfalls
14The upper threshold is an artifact of the quadratic specification. We experimented with the in-
clusion of higher order polynomials of the threshold variable (and corresponding interactions with
financial openness). The coefficients on the higher order terms were usually not statistically signifi-
cant but their magnitudes generally showed a flattening out of (rather than a decline in) the implied
marginal effect of financial openness on growth at high levels of the threshold variable. This is
another reason why we focus on the lower threshold.
15An important issue here is whether the thresholds themselves change over time. This is not
an easy question to address in an empirical framework that uses cross-country data and, therefore,
comes up against obvious data limitations. We leave this for future work and note that our exercise
here is meant only to be illustrative of the empirical content of the thresholds concept.
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of using a particular uni-dimensional measure of financial development. And of
course the worldwide crisis that first hit the U.S. and then spread to other industrial
countries has shown that financial depth is not equivalent to financial stability.
Figure 4.3: Average Private Credit to GDP Relative to Estimated Thresholds:
Emerging Market Economies, 1975-79 and 2000-04
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4.5.2.2 Robustness of financial depth threshold
We test the sensitivity of our baseline results for the financial depth threshold
in a number of ways. First, we use a different set of basic controls and redo the
regressions in Table 4.2. We retain log initial income and the education variable,
and add the following controls—trade openness, CPI inflation, and the logarithm of
the number of phone lines per capita (a proxy for the level of infrastructure). We
do not present the results here, but they were quite similar in terms of the signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients of interest. The implied upper and lower thresholds
from the FE specification with quadratic interactions are private credit to GDP ratios
of 63 percent and 148 percent, respectively (compared to 71 percent and 137 percent
based on the results in Table 4.2). For the GMM specification the results are such
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that, while the estimated overall financial openness coefficient retains an inverted
U-shape, it remains positive and does not cut the x-axis.
Second, we use an alternative measure of financial depth—the sum of private
credit and stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP. Unfortunately, given the
absence of stock markets in many of the developing countries, especially in the
early years of the sample, the sample drops to about half the original size. In the
specification with quadratic interactions, the estimated coefficients on the interac-
tion terms have the same sign as in our baseline, but they are smaller and not statis-
tically significant. Given the low levels of stock market development in ODCs and,
until recently, in emerging markets as well, this broader measure of financial depth
does not seem to be useful for constructing thresholds.
Third, we check if the results are driven by the choice of countries in our sample.
We test for robustness to the exclusion of three groups of countries (dropping one
group at a time): (i) OPEC countries (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait,
UAE and Venezuela); (ii) offshore financial centers (Ireland, Panama, Singapore);
and (iii) countries hit by the Asian financial crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand). The results with the high-low interactions and linear in-
teractions were broadly similar when we excluded these sub-samples. Table 4.3
shows that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients, as well as the implied
thresholds, are relatively stable when we drop each of these groups of countries,
suggesting that the results are not being driven by outliers or any specific group of
countries.
Fourth, we go back to the original financial depth variable but look at alternative
measures of financial openness (FO). The threshold value of private credit to GDP
is almost unchanged when we use the stock of gross external liabilities as a ratio to
GDP—rather than the sum of external assets and liabilities–as the measure of FO
(0.51 in the GMM estimates, which is almost identical to the baseline result from
Table 4.2).
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Fifth, we consider different growth time windows for the analysis to examine
how the results are sensitive to the choice of a five-year window. The usage of
five-year periods is common in the related literature since it increases the number
of observations, allowing for the usage of the GMM technique, and provides an
indication of medium-run growth determinants. However, the period cut-offs are
arbitrary, determined by the choice of the length of each period and the overall
sample size, and may catch countries at different stages of their growth and financial
integration dynamics (e.g. post- or pre-crisis).16 Due to the reduced number of
periods with longer sample lengths this sensitivity analysis focuses on the fixed
effect results. The inverted U-shape pattern of the quadratic interaction between
credit-to-GDP and gross financial openness remains with the different windows (see
Appendix Table 4.14). The upper and lower thresholds for credit-to-GDP between
which the overall financial openness coefficient is positive are of similar order of
magnitude (with the lower cut-off ranging from around 40 to 90 percent of GDP
and the upper from around 140 to 170 percent). The significance levels are however
weaker, although less so for the 10-year window. This sensitivity of results to the
specification of the growth windows is likely to be a generic issue of importance to
the wider literature using similar approaches to this Chapter.
16An alternative empirical strategy is therefore to focus on growth around an increase in financial
integration, i.e. adopt an event study approach. However, as discussed, identifying the appropriate
liberalization event is itself a difficult choice, for example due to the distinction between the various
de jure measures of financial account liberalization and their enforcement.
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4.5.3 Breaking down the nature of financial integration
The literature on financial flows makes a distinction between FDI and portfolio
equity flows, on the one hand, and debt on the other. It is generally believed that the
former types of flows generate more of the indirect benefits of financial integration
and also have fewer risks than debt. Does the composition of external liabilities (or
flows) influence the threshold level of financial depth? Here we obtain a very inter-
esting result (Table 4.4). When we measure FO as the stock of FDI plus portfolio
equity liabilities, the threshold is lower (credit to GDP ratios of 58 percent and 34
percent for the FE and GMM estimates, respectively). By contrast, when we use
debt liabilities, the threshold is much higher (credit to GDP ratios of 75 percent and
55 percent for the FE and GMM estimates, respectively). That is, the risks of finan-
cial integration seem to be lower when it takes the form of FDI or portfolio equity
liabilities. When debt liabilities constitute the primary form of financial integra-
tion, the level of financial depth necessary for financial integration to have growth
benefits is much higher. The results with flows are more mixed (Table 4.5). Using
total inflows, the signs of the interaction effects are such that the overall financial
openness coefficient has a U-shape as credit to GDP rises, the reverse of the results
with the stock measures of openness. Again, there is a dramatic difference between
the results when using FDI plus portfolio equity inflows versus debt inflows. In the
former case, the inverted U-shape of the overall financial openness coefficient re-
mains (although insignificant using GMM estimates). By contrast, the results with
debt inflows correspond to those for total inflows (as expected, given the high share
of debt to total inflows). In this case, the impact of financial openness on growth is
estimated to be positive for lower or particularly high levels of financial depth but
negative at intermediate levels. This result is consistent with models of potential
instability induced by greater capital inflows in economies at an intermediate level
of financial development (Aghion et al., 2004).
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4.6 Alternative Thresholds
Our focus has so far been on the financial depth threshold. We now examine
threshold effects based on a range of other indicators suggested by the discussion
of theoretical models in Section 4.2. We maintain the FE and GMM specifications
as our benchmarks and focus on the quadratic interaction specifications.
The first panel of Table 4.6 repeats the results for the financial depth variable.
The second panel looks at a composite measure of institutional quality (IQ). Many
authors have argued that IQ is a crucial determinant of growth and volatility, es-
pecially crises (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2003). There is indeed a clear threshold
effect that we can identify; the interactions of financial openness with the level
and squared level of the IQ variable are statistically significant. All of the indus-
trial country observations (five-year averages) exceed the estimated threshold, while
only 29 percent of emerging market observations and about 20 percent of ODC ob-
servations do. By this measure, most developing countries are below the level of IQ
at which the marginal benefits of increasing financial openness become apparent.
We also looked at some of the constituents of the composite measure of institu-
tional quality—level of corruption, cost of enforcing debt contracts etc.—but could
not identify any strong threshold effects based on these components of the IQ in-
dicator (results not shown). The level of per capita income (on an internationally
comparable basis) is often seen as a composite index that proxies for a variety of
factors that have been found to boost growth. But there is no clear threshold effect
based on this variable.
We can identify a threshold based on trade openness (the ratio of the sum of
imports and exports to GDP) but the estimated threshold is so high that few coun-
tries meet this threshold. We also experimented with a policy measure of trade
openness (results not reported here). The relevant interaction coefficients were sig-
nificant in the FE regressions but not in GMM. We also looked at thresholds based
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on a measure of structural policies—labor market flexibility—and two measures of
macro policies—inflation volatility and the ratio of government revenues to expen-
ditures. There are a number of significant interaction terms in the regressions with
these variables, but they are in general not robust, so we choose not to focus on the
implied thresholds.
To visually examine how the estimated thresholds look for a few key variables,
Figure 4.4 plots the overall (including interactions) financial openness coefficient
estimates against different values of the relevant threshold variable. Private credit
and IQ illustrate the inverted U-shaped relationship, with the standard error bands
often encompassing zero but still leaving some empirical content in this threshold
measure. When we use trade openness or the log of initial income, the threshold
effects are essentially linear in the relevant range.
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Figure 4.4: Overall Financial Openness Coefficient Against Alternative
Threshold Variables (based on GMM estimation)
 
a) Private credit to GDP as threshold variable b) Institutional quality index as threshold variable 
 
 
c) Trade openness to GDP as threshold variable d) Ln initial GDP per capita as threshold variable 
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Note: See Table 4.6 for estimation details. The lighter lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
To examine the overall estimated contribution of financial openness to the pre-
dicted level of growth, the overall financial openness coefficient estimates must be
combined with the level of financial openness. Figure 4.5 plots these overall growth
contributions over the five-year periods for the quadratic specifications using private
credit and institutional quality as the threshold variables. It also indicates the extent
of financial openness for the different observations. Given the estimating equation,
the level of gross financial openness amplifies the estimated growth contribution,
with the sign determined by the level of the threshold variable. For example, an ob-
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servation with values of credit-to-GDP and financial openness to GDP at their 90th
percentile levels (around 100 and 250 percent of GDP respectively) would give an
overall growth contribution of around 0.04. But, for those with a negative overall
financial openness coefficient, the negative contribution to growth can be of even
greater magnitude, at both the low and high ranges for private credit. Similar mag-
nitude contributions to growth are found when institutional quality is used as the
threshold variable. When considering these estimates, the size of the confidence
intervals must also be noted, along with the difficulty within cross-country growth
regressions in attributing causality given the difficulty in adequately controlling for
endogeneity.
Figure 4.5: Overall estimated contribution of gross financial openness to pre-
dicted growth over five-year periods
(a) Private credit-to-GDP as the threshold variable
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(b) Institutional quality index as the threshold variable
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Note: Size of circles proportional to level of gross financial openness to GDP. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Estimate growth contribution is equal to FOit ∗ (βFO + βFOTHTHit + βFOTHsqTH2it) . Plots based on coefficient
estimates from the GMM specifications with quadratic interaction terms (see Tables 4.2 and 4.6 for details).
The analysis in this section suggests that, at a first pass, the results for financial
and institutional development are more supportive of the presence of threshold ef-
fects. Other variables we have looked at also hint at threshold effects, particularly
for high/low interactions, although the estimates from other specifications are less
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robust and not always statistically significant.17
4.7 Results Based on Semi-parametric Approaches
We now explore the relationship between financial openness and growth using
the semi-parametric methods outlined in Section 4.4. To illustrate these methods,
we first start with a univariate nonparametric specification in the partial linear setup.
That is, we look at the potential nonlinear relationship between growth and financial
openness itself. We then examine interaction effects between financial openness and
various threshold variables.
4.7.1 Semiparametric estimation of the effects of financial open-
ness on growth
The regressions of growth against the baseline controls plus gross financial
openness to GDP indicate an insignificant negative coefficient on the latter from
both the FE and system GMM estimation (Table 4.4). However, unconditional plots
suggest that the level and shape of the relationship between financial openness and
growth vary by quintile of financial openness (Appendix Figure 4.11). To investi-
gate this in more detail, we employ the partial linear model with the gross financial
openness variable alone entering the specification nonparametrically.18
First, we run a regression to eliminate the baseline parametric effects (includ-
ing country and time fixed effects) from the growth data.19 Figure 4.6 plots growth
17We also experimented with using the IMF AREAER de jure measure of financial openness as
a threshold variable in place of the de facto measure. The coefficient on gross financial openness is
positive at higher levels of financial openness, although the coefficient is significant only in the fixed
effect estimates.
18Whilst this section focuses on the potential non-linear relationship between the stock measures
of financial openness and growth, similar considerations also apply to flow measures. Indeed the
importance of non-linearities may be even greater for the latter given the likely higher instability of
flow measures for many countries.
19Note that the baseline parametric effects exclude the indirect influence of the financial openness
on these variables.
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residuals from this regression against the gross financial openness variable. Next,
we use nonparametric methods to estimate the form of the relationship between
these two variables. Specifically, we employ the Robinson residual method, first
using local regression with two different spans (the percentage of data points in-
cluded in the local regression) and then a kernel estimator (with a triangular kernel)
as the nonparametric technique. We also use the alternative “differencing approach”
described by Yatchew (1998, 2003) and Yatchew and No (2001).20 If we demean
the growth estimates from the first-stage parametric regressions, we obtain “purged”
or demeaned growth residual values that illustrate the nonparametric relationship at
the mean of the parametric variables (Yatchew, 2003). These different relationships
are illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 4.6.
These plots illustrate a similar pattern in the results from different approaches,
with an increasing relationship between growth and financial openness at low levels
of the latter, which then turns negative and reverts to being positive at the high-
est levels of financial openness. However, the estimated relationship becomes in-
significant as financial openness rises. The plots also highlight the potential roles
of outliers on financial openness in influencing the results and the relatively large
confidence intervals attached to the point estimates. The variations in the effects
across financial openness values may contribute to the overall negative insignificant
coefficient in the standard linear parametric estimation.
We replicated the above analysis for different measures of financial openness.
As with the parametric results, there are marked differences across these measures.
For example, the stock of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities, which has a positive
but insignificant linear coefficient in the parametric setup (see Table 4.4), has a
relationship that is broadly flat at positive values of the demeaned growth residuals
20This involves the removal of the non-parametric function by taking the difference in the depen-
dent variable relative to its nearest neighbour by the similarity of linear control variables. Once the
non-parametric function has been removed the linear coefficients are estimated. The resultant fitted
values are then used to obtain residuals which can then be used to estimated the non-parametric
function, for example, by locally-weighted regression techniques.
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Figure 4.6: Gross Financial Openness and Growth Residuals
Note: The plots illustrate the relationship between five-year growth rates–once standard controls and dummy variables have
been controlled for (excluding the indirect effect of gross financial openness on these controls)–and gross financial openness.
A nonparametric relationship is then estimated and illustrated on the graph with 95% confidence intervals indicated by
vertical lines. Four alternative methods are illustrated. Three employ the Robinson double residual estimator including
local regression estimator (loess) using various spans of the observations and a kernel smoother. The final one employs
the differencing estimator described above. The lower panel looks across methods and employs “purged” or demeaned
growth residual values, i.e. when growth estimates from the first-stage parametric regressions are demeaned, to illustrate the
nonparametric relationship at the mean of the parametric variables.
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and then increases with the financial openness measure. In contrast, the relationship
of the debt measure with the demeaned growth residuals has a marked downward
slope above a certain value of debt (see the discussion of Imbs and Rancie`re, 2007,
of the external debt Laffer curve).
4.7.2 Semiparametric interactions between financial openness
and threshold variables
The double residuals approach is applied in a similar manner when looking at
interaction effects, i.e., when both financial openness and a threshold variable enter
nonparametrically. As before, we first obtain growth residuals by eliminating the
baseline parametric effects. To conduct the nonparametric smoothing, we then focus
on the local regression estimator.21
Unconditional plots of growth against financial openness reveal patterns that
vary by the level of credit to GDP (Appendix Figure 4.12). At low levels of credit
to GDP, the relationship tends to be negative, then moving towards a flat relationship
at higher levels of credit to GDP. Using the double residual approach with a local
regression span of 0.75, the estimated nonparametric relationship between growth
residuals and financial openness is illustrated in Figure 4.7.22 This figure is simi-
lar to Figure 4.6 but, rather than showing the univariate nonparametric relationship
between growth residuals and financial openness, it shows the multivariate relation-
ship of growth residuals with financial openness and the credit to GDP ratio. Thus, it
represents one nonparametric approach to illustrating the interaction between finan-
cial openness and a threshold variable in their relationship with growth residuals.
For relatively low levels of credit to GDP and low levels of financial openness, the
estimated relationship between growth and financial openness is indeed negative.
21This fits a local quadratic regression including the threshold and financial openness variables,
their squares and cross-products. Insightful Corporation (2007) has details on local regression pro-
cedures.
22The results were not greatly sensitive to alternative local regression spans.
183
Figure 4.7: Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects (Credit to GDP
as the threshold variable, interacted with gross financial openness to GDP)
Note: This plot illustrates the estimated nonparametric relationship between conditional growth once standard controls and
dummy variables have been controlled for (excluding the indirect effect of gross financial openness and credit-to-GDP on
these controls) and gross financial openness and credit-to-GDP. Growth estimates from the first-stage parametric regressions
are demeaned to obtain “purged” or demeaned growth residual values that illustrate the nonparametric relationship at the
mean of the parametric variables. The Robinson double residual estimator is employed using a local regression estimator
(loess) with a span of 0.75.
This is the range in which most country observations actually fall. The five-year
growth rate purged of the linear determinants reaches a peak of around 0.1 for mid-
ranges of financial openness and credit-to-GDP and lows of around -0.2 for low
private credit-to-GDP and high or low financial openness
An alternative way to examine this relationship is to look at how the relationship
of the demeaned growth residuals with financial openness varies with the level of the
threshold variable (and vice versa). Figure 4.8 shows such relationships and their
confidence intervals for different slices of the corresponding 3D plot. The right
panel in this figure illustrates the negative relationship between demeaned growth
residuals and financial openness at low levels of credit to GDP. The left panel shows
that the inverted U-shaped relationship between these residuals and credit-to-GDP
tends to be more prevalent at higher levels of financial openness. One point to note
concerning these plots is that the slices are taken at equally spaced splits across the
full range rather than at percentile values of the distribution of observations. Thus,
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given the skewed distribution of both credit to GDP and financial openness most
country data points lie in the bottom and left-hand side plots. Again, these plots
illustrate the wide confidence intervals around the estimated effects, which in many
cases are not significantly different from zero.
Figure 4.8: Cross-Sections of Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Ef-
fects (Credit to GDP as the threshold variable, interacted with gross financial
openness to GDP)
(a) Sliced at different values of financial openness to GDP (b) Sliced at different values of credit to GDP
Note: The six lower panels show the relationship between residual growth and financial openness in part (a) and credit to
GDP in part (b) with 95% confidence intervals indicated by the vertical lines. The six plots are taken at six equally spaced
levels of credit-to-GDP and financial openness to GDP in parts A and B, respectively. The lowest value of the given variable
is represented in the bottom left-hand panel with the level rising in subsequent panels as one moves from left to right and
then up and long the second panel. The corresponding values of the given variable at which the slices are made are indicated
by the dots in the uppermost plot across the width of the figure.
This analysis can be repeated for different measures of financial openness. As
with the parametric estimates, the results for total liabilities are similar to those
for the gross measures. There are again marked differences between the estimates
using FDI and portfolio equity liabilities versus debt liabilities. With the former, the
unconditional relationship between growth and financial openness is mostly flat or
slightly positive throughout different sub-samples based on levels of credit to GDP.
By contrast, with debt liabilities the relationship with growth is downward sloping
for half of the sub-samples with lower levels of credit to GDP.
Turning to the nonparametric model, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the fitted
nonparametric interaction effects for FDI and portfolio equity and debt liabilities
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as the financial openness variables when interacted with credit to GDP. For low to
medium levels of credit to GDP, the relationship between growth and the financial
openness measure based on FDI and portfolio equity liabilities is flat or increasing.
However, at these low levels of credit to GDP, the relationship between growth and
debt liabilities is negative. Again, when analyzing these results it is important to
note that the confidence intervals around these estimates tend to be relatively large
and that most observations lie at lower levels of financial openness and credit to
GDP.
Figure 4.9: Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects (Credit to GDP
as the threshold variable, interacted with gross FDI and portfolio equity liabili-
ties to GDP)
Note: See Figure 4.7 but with FDI and portfolio equity liabilities to GDP as the financial openness variable rather than gross
financial openness to GDP.
We now apply this methodology to a few other threshold variables.23 Uncon-
ditional growth plots illustrate that the relationship between growth and financial
openness is negative for samples with lower trade openness ratios. This effect disap-
pears once we control for other growth determinants and fixed effects in estimating
the nonparametric interaction relationship with the relationship between residual
23See Appendix Figures 4.13 and 4.14 for trade openness and Appendix Figures 4.15 and 4.16 for
institutional quality as the threshold variables.
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Figure 4.10: Double Residual Nonparametric Interaction Effects (Credit to
GDP as the threshold variable, interacted with gross external debt liabilities
to GDP)
Note: See Figure 4.7 but with external debt liabilities to GDP used as the financial openness variable.
growth and financial openness broadly flat at different levels of trade.
Turning to institutional quality, again unconditional plots indicate a negative re-
lationship between growth and financial openness at lower levels of the threshold
variable. At low levels of institutional quality, the relationship between gross finan-
cial openness and growth is U-shaped. However, at higher levels of institutional
quality the relationship becomes more linear. In line with the quadratic parametric
estimation, for a given level of financial openness, residual growth increases with
institutional quality at a decreasing rate. Once again, the interpretation of these re-
sults is subject to caveats on the size of confidence intervals and also on the actual
distribution of observations by institutional quality and financial openness.24
24The double residual estimation process is complicated in this case by the non time-varying
nature of the threshold variable. In the first stage nonparametric estimation we have been conducting
a nonparametric regression of each of the baseline controls, including country dummy variables, on
the threshold and financial openness variables. Applying this technique with institutional quality
would mean that the country dummy variables are regressed on institutional quality, which is also a
country-specific time invariant variable. This leads to a singular regressor matrix in the second stage
regression. To get around this problem, we remove fixed effects from the first stage regression. We
then estimate the second stage nonparametric interaction effects also without the country dummy
variables (although we obtain similar results if we then include them).
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4.8 Summary and Implications
Recent advances in the theoretical and empirical literatures indicate that the ben-
efits of financial integration may be far subtler than had been presumed earlier. A
new framework for analyzing financial globalization highlights the tension between
the indirect benefits of financial integration and the potential risks if a country opens
up to capital flows without the right initial conditions in place. From a practical
policy perspective, however, a reasonable evaluation of the cost-benefit trade-off
requires a better understanding of what these initial conditions are and how exactly
they matter. This is an essential component of an analytical framework that can take
account of country-specific features and initial conditions in designing a pragmatic
approach to capital account liberalization (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). In this Chapter,
we have tried to put some empirical structure on the concept of threshold conditions
in order to give policymakers guidance on this issue. For instance, our results sup-
port the widely held conjecture that FDI and portfolio equity flows are safer than
debt flows at low levels of financial and institutional development. We do not claim
to have identified definitive thresholds. Our main contribution, instead, has been to
develop an empirical structure to address this issue and frame it in a more concrete
and tractable manner. Our analysis has already generated a number of interesting
findings, which we now briefly summarize before discussing what policymakers
should make of them.
Based on different methodologies and different definitions of thresholds, we
conclude that there are threshold levels of certain variables that are important deter-
minants of the relationship between financial integration and growth. In our empir-
ical work, we have focused on a few variables motivated by the existing theoretical
literature. These include domestic financial market development (in particular, the
depth of credit markets), institutional quality, trade openness, and the overall level
of development. All of these seem to be relevant threshold variables, with varying
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degrees of importance—the most clearly-defined thresholds are based on the finan-
cial depth and institutional quality variables. We find that many of these thresh-
olds are much lower when we measure financial integration by the stocks of FDI
and portfolio equity liabilities rather than debt liabilities. The confidence intervals
around some of the estimated thresholds are large, but in many cases the estimated
coefficients yield reasonably tight estimates of the threshold conditions.
Do the thresholds have empirical content? Our results generally indicate that the
estimated thresholds are reasonable and well within the ranges of the data samples.
For instance, most industrial countries and a few emerging markets are above the
estimated threshold levels of financial depth, while a majority of emerging markets
and nearly all other developing countries are below them. This result is consistent
with observed differences in growth outcomes associated with financial integration
across these groups of countries. Of course, the recent global crisis shows that
financial depth is not a reliable measure of financial stability, which should also
take into account regulatory and supervisory structures.
Indeed, there is a rich research agenda that comes out of our work. Future the-
oretical studies in this area should focus on the precise nature of the threshold rela-
tionship and provide testable predictions in the context of reduced form solutions.
On the empirical front, our results show that focusing on individual threshold vari-
ables could lead to misleading conclusions. Some of the open questions prompted
by our analysis are as follows. Are there trade-offs among different threshold con-
ditions, such that a high level of one variable can lower the threshold on another
variable?25 If the level of financial integration itself acts as a threshold, how can it
be integrated into the framework based on other thresholds laid out in this Chap-
25We find preliminary evidence that financial depth matters less in countries that have high insti-
tutional quality levels. We also checked if a simple composite measure derived from the different
threshold variables in our analysis could serve as a composite threshold indicator. Preliminary anal-
ysis suggests that there are indeed threshold effects in the data based on this composite indicator. We
have not, however, developed a procedure to find the optimal composite indicator that captures the
complementarity and substitutability among different threshold conditions and leave that for future
work.
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ter? Have the levels of different thresholds been changing over time as virtually
all countries become more financially open in de facto terms, irrespective of their
capital control regimes? How do circumstances in global financial markets affect
the thresholds?
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4.A Appendix: Sample description
Table 4.7: Country Sample
 
Industrial Emerging economies 
(EMs) 
Other developing 
countries (ODCs) 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Egypt 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Korea, Republic of 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Cameroon 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iran 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Togo 
Trinidad &Tobago 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Note: The sample comprises 84 countries—21 industrial and 63 developing (of which 21 are emerging market economies,
EMs, and 42 are other developing countries, ODCs).
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Table 4.8: Variable Definitions and Sources
 
Variable Sources 
Growth rate of PPP real GDP per capita (log 
difference over period) 
PWT 
GDP per capita PPP, 1996 constant prices PWT 
Average investment to GDP PWT 
Average schooling years in population over 25 
years old 
Updated Barro and Lee (2000) database. Data 
available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
Average annual population growth rate (log 
difference over period divided by length) 
WDI 
Gross de facto financial openness to  GDP Stock data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
Current price US dollar GDP data from WDI. 
Stock of external liabilities to GDP As above 
Stock of external FDI and portfolio equity 
liabilities to GDP 
As above 
Stock of external debt liabilities to GDP As above 
Gross flows to GDP defined as sum of 
absolute inflows and absolute outflows 
Flow data from IMF IFS. Current price US dollar 
GDP data from WDI. 
Total financial inflows to GDP As above 
FDI plus portfolio equity inflows to GDP As above 
Debt inflows to GDP As above 
Domestic credit to private sector to GDP WDI 
Current price trade openness (exports plus 
imports) to GDP 
PWT 
Average institutional quality index Simple average of six World Bank Governance 
Indicators (data available from 1996) 
Rigidity of employment index for employing 
workers 
World Bank / International Finance Corporate 
Doing Business Database (data available from 
2003) 
Annual CPI inflation IFS 
Note: PWT: Penn World Tables (version 6.2); IFS: International Financial Statistics; WDI: World Development Indicators.
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4.C Appendix: Additional results
Table 4.14: Sensitivity of quadratic interaction results with gross financial
openness for different period windows (fixed effects specification)
(a) Interaction with private credit-to-GDP
 Length of period (years)
 5  7  8  8  9  10  
Coefficient estimates:       
FO -*** - - -* - -* 
FO*PC +*** +* + + + +** 
FO*PC squared -*** -* - - -* -** 
PC cut offs at which 0.71 0.55 0.44 0.93 0.52 0.66 
overall FO coefficient is zero: 1.37 1.55 1.68 1.52 1.52 1.53 
Memo:       
Adjusted R-squared 0.338 0.152 0.144 0.181 0.249 0.277 
Observations 456 294 294 212 212 212 
Number of countries 84 83 84 83 83 84 
Sample length 1975-2004 1977-2004 1973-2004 1981-2004 1978-2004 1975-2004 
(b) Interaction with institutional quality
 Length of period (years)
 5  7  8  8  9  10  
Coefficient estimates:       
FO -** - - -*** - - 
FO*IQ  +*** + + + + + 
FO* IQ squared -** - - - - - 
IQ index cut offs at which 0.29 0.15 0.06 1.65 0.06 0.22 
overall FO coefficient is zero: 1.85 1.79 1.99 2.70 1.78 1.78 
Memo:       
Adjusted R-squared 0.359 0.145 0.166 0.170 0.237 0.261 
Observations 457 295 295 212 212 212 
Number of countries 84 83 84 83 83 84 
Sample length 1975-2004 1977-2004 1973-2004 1981-2004 1978-2004 1975-2004 
Note: All specifications include the same base controls as Table 4.2 and period effects, which are not reported. The symbols
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 4.11: Unconditional relationship between five yearly growth and gross
financial openness by quintile of gross financial openness
Note: Bold line indicates local regression smoother.
Figure 4.12: Unconditional five yearly growth against gross financial openness
to GDP by sub-samples determined by credit to GDP
Note: Bold line indicates local regression smoother. The sub-sample with the lowest values of credit-to-GDP is represented
in the bottom left-hand panel with the level rising in subsequent panels as one moves from left to right and then up and long
the second and then the third panel. The top panel indicates the range of the different, non-overlapping sub-samples.
199
Figure 4.13: Unconditional five yearly growth against gross financial openness
to GDP by sub-samples determined by trade to GDP
Note: Bold line indicates local regression smoother. The sub-sample with the lowest values of trade-to-GDP is represented
in the bottom left-hand panel with the level rising in subsequent panels as one moves from left to right and then up and long
the second and then the third panel. The top panel indicates the range of the different, non-overlapping sub-samples.
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Figure 4.14: Double residual non-parametric interaction effects with trade to
GDP as the threshold variable and gross financial openness to GDP as the fi-
nancial openness variable
Note: As for Figure 4.7 but with trade to GDP as the threshold variable.
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Figure 4.15: Unconditional five yearly growth against gross financial openness
to GDP by sub-samples determined by institutional quality index
Note: Bold line indicates local regression smoother. The sub-sample with the lowest values of institutional quality index is
represented in the bottom left-hand panel with the level rising in subsequent panels as one moves from left to right and then up
and long the second and then the third panel. The top panel indicates the range of the different, non-overlapping sub-samples.
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Figure 4.16: Double residual non-parametric interaction effects with institu-
tional quality index as the threshold variable and gross financial openness to
GDP as the financial openness variable
Note: As for Figure 4.7 but with institutional quality as the threshold variable. Country dummy variables not included in this
estimation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This concluding chapter provides a brief recap of the main results of the pre-
ceding chapters, returning to the central questions posed in the introductory chapter
- how do financial reforms affect an economy’s allocation of production and long-
run macroeconomic performance? how does this impact of financial reforms inter-
act with that of other policy reforms or an economy’s structural characteristics? It
then considers the rich set of implications of the analysis of these three chapters for
future work.
The heterogeneous firm trade model of Chapter 2 examines the interaction be-
tween domestic financial sector and trade policy reforms. Relative to the related
literature, the value added is the ability to examine the general equilibrium steady
state comparative static effects of the two reforms within a multi-country model.
The interaction effects between trade reforms and domestic financial sector reforms
appear qualitatively important. On the one hand, trade and domestic financial sector
reforms can have complementary effects in increasing the average productivity and
size of producing entrepreneurs. On the other hand, in such a case the marginal
gains for wages and household utility as a result of trade liberalization are reduced.
If credit constraints are less restrictive then effective borrowing costs are lower, in-
termediate prices are reduced and real wages are higher. Thus, the marginal benefits
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of trade liberalization in lowering prices and increasing real wages are reduced if
much reallocative work has already been done through a well-functioning domestic
financial sector. In terms of the potential linkage between exports and credit con-
straints, improvements in the relative ability to pledge exports to creditors amplify
the benefits of trade liberalization. A further insight of the paper is that even in
financial autarky the financial development of not just the domestic economy but
also its trading partner can play a role in determining the real wages and the effi-
ciency of domestic production. In particular, domestic financial sector reforms in
one economy can be exported via the trade channel putting downward pressure on
foreign real wages.
Chapter 3 sets out a modified credit multiplier model to examine how domestic
and international financial reforms interact in causing general equilibrium reallo-
cations in production across firms and across sectors. Financial reforms lead to
changes in the investment decisions of firms as they adjust to changes in their abil-
ity to borrow against future revenues. These partial equilibrium effects result in
general equilibrium adjustments in sectoral relative prices and the domestic inter-
est rate so as to maintain equilibrium between demand and supply of investment
funds. As credit constraints are relaxed, the resultant changes in firms’ incentives
to invest depend on their productivity, leading to reallocations across firms, and on
the sector of investment, shifting incentives to reallocate production across sectors.
Through its impact on relative prices, the domestic recovery rate influences which
entrepreneurs produce and in which sectors, and determines the partitioning of equi-
libria by different production combinations. Structural characteristics also act as
conditioning factors determining the equilibrium allocation of production. There
are potential policy complementarities between financial reforms and, for exam-
ple, improvements in regulatory and legal certainty. The impact of capital account
liberalization on relative prices also depends upon the state of domestic financial re-
forms since, for example, the leverage benefits of a relaxation in international credit
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constraints will be greater at higher levels of overall domestic pledgeability.
The areas for future work stimulated by the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 can be
grouped into four main topics: how financial reforms are modeled and the focus on
steady state comparative statics; the sensitivities of the results to the model set up;
the need for further empirical investigation of the channels highlighted; the potential
political economy implications.
In both chapters, different types of financial reforms are modeled as relaxations
in the credit constraints faced by firms and the focus is on their comparative static
implications in steady state equilibria. This takes a longer-term view of financial
reforms. Future work could examine the transitional dynamics of the models which
are used in the credit multiplier literatures to highlight the propagation and am-
plification of shocks to the financial health of firms. For reasons of tractability,
the models also abstract from some of the key financial issues highlighted in the
experiences of the 2008 and 2009 global financial crisis. As with much of the
broader credit multiplier literature, this is due to a relatively simple approach to
modeling financial intermediation which abstracts, for example, from risk-taking
incentives within financial institutions, liquidity and counter-party risks, network
linkages amongst institutions and regulatory and supervisory mechanisms.
Both models provide relatively tractable approaches to general equilibrium mod-
eling of credit constraints which can vary across sectors, types of goods and types
of creditors. However, additional empirical research is required on the quantitative
significance of the interaction effects that are highlighted. In particular, as noted
by Banerjee and Duflo (2005), the question of whether there are potential gains
from adding multiple sources of inefficiency to models to explain productivity dif-
ferences across countries is dependent upon their empirical relevance. An important
next step would therefore be to see to what extent the models of both chapters can
be applied to examine sectoral reallocations in output around trade and financial
reforms.
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The third area for future work related to the theoretical chapters is to examine
how sensitive are the results to modifications of the baseline set up. For exam-
ple, both production structures could be expanded to include labor, capital and land
with the latter providing a powerful propagation and amplification mechanism, as
emphasized in the work of Kiyotaki (1998) and Aoki et al. (2009). Another interest-
ing extension is to follow the approach of Matsuyama (2007) where the productivity
in each sector varies as well as the credit multiplier. This may be intuitive since, for
example, a potentially high return sector may also be one in which it is harder for a
creditor to take over and operate efficiently in the case of default.
Finally, since both models have heterogeneous agents who are differently af-
fected by financial reforms, a natural extension is to use them to explore political
economy questions. For example, how does the choice of optimal policy settings
vary across agents? what are the implications of endogenizing policy choices? The
two economy set-up of Chapter 2 could also be used to look at how these policy
settings depend upon spillovers of trade and financial reforms across countries. Fi-
nally, the different credit multipliers across sectors in Chapter 3 could be employed
to highlight the macro impact of directed credit policies.
Turning to Chapter 4, this analysis aims to put some empirical structure on the
concept of threshold conditions which influence the relationship between interna-
tional financial integration and growth in order to give policymakers guidance on
this issue. Based on different methodologies and definitions of thresholds, the anal-
ysis finds that a range of variables, including domestic financial market development
(in particular, the depth of credit markets), institutional quality, trade openness and
the overall level of development, seem to be relevant threshold variables, with vary-
ing degrees of importance—the most clearly-defined thresholds are based on the
financial depth and institutional quality variables. Many of these thresholds ap-
pear to be much lower when financial integration is measured by the stocks of FDI
and portfolio equity liabilities rather than debt liabilities. The confidence intervals
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around some of the estimated thresholds are large, but in many cases the estimated
coefficients yield reasonably tight estimates of the threshold conditions. The results
generally indicate that the estimated thresholds are reasonable and well within the
ranges of the data samples.
The experience of the financial crisis provides a rich vein of follow-up work
to this empirical analysis. The sample period examined in Chapter 4 excludes the
largest global downturn since the Great Depression. Repeating this work includ-
ing the experience of the past few years would likely provide new and interesting
results. In addition, the experience of the crisis shows that financial depth is not a re-
liable measure of financial stability, which should also take into account regulatory
and supervisory structures. Some of the other open empirical questions prompted
by this analysis are as follows. Are there trade-offs among different threshold con-
ditions, such that a high level of one variable can lower the threshold on another
variable? If the level of financial integration itself acts as a threshold, how can it be
integrated into the framework based on other thresholds laid out in this paper? Have
the levels of different thresholds been changing over time as virtually all countries
become more financially open in de facto terms, irrespective of their capital control
regimes? How do circumstances in global financial markets affect the thresholds?
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